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FRONTISPiECE 


‘ ^ / 

REAR-ADMIRALS SCHLEY 
SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


A Review of the Naval Campaign of i8g8, in Pursuit 
and Destruction of the Spanish Fleet 
Commanded hy Rear-Admiral 
Pascual Cervera 


By 

JAMES PARKER 

u 

Formerly Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy 

With Portraits 



f 


) ^ 

5 . » 


New York and Washington 

THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY 

1910. 



s 


Copyright, 1910, by 
The Neale Publishing Company 



(g'Ci.A256iSkJ 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

Preface — A Biographical Sketch of the Author . . 9 

Chapter 

I. Preliminary 14 

II. Causes of the War with Spain . . . . 15 

III. The Destruction of the United States 

Battleship “Maine’^ 17 

IV. Events Preliminary to the Declaration of 

War 19 

V. The “Flying Squadron” is formed . . .21 

VI. Commodore Winfield Scott Schley is Placed 

in Command of “The Flying Squadron” 25 

VII. The Naval War Board ...... 28 

VIII. Sampson Assigned to Command with Rank 

as Rear Admiral 31 

IX. Commodore Winfield Scott Schley . . 36 

X. Schley in an Assault on a Korean Fort . 38 

XI. The Greel}^ Relief Expedition of 1884 • 4^ 

XII. Record of Sampson’s Services in Civil War 46 

XIII. Sampson’s Appointment Without Warrant 

of Law, and Contrary Thereto ... 48 

XIV. Sampson’s First Day as Rear Admiral, 

Commander-in-Chief 52 

XV. What the Flagship New York did while 
Absent from the Fleet — Alteration of 

her Log-book 57 

XVI. The Search for Cervera’s Fleet ... 60 

XVII. The Flying Squadron and Sampson arrive 

at Key West 65 

XVIII. The Flying Squadron sails for Cienfuegos 

— Sailing Orders 69 

XIX. Schley meets M’Calla’s Division . . .71 

XX. The Alleged delay in the Voyage of the 
Flying Squadron from Key West to 

• Cienfuegos 74 

XXL The Blockade of Cienfuegos by the Flying 

Squadron 76 

XXII. The Signals at Cienfuegos not made known 

to Schley 78 

XXIII. Despatches Received by Schley at Cien- 
fuegos 85 

XXIV. Despach No. 7 88 


6 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Chapter 


Page 


XXV. 

XXVI. 

XXVII. 

XXVIII. 

XXIX. 

XXX. 

XXXI. 

XXXII. 

XXXIII. 

XXXIV. 

XXXV. 

XXXVI. 

XXXVII. 

XXXVIII. 

XXXIX. 

XL. 

XLI. 

XLII. 

XLIII. 

XLIV. 

XLV. 

XLVI. 


XLVII. 

XLVIII. 

XLIX. 

L. 

LI. 


The Remarkable Elusiveness from Pub- 
licity of Despatch No. 7 93 

The Nominations of Schley and Sampson 


for Promotion 95 

The Blockade of Cienfuegos Continued . 100 
The Character of Schley’s Blockade of 
Cienfuegos 109 


The Voyage of the Flying Squadron from 

Cienfuegos to Santiago 1 1 1 

The Events of May 26, 27, and 28 . • 115 

The Conference between Schley and 

Sigsbee 118 

The Coaling Problem 123 

The Events of May 26, 27, and 28 . .126 

The Return to Santiago de Cuba . . .132 

Schley Discovers Cervera’s Fleet in Harbor 

of Santiago 135 

Schley’s Plan of Battle and Blockade of 

Santiago de Cuba 139 

Sampson’s Unofficial Statement About 

Schley’s Blockade 143 

The Reconnaissance of May 31, 1898 . 148 

Admiral Sampson Arrives at Santiago de 
Cuba and Assumes Command . . .153 

The Sinking of Colliers in the Entrance to 

Santiago Bay 158 

The Sinking of the Merrimac . . .161 

Sampson’s Order of Blockade . . . .168 

Events During the Month of June . 172 

The Occupation of Guantanamo . . .174 

The Bravery of Lieutenant Victor Blue, 

United States Navy 176 

The Morning of July 3, 1898, Sampson, 
in his Flagship l^ew York leaves Block- 
ade for Siboney at 8.50 179 

The Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898 . .182 

Almiral Schley’s Story of the Battle . .184 

The Tragic Death of Yeoman George H. 

Ellis * . . 192 

The Colon hauls down her Flag . . . 196 

The Brooklyn is Sent to Fight a New Foe 
While Admiral Sampson remains be- 
hind 198 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


7 


Chapter Page 

LIE Schley meets Admiral Cervera — No Cheers 

Allowed 202 

LIII. Captain Francis A. Cook’s Story of the 

Battle . . . ' 204 

LIV. Captain Clark’s Story of the Battle . . 207 

LV. Lieutenant Commander Hodgson’s Story of 

the Battle 212 

LVL Schley’s and Sampson’s Announcements of 

the Victory 217 

LVIL Schley’s Preliminary Report of the Battle 220 

LVIII. The Notes of the Battle Taken on Board 

the Vixen 224 

LIX. Rear Admiral Sampson’s Report of the 

Battle 239 

LX. The Loop (so-called) made by the Brook- 
lyn 244 

LXI. The Loop (continued) — Its Propriety 
Illustrated in the Battle Between United 
States Frigate United States and the 
British Frigate Macedonian . . . • 251 

LXII. The Alleged Danger of Collision Between 

the Brooklyn and Texas 260 

LXHL The Personal Conduct of Commodore 

Schley during the Battle .... 268 
LXIV. Under Whose Command was the Battle 

of Santiago Fought and Won? . . . 273 

Admiral Dewey and Captain Clark say 


“Schley,” 285 

LXV. The Part in the Battle Taken by the Flag- 
ship New York 286 

LXVI. Was the Battle of Santiago a Captain’s 

Fight? 289 

LXVII. Paul Jones and the Battle of the Liman . 294 

LXVIII. Schley’s Generosity towards Sampson . . 297 

LXIX. Sampson’s Conduct towards Schley . 300 

LXX. The Navigators’ Chart of the Battle . . 303 


LXXI. The Alleged Controversy with Lieutenant 

Hodgson during the Battle .... 306 

LXXII. The Court of Inquiry 317 

LXXIII. Why did Schley ask for a Court of In- 
quiry? 324 

LXXIV. Conclusion — A Contrast 327 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Captain James Parker Frontispiece 

Facing Page 

Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley 25 

Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson 31 

Diagram I 57 

‘‘It has not been possible to procure a fac- 
simile copy, but the appearance of that part of 
the log-book of the New York for that day is, 
as nearly as possible, as shown by Diagram I.” 

Diagram II 133 

“The chart shows the whole movement of the 
Flying Squadron during these three days. 

May 26, 27 and 28.^’ 

Diagram III 168 

“Accompanying this Order of Blockade was 


a diagram showing the position each vessel 
was expected to maintain.” 

Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera 182 

Diagram IV 187 

“He replied that it was either ‘a-port,’ or 
‘hard-a-port* ; I think he said ‘hard-a-port.’ ” 

Diagram V 251 

“The plan of the battle, as given by Captain 
Mahan, is here reproduced.” 


PREFACE 


A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE 

AUTHOR 

The feeling displayed by the Navy Department of 
the United States; between the officers of the navy, 
and throughout the country, that resulted from the 
events of the naval campaign of 1898 in the West 
Indies, in the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish 
fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, 
would seem to justify a review of those events; and 
some reference to the career and experience of the 
author hereof may not be without interest in de- 
termining his fitness to undertake such review. 

I was born in the town of Newark, Licking County, 
Ohio, of New Jersey parentage and lineage, in the 
year 1832; was appointed midshipman in the navy 
of the United States November 14, 1846, and sent 
to the then newly established “Naval School,” as it 
was then called, at Annapolis, Md., for a few months. 
It is proper here to state that when the Hon. George 
Bancroft, then Secretary of the Navy, established 
that institution the intention was that when a lad 
was appointed midshipman his first two years of ser- 
vice were to be passed there; he was then to be sent 
to sea for a three years’ cruise; then brought back 
to the Naval School for one year; and at the end of 
the year be examined by a board of captains of the 
navy, and, if passed, be warranted as passed mid- 
shipman. 

The Mexican War broke out in May, 1846, and 
a great need of young officers having developed, I 
was soon ordered away for service on board ship. 


lO 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


and on March 26, 1847, sailed from Norfolk, Vir- 
ginia, for Vera Cruz, on board the sloop-of-war 
SaratogUy under command of the late Admiral David 
G. Farragut, then a commander in rank. It was his 
first command. 

Farragut hoped to get to Vera Cruz before the 
capture of the castle of San Juan d’Ulloa, and on 
the way down the crew of the ship were assiduously 
practiced in all sorts of apparently useless drills, such 
as boarding from yard-arms, dropping hand grenades 
upon the decks of imaginary ships, etc. It was long 
years afterwards that we learned that his plan and 
purpose were to dress the ship up as an old merchant- 
man, run the blockade into the harbor, tie up along- 
side the castle, and “board” from our yard-arms and 
attempt to capture it; but his plan was frustrated by 
the fact that the castle surrendered the very day the 
ship sailed from Norfolk. 

Although there were no naval enemies to fight, yet 
almost as soon as we arrived the dreaded “Yellow 
Jack” broke out and continued its ravages until De- 
cember. We had 105 cases, and 26 deaths, out of 
a complement of 159 officers and men. This was a 
lesson of patient performance of duty in the face of 
death that has not been without its effect upon my 
subsequent life. 

After the usual midshipman's experience of five 
years, two of which were on the coast of Africa, 
where I suffered shipwreck, I again came to the 
Naval School — which had meanwhile been recog- 
nized by Congress and dignified by the title of 
“Academy.” After a year’s study and preparation, 
in June, 1852, I was graduated as passed midship- 
man, second of a class of which the late Rear- 
Admirals Lewis A. Kimberly, Bancroft Gherardi, 
Daniel L. Braine, Lieutenant George U. Morris, 
who fought the Cumberland against the Merrimac; 
Captain Kidder R. Breese, who was Rear Admiral 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA ii 

David G. Porter’s fleet captain during nearly the 
whole of that distinguished officer’s Civil War ser- 
vice; Lieutenant John G. Sproston, the first regular 
officer of the navy to give his life in the Union cause, 
and others of like character were members. 

I then served as passed midshipman for nearly 
three years on the Mediterranean Station, on board 
the U. S. sloop-of-war St, Louis, under command of 
Commander Duncan N. Ingraham; and was an of- 
ficer of that vessel when Ingraham rescued Martin 
Kozta (one of Kossuth’s patriotic band of revolu- 
tionists) from the Austrian brig-of-war Huzzar, 
whose officers had kidnaped him from shore at 
Smyrna in 1853. 

That incident has long been practically forgotten, 
but it then set the world of diplomacy on fire, and 
established the principle that one who comes to the 
United States, renounces allegiance to the ruler of 
the land of his birth, and, under our naturalization 
laws declares his intention to become a citizen of the 
United States, becomes, ipso facto, entitled to, and 
will receive, the protection of our flag and power. 

In September, 1855, I was promoted to be lieuten- 
ant, but having in the meanwhile become engaged to 
be married, in November, 1856, I resigned my com- 
mission. Having read law in Cincinnati, in the office 
of Hon. Salmon P. Chase, ^ I graduated LL. B. from 
the Cincinnati Law School.^ 

I was admitted to the bar of Ohio April 14, 1857, 
and on June 3 married my Virginia sweetheart (Miss 
Kate McLean, of Norfolk). I practiced law until 
the Civil War broke out. 

On April 13, 1861 (though at that time an ardent 

^Then Governor of Ohio, subsequently Secretary of the Treas- 
ury under President Lincoln, and later Chief Justice of the Su- 
preme Court of the United States. 

^President William H. Taft was graduated from and for several 
years was dean of that school. 


12 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Democrat), I volunteered to resume my former place 
in the navy, to aid in the maintenance of the Union, 
and was the first officer who had formerly resigned 
from the regular navy to be reappointed (on May 
8th, i86i). I was subsequently reinstated, and 
commissioned Lieutenant-commander (July 22, 
1862), In my former place on the regular navy list. 

I served through the Civil War with credit and 
some distinction; was the executive officer of the 
frigate Minnesota} in the five days’ bombardment of 
Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and the senior officer 
in the naval assault on that fortress January 15, 
1865, concerning which assault Rear Admiral Porter, 
in his report, said: “Nowhere in the annals 

of war have officers and sailors undertaken so desper- 
ate a service. The work, as I said before. Is really 
stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied so 
long the combined power of France and England. 
The courage of these officers deserves the highest 
reward.” And Rear Admiral Porter recommended 
the author and five others (viz: Lieutenant Com- 

manders K. R. Breese, Charles H. Cushman, and 
Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., and Lieutenants George 
M. Bache and Roswell H. Lamson) for promotion 
for personal gallantry displayed in that deadly assault. 

When hostilities were entirely over I again resigned 
my commission and retired to private life. Had I 
remained In the navy I would now be a rear admiral 
on the Retired List. 

I am a counsellor-at-law of the Supreme Court of 
the United States and of the highest courts of Ohio, 
New Jersey, and New York. 

As one of the counsel for Rear Admiral Schley 
before the Court of Inquiry held In 1903, I had every 
opportunity to acquire full and accurate knowledge 
of all the facts and reports of the campaign. 

While it will be evident to the reader of this review 
that my professional, legal, -naval, and personal judg- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


13 


ments are favorable to Admiral Schley, I yet trust to 
be believed when I say that I would not willingly do 
the slightest injustice to any other officer, because I 
regard them generally as still my professional breth- 
ren. 

% 

This book has been written without any consulta- 
tion with Rear Admiral Schley, who has never seen 
a line of it, and does not know that is has been written ; 
and it is proper to say that Schley’s book, ‘‘Forty-five 
Years under the Flag,” was also written by him 
without consultation with the writer of this book, 
who never saw a line of it until after this book was 
entirely written. 

For all facts stated in this review proof is given. 
Opinions based on, and inferences drawn from, those 
facts are, of course, my own. 

The author feels confident that a careful reading 
of this review will dispel all misunderstanding of that 
campaign, a misunderstanding which has pertina- 
ciously been promulgated in the effort to convey false 
impressions in respect to the principal actors in it. 

JAMES PARKER. 


Perth Amboy, New Jersey, 
September i, 1907. 


CHAPTER I 

PRELIMINARY. 

The Admiral of the Navy, George Dewey, well says, 
in his Introduction to the book “James Lawrence,” 
which he most fitly styles “the admirable work of 
Lieutenant Commander Albert Cleaves, U. S. N” : 

“It is by the close and careful weighing of the 
causes which produced the wonderful results of our 
sea battles of the past, that we equip ourselves for the 
warfare of the future.” 

The complete success and far-reaching results of 
the United States naval campaign of 1898, in the 
pursuit and destruction of the Spanish fleet com- 
manded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, are with- 
out a parallel in the naval histories of the world; and 
are fruitful of lessons for the future, of warning 
against the mistakes and errors of judgment, depart- 
mental or Individual, that may have occurred, and 
of example that may serve as Inspiration and guide 
to the navy that Is to carry on the record of excellence ; 
and of brave deeds well and effectively done, in the 
past, under and for the flag and honor of our country. 


CHAPTER II 


CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

It is common to attribute that war to a particular 
cause; but the truth is that the sentiment which 
brought it about had been growing for centuries; 
certainly since the days when the Spanish Armada 
was sent against England In Queen Elizabeth’s time. 

There is no doubt that there has been transmitted 
to us from our English ancestry a feeling of contempt 
for what English-speaking sailors from that day to 
this have called the ‘‘Dagoes”; and that the Span- 
iard has always been regarded by English-speaking 
peoples as a pompous, exaggerated, rapacious, blood- 
thlrtsy and tyrannical type of man. The record of 
the crimes of Spain against the peoples of Holland, 
Peru, Chili, Mexico, and the Philippines is a black 
one, truthfully told in the pages of Prescott and other 
historians, and Is well known and Indubitable. 

It may well be doubted If any other nation (not 
of Spanish blood or teaching, and professing to be 
Christian and civilized) can be truthfully charged 
with such a deliberate murder of defenseless prisoners 
as that of Captain Joseph Fry and his fellow-martyrs 
at Santiago de Cuba In 1874; and It Is the highest 
retributive justice that the power of Spain on this 
hemisphere should have been brought to an end there 
by Fry’s countrymen; and that the last of Spain’s 
naval vessels In American waters — the Cristobal 
Colon, named after him who by his discoveries gave 
to Spain her first power over the people of the An- 
tilles — lies a submerged wreck at the mouth of the 
Rio Tarquino, near which Fry and his ill-fated com- 
panions were captured and taken to their murder at 
Santiago de Cuba. 


i6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Another remarkable coincidence is that the Infanta 
Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera’s flagship (which 
was the only vessel of his fleet saved from the beach 
after the Battle of Santiago), was, while on her way 
to the United States, driven ashore by a violent gale 
at nearly the exact spot where Columbus landed In 
1492 and planted the standard of Spain; and lies 
there a wreck. 

Since we became a nation every effort that has 
been made by Spain’s colonies In America to throw 
off her tyrannical yoke has had the earnest and active 
sympathy of the people of the United States. Our 
adventurous young men have freely risked their lives 
In that behalf. Numerous “filibustering expeditions,” 
so called, have gone from our shores to aid, with arms 
and men, the Cubans In their efforts for independence; 
and from the walls of all the military prisons in the 
“ever faithful Isle” — as the Spaniards persisted, not- 
withstanding, In calling Cuba — thousands of bullets 
can be dug, ghastly proofs of the fate of those pa- 
triots or their associates who unsuccessfully had at- 
tempted to overthrow 'the Spanish domination. All 
such efforts, and they were many, came to defeat until 
the United States government and people took an 
active part In the movement In the year 1898. 

“It was in the air,” at the b^innlng of that year, 
that war between the United ^ates and Spain was 
imminent; and it needed only an incident to make 
that war a reality. 


CHAPTER III 


THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLE- 
SHIP ''maine^" 

That incident came when our battle-ship Maine ^ 
while lying peacefully moored to a buoy where she 
had been placed by Spanish pilots, in what was then 
the friendly harbor of Havana, was on February 17, 
1898, blown up. By this disaster 270 of her officers 
and men were hurled, unexpectedly and instantly, to 
death. 

No more dastardly act was ever perpetrated. 
Those who did it waited until most of the victims 
were asleep for the night — when, of course, they had 
least chance of escape. 

The whole world stood amazed, and our entire 
nation, though blazing with indignation, waited until 
a most patient and careful investigation could be 
had. A naval court of inquiry, of which Captain 
William T. Sampson was president, made it certain 
that a submarine mine or other instrumentality had 
been exploded under the ship; but how so exploded 
has never yet been discovered. There are some sig- 
nificant facts, however, that demonstrate but too 
clearly that, while privity on the part of the Spanish 
authorities in the atrocity has not been shown, those 
authorities must have known whether the Maine was 
located over or in dangerous proximity to such instru- 
mentality, because they knew exactly where every such 
— if there were such in that harbor — was located; 
and they have never given up that knowledge to us. 

If such mine was located near that buoy to which 
the Maine was moored, it seems evident that it must 
have been done for the purpose of exploding it under 


i8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 

a friendly vessel, because none others were ever 
moored there; and the Maine was so moored by 
direction of the Spanish port officers. 

The explosion must have been caused by someone 
entirely familiar with the location of the mine, be- 
cause it could have been effectively exploded only 
when the Maine was directly over It, as the winds and 
tides would change her position in respect to it. It 
must therefore have been exploded by some Spanish 
official who had the means of determining with pre- 
cision when she was over It; and who had access to 
the batteries by which alone the explosion could be 
effected. 

The Spanish authorities could easily have located 
all who had such knowledge and access; and this they 
have never done, so far as we know. 

Admiral Dewey, in the Introduction to Cleaves’ 
book before referred to, says: “Out of the accounts 
of great battles, by sea and land, we seize as watch-: 
words the phrases of the commanders.” 

Thus the words “Remember the Maine (like 
those other words, “Remember the Alamo!”; Law- 
rence’s dying cry, “Don’t give up the ship!”; Farra- 
gut’s, “Damn the torpedoes, go ahead!”; and Dew- 
ey’s quiet command, “You may fire when you’re 
ready, Gridley,” which sounded the death-knell of 
Spain’s dominion over the Philippines) became an 
Inspiration to the country at large, and the navy in 
particular. 


CHAPTER IV 


EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR 

Events moved very rapidly in the early part of 
1898. Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard com- 
manded the North Atlantic Station at the time the 
Maine was destroyed, and on March i, 1898, ap- 
pointed a court of inquiry to be held on board the 
steamer Mangrove, at Havana. The members of the 
court were Captain William T. Sampson, president; 
Captain French E. Chadwick, and Lieutenant Com- 
mander William P. Potter, members; and Lieuten- 
ant Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate. 

After a most thorough investigation the court re- 
ported that, in its judgment, the ship had been blown 
up from without; but did not, except by inference, 
implicate the Spanish authorities; and that it was 
“unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for 
the destruction of the Maine upon any person or per- 
sons.” 

On March 5, by recommendation of President Mc- 
Kinley, Congress voted fifty millions of dollars then 
lying idle in the Treasury, to be used by the President, 
in his discretion, for national defense. This great 
mark of confidence and purpose was displayed with- 
out distinction of party, and almost unanimously. 

Warlike preparations immediately began, and 
were continued with zeal. New vessels then building 
in England were purchased, examinations of vessels 
suitable for auxiliary purposes were made in our va- 
rious ports, and warlike spirit and activity everywhere 
prevailed. 

On March 17 Senator Proctor, of Vermont, who 
had been an officer of distinction in the Civil War, 
had been Secretary of War, and had just returned 
from an inspection of the “reconcentrado camps” in 
the island of Cuba, made an address in the Senate of 


20 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


the United States that created a profound impression, 
not only In the United States, but abroad. His de- 
scriptions of the horrors he had seen in those camps, 
of the slowly starving old men, women, and little 
children, (whose only fault was that they were sus- 
pected of being in sympathy with their husbands, 
fathers, brothers, or sons who were in the patriot 
army of Cuba,) declared in clarion tones to the 
country and the world, that to relieve the suffering 
people of that Island from the cruel domination of 
Spain was not only a national, but a moral, duty on 
our part. It removed all lingering doubts. 

Two names will go down to history In a common 
infamy: The Austrian Field Marshal Haynau, 

whose atrocious treatment of the Hungarian and 
Austrian patriots of 1848-9 aroused the Indignation 
of the world; and the Spaniard, Captain-General 
Weyler, by whose orders the atrocities that Senator 
Protor described were committed. 

The President’s call for volunteers for army and 
naval service was responded to by a vast multitude of 
men. North and South, East and West, vied with 
each other in display of patriotic zeal. Veterans of 
the Blue and veterans of the Gray stepped out with 
their sons and grandsons, in patriotic emulation, to 
march and suffer and, if necessary, to die under the 
Old Flag, when and wherever they might be called 
upon to go. 

Into the navy, as parts of the naval militia, went 
the yachtsmen that owned and ran expensive yachts, 
who left their business to become enlisted men and, 
with dainty hands that had never known labor. In- 
dulge in the pleasant tasks of coaling ships and 
scrubbing decks. 

There was only one rivalry — who should do and 
dare and suffer most in the great good cause and duty 
of the hour, and for the honor and glory of the 
United States and the Stars and Stripes. 


CHAPTER V 


THE ‘‘flying squadron” IS FORMED 

To form the squadron that will go down to history 
as “The Flying Squadron” several ships were taken 
out of the North Atlantic fleet and sent to rendezvous 
at Hampton Roads. These were the armored cruiser 
Brooklyn (Captain Francis A. Cook) ; battleships 
Texas (Captain John W. Philip; Massachusetts 
(Captain Francis J. HIgginson) ; and armored 
cruisers Minneapolis (Captain F. M. Wise) ; and 
Columbia (Captain James H. Sands). The last two 
were soon sent to the New England coasts, and some 
smaller vessels and a collier {Sterling) were sent to 
Hampton Roads in their stead. 

On March 24 Rear Admiral Sicard broke down 
under the strain of his greatly increased official labors 
and anxieties and was relieved from his command. 

Sicard was a distinguished officer who had served 
faithfully and with distinction during the Civil War. 
In command of the gunboat Seneca he took part in 
the battles of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and vol- 
untarily — for he was under no obligation of duty to 
do so — headed the officers and men from his vessel 
in the naval assault on that fort, January 15, 1865, 
where he behaved with much gallantry. He had 
served as chief of bureau in the Navy Department, 
had commanded the monitor Miantonomoh in the 
North Atlantic fleet when it was under command of 
Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce, and succeeded that 
able officer in command of that fleet. 

His detachment left Captain William T. Samp- 
son the senior officer of that station; and on March 
27 Captain Sampson published an order in which he 
announced: “By order of the Honorable Secretary 


22 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


of the Navy I have assumed command of the United 
States naval force on the North Atlantic Station; and 
hoisted my pennant on board the armored cruiser New 
York, at 3.30 P. M. this day.” And then after an- 
nouncing his staff as follows : Chief of staff, Captain 
French E. Chadwick (who was also the captain of 
the flagship New York) ; assistant chief of staff, Lieu- 
tenant Sydney A. Staunton; flag lieutenant, Charles 

C. Marsh; secretary ensign, E. L. Bennett; he signed 
himself, “William T. Sampson, Captain, Commander- 
in-Chief, U, S, Naval Force, North Atlantic Station 

The above named continued to be his staff during 
the Spanish War. Up to this time Sampson had been 
the captain of the battle-ship Iowa, Captain Robley 

D. Evans was on March 28 ordered to the command 
of that ship, and thus became next in rank to Samp- 
son. In the opinion of the author that appointment 
of Evans was a most significant move; for, that 
Sampson was a frail man and therefore liable to break 
down at any moment was a fact that was not unknown 
(certainly should not have been) to the officials of 
the Navy Department; and If he did break down, 
Evans, as senior captain, would have become Samp- 
son’s successor, just as Sampson did when Sicard 
broke down. It would never have done to detach 
Sampson and put Evans In his place — the whole navy 
would have cried out in condemnation of that; but 
If Evans could succeed to the command In the way 
Indicated the scheme might have gone through with 
much less comment. 

If this was the scheme, one very important individ- 
ual was “left out of the count.” That was Captain 
Chadwick, chief of staff, who apparently made up 
his mind that Sampson should not break down. 

Evans, who bears the sobriquet of “Fighting 
Bob,” has always been a lucky character, “reaping 
where he had not sown, and gathering where he had 
not strewn;” but his luck seems to have failed him 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 23 


in this matter. Where he got his sobriquet of 
“Fighting Bob’’ neither he (as he says) nor anyone 
knows. He was an acting ensign in the Fort Fisher 
assault, but although he was painfully wounded in the 
legs, none of the official reports mentioned him for 
bravery; and in fact he was not conspicuous. 

Several months after the assault I learned that 
he had been placed on the retired list because of 
his wounds, and, for the purpose of remedying the in- 
justice of retiring a young officer because he had been 
wounded in battle, I wrote the letter praising him 
which Evans quotes on page 108 of his book, “A 
Sailor’s Log.” If I had known what effect the letter 
was later to have, it would not have been so strongly 
worded. 

When in 1866 selections were made to fill up the 
increase in the grades authorized by Congress in that 
year, Evans was advanced thirty-four numbers — 
over the heads of the present rear admirals. Glass, 
Sands, Sigsbee, and many others who had a much 
better fighting and professional record than he. 
When those over whom he had been promoted com- 
plained of injustice, a naval board of distinguished 
officers, of which the late vice admiral Stephen C. 
Rowan was president, reported that his advancement, 
to the extent to which it had been made, was an in- 
justice to those over whom he had been promoted, 
and that an advance of ten numbers was all that 
Evans’ conduct merited. A second board of rear 
admirals recommended that Sands, Glass, and Sigsbee 
should be restored to their places above him. Not- 
withstanding that Sands had stooped over Evans, at 
his request, and bound up his wounds under the 
furious fire at Fort Fisher, and had then gone further 
into the fight and had been mentioned in the reports 
for gallantry displayed, yet Evans in Congress had the 
bills defeated that were introduced to effectuate the 
recommendation of the boards of admirals. 


24 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


He was a good “Fighting Bob” to prevent justice 
being done to his brother officers. 

After the battle of Fort Fisher Evans had no op- 
portunity for fighting (except with his tongue) until 
the Spanish War occurred. 

The foregoing incidents of his history are given 
because he, in his “Sailor’s Log,” “points with pride” 
to my praise of him in that letter from which he 
quotes, and it is but just that the whole truth about 
the matter should be told. 


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FACING 25 





CHAPTER VI 


COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY IS PLACED IN 
COMMAND OF '^THE FLYING SQUADRON 

Commodore Winfield Scott Schley had been 
promoted to that rank in regular order, on February 
6, 1898. On March 28 he was assigned to the 
command of the Flying Squadron, and hoisted his 
broad pennant on board the Brooklyn on that day. 
It was a high compliment, and it may be presumed 
that it would not have been paid him but for the con- 
viction that he was the man to fill the part which that 
squadron was expected to play. As its name implies, 
it was intended that the squadron should be in con- 
tinual readiness to fly to meet the Spanish ships should 
they appear on our coasts. On April 6 the Navy De- 
partment, in a confidential circular to Captain Samp- 
son, commanding, etc., said: ‘‘Should the department 
learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Porto Rico, 
it is possible that the Flying Squadron may be sent 
thither; in which case some of your vessels may bd 
needed to reinforce that squadronF^ Therefore at 
that date it seems to have been intended to take away 
from Sampson a part of the vessels of his command 
to add to Schley’s command.' Schley in command of 
the augmented Flying Squadron was then to find and 
fight the Spanish fleet, which was the important duty 
of the war, while to Sampson was left the perform- 
ance of the other duties pertaining to his position as 
“captain commanding the North Atlantic Station,” 
such as blockading the Cuban ports, etc. 

Commodore Schley’s statement of his doings as 
soon as he assumed command, made to the Court of 


^ Italics are mine. — J. P. 


26 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 



He said: ‘‘During the time that we lay at Hamp- 
ton Roads the squadron was organized. Its com- 
manding officers were brought together, and the gen- 
eral plan of campaign was thrashed out. I put the 
squadron on a war basis, established the matter of 
pickets and patrols, and also the masking of lights. 
During the time we were there I explained to the com- 
manding officers that as It would be Impossible to 
construct a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen 
contingencies, the general plan of the squadron would 
be to cruise In line of battle ; and Its general principle 
would be to attack the head of the leading vessels, 
concentrating fire upon them. In order, first, to obtain 
the moral effect; and, second, to throw them Into 
confusion, making victory over them very much more 
successful and complete. 

“I did this for the reason that the older plans had 
all been to attack center and rear, resulting In the 
escape, usually, of a part of each squadron. I thought 
that the attack on the head of a squadron, which was, 
to some extent, new, would Involve the destruction 
of the whole, and this was to be the general plan of 
action as explained on that occasion. 

“These preliminaries arranged, target practice 
was taken up with sub-callber guns. It resulted In an 
accuracy of fire which, I think, was fully demon- 
strated In the action that occurred some months later. 

“There was a good deal of restlessness, naturally, 
among the squadron at being held from what they 
thought was the scene of action; which was, happily, 
relieved when orders were received from the Secre- 
tary of the Navy to proceed off Charleston, where 
orders would await us.” 

Schley’s “Squadron General Order No. 9,” which 
was Issued at Hampton Roads April 22, 1898, elab- 
orately provides directions for the efficiency of the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 27 


squadron in minute particulars. It will be found in 
full in the Record of the Court of Inquiry, 1 .^ 1216, 
and it is commended to those who are not, and wish 
to be, informed as to the commodore’s preparedness 
for emergencies. 

In thus discussing with his captains the general 
plans to be pursued in attacking and otherwise dealing 
with the enemy, should he be met, Schley was but fol- 
lowing the plan Nelson had pursued in that memor- 
able chase after the French fleet after its escape from 
Toulon, culminating in its destruction in the Battle 
of the Nile. 

Concerning this, Fitchett (an English writer of 
merit) says : “Throughout that memorable cruise, 
whenever the weather permitted he (Nelson) sum- 
moned his captains on board the flagship, where he 
would fully develop to them his own ideas of the dif- 
ferent and best modes of attack, and such plans as he 
proposed to execute upon falling in with the enemy.” 


^ Report of Court of Inquiry. 


CHAPTER VII 


THE NAVAL WAR BOARD 

An anomalous body with this pretentious title sprang, 
like Minerva from the brain of Jove, Into existence 
at the outbreak of the war with Spain; but who was 
Jove, and how he came to give being to such a Min- 
erva, has not yet been explained. 

“History repeats itself.” So long a time had 
elapsed that It had been forgotten how, during the 
Civil War, the efforts of our generals in the field had 
been rendered abortive by Interference from Wash- 
ington, whose “Organizers of Victory” and “Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War” had come to be 
more dangerous to our armies than all the foes that 
confronted them. 

There was no such body In the Navy Department 
before the war with Spain. It was organized 
May 21, 1898, which, fortunately for the coun- 
try, was day after Dewey had destroyed or 
captured all naval enemies in the Philippines; 
and was composed of Rear Admiral SIcard, presi- 
dent (who had recovered from his disability to 
command the North Atlantic fleet, and was now 
able to command it and its new commander. 
Commodore Dewey and his fleet, Schley and the Fly- 
ing Squadron, and Clark and the Oregon^ as well) ; 
Captain A. S. Barker, and Captain A. S. Crownln- 
shleld (titular rear admiral). Chief of the Bureau 
of Navigation, which bureau controlled the whole 
personnel of the navy. 

Captain Alfred T. Mahan was then In Europe, 
under summons to join the board. The nation waited 
with bated breath while he was returning (It has been 
said, under an assumed name and in disguise) to 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 29 


I 

make sure that in spite of Spanish spies, assassins, or 
other evil agencies he might safely reach his expect- 
ant country, and be able to shed the light of his great 
strategic wisdom and undoubted professional skill and 
ability on the naval conduct of the war; and breathed 
with assured confidence of success when, on May 9, 
he arrived safely in Washington and took his seat 
as an additional member of the board. Never since 
Mr. Lincoln flitted through Maryland disguised in 
Scotch cap and long cloak has so important a journey 
been accomplished. 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt was 
for a time a member of the board; but on May 7 
(probably attracted more by the “Rough Rider” 
scheme, or perhaps unequal to the mysterious charac- 
ter of the board’s methods) he “severed his connec- 
tion” with it. 

A great air of mystery as to the proceedings of the 
board at once pervaded the department. Its sessions 
were held in the topmost attic, so that “far from the 
madd’ing crowd’s ignoble strife” its meditations 
could not easily be disturbed. No one could get near 
it without special permission from the Bureau of 
Navigation. The elevator men, who seemed to be 
very dubious as to the exact location of the board, 
scanned with suspicious eye everyone who mentioned 
it and asked to be let out at its floor, and a double 
line of messengers or guardians carefully scrutinized 
any individual, as well as his credentials, who desired 
admission . . . one of the guardians then disap- 
peared into the room, and, if so directed, ushered the 
visitor into “the presence.” 

A friend who once got into the board room, said 
that he found Admiral Sicard writing a private letter; 
Barker with his feet on the table reading a news- 
paper, while Mahan’s polished crown looked as if 
it was struggling to keep him from giving forth a 
new book on the “Influence of Sea Power,” which 


30 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


the strategy about to be developed by the board was 
soon to exert through the navy of the United States. 
Cold indifference pervaded the room; but it was all 
assumed, for henceforth naval strategy ruled the 
hour. 

Luckily Dewey had taken the precaution to cut the 
cable from Manila that might otherwise have con- 
nected him with the board, and so his operations 
could not be interfered with, and from start to finish 
were conducted without error. He had used his own 
method of learning the whereabout of the Spanish 
fleet in those waters, and he made no mistakes from 
the time he left Hong Kong, through the episode with 
von Diederichs, the German admiral, down to the 
time of his departure tor the United States, to be 
received by his admiring countrymen in a manner 
which would have caused the splendors of the Ro- 
man triumphs to pale into insignificance. In one re- 
spect Dewey had a great advantage over Schley and 
Sampson. Before leaving Mirs Bay for Manila he 
waited until he knew where the Spanish fleet would be 
found, and was never troubled by any of the uncer- 
tainties which the Navy Department (inspired as the 
Secretai^y of the Navy undoubtedly was by the wis- 
dom and strategic insight and foresight of the Naval 
Board) succeeded in enveloping Schley and Sampson 
with respect to the whereabouts of Cervera. 

It was a great body, that War Board, and, whether 
correctly or not, felt itself big with the fate of our 
naval operations. 

Captain Clark, upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro, 
on his wonderful voyage in the Oregon^ no sooner 
came in communication with the board than he felt 
himself impelled to voice his opinion of it by his 
famous despatch: ‘‘Don’t hamper me with instruc- 

tions. I am not afraid, with this ship, of the whole 
Spanish fleet.” 











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FACING 31 


CHAPTER VIII 


SAMPSON ASSIGNED TO COMMAND, WITH RANK OF 

REAR ADMIRAL 

Sampson continued In command of the North At- 
lantic Station as captain until, at midnight of April 
21, 1898, he received from the Secretary of the Navy 
a telegram in the following words, viz : 

“Washington, April 21, 1898. 
“Sampson, Key West, Fla. 

“You are assigned to command of the United 
States naval force on the North Atlantic Station, with 
the rank of rear admiral. Hoist the flag of rear ad- 
miral immediately. 

“Long.^' 

This he did on the morning of the 2 2d. 

No more remarkable act has ever occurred In the 
navy of the United States than this. It was plainly 
contrary to all naval precedent and rule, and it Is 
quite easy to show that it was not only without war- 
rant of custom or law, or of the Constitution of the 
United States, but zvas also against one positive pro- 
hibition of statute law, and. contrary to the Constitu- 
tion, 

The only attempt at justification that the depart- 
ment has ever made is found in the statememnt made 
by Mr. Long, In his letter addressed confidentially to 
the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. p. 6.)^ that “Sampson had 
been second in command of that fleet, been with it in 
its evolutions and practice during the previous year, 
and was familiar with Its workings.” 

If that was a good reason, then it may be said that 


^Senate Executive Document, 1899. 


32 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce (to whom the eyes 
of many officers of the navy turned when Sicard gave 
up) had commanded that fleet for more than two 
years; and Schley had been his “chief of staff” (the 
same position Sampson held under Sicard), and both 
were more “familiar with its workings” than Samp- 
son. The fact that Bunce was to retire on Christmas 
Day of that year need not have stood in the way of 
his assignment to command, because a law authorized 
the President to assign any officer on the Retired List 
to active duty. And when that Retired List is 
looked over the names of the following officers, avail- 
able and fully competent to discharge such duties, 
could be found: 

Jouett, the most conspicuous figure of the battle of 
Mobile Bay, next to Farragut. 

Glorious old Kimberly, the executive officer of the 
Hartford, the hero of nearly all Farragut’s battles, 
and whose conduct in the Samoan hurricane won for 
him the praise of the civilized world. 

Walker, one of the most accomplished of our offi- 
cers, conspicuous as a fighter on the Mississippi River 
during the many months of almost daily battle during 
the Civil War; who had been Chief of the Bureau 
of Navigation for eight years; had commanded the 
“White Squadron” for three years with great ability 
and success; and since his retirement for age had 
been president of the Inter-oceanic Canal Commis- 
sion. 

Self ridge (just retired for age) , than whom no bet- 
ter officer ever trod a deck, who had served with great 
credit and ability and conspicuous bravery during the 
Civil War, and was one of the lieutenants of the 
Cumberland when she was sunk by the Merrimac, 
standing to his guns until the water covered them as 
she sank. Lieutenant George U. Morris, who was 
in command of the ship, said of him: “He did all 
that a noble and gallant officer could do.” He was, 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 33 


immediately after the sinking of the Cumberland, or- 
dered to the command of the victorious Monitor; 
but held the command only a short time, because of 
his junior rank. He had commanded one of Porter’s 
Mississippi fleet, in the Vicksburg campaign, took 
part in the Fort Fisher battles, both afloat and in the 
naval assault, and was one of the six officers before 
mentioned who were recommended by Admiral Por- 
ter for promotion for conspicuous gallantry displayed 
on the last occasion. Up to his retirement (only six 
weeks before) he had commanded the European 
Squadron. 

There were Belknap, who had been the executive 
officer of the New Ironsides off Charleston in many 
fights with the formidable batteries by which that 
stronghold had been defended; had commanded a 
double-turreted monitor with great efficiency in the 
Fort Fisher battles; and Phythian, who was the exec- 
utive officer of the New' Ironsides in the same battles, 
both accomplished and distinguished fighters of the 
Civil War. 

Also Howell, Watson, Remey, and Schley, whose 
records will be referred to hereinafter. 

The Secretary of the Navy In his confidential letter 
to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. i) said that ‘‘when Com- 
modore Schley was given command of the Flying 
Squadron he was informed verbally that If his com- 
mand and that of Sampson came together the latter 
would command the whole.” 

The Secretary is probably in error as to this, be- 
cause, as has already been shown Sampson was still 
only a captain ; and it was at that time contemplated 
that Sampson’s fleet should be further depleted by 
sending more of his vessels to Schley’s command. 
And it Is most highly improbable that the Secretary 
would say to a commodore that he was to be put 
under command of a captain, for, as every naval 

3 


34 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


officer knows, if at any time the commodore had come 
into the presence of a captain, the commodore would 
have commanded and the latter obeyed his orders. 

The Secretary has also stated that when Schley 
was Informed as stated above, he “expressed ready 
acquiescence in the proposed arrangement.” It will 
be remembered that Schley assumed command of the 
Flying Squadron on March 28, and Sampson’s ap- 
pointment as a rear admiral was April 21, three weeks 
later. 

It is not improbable that if the commodore had 
been so informed, after Sampson had been appointed 
rear admiral, he would have acquiesced, as in fact he 
afterwards did; because apparently the only hope 
any of the Sampson’s illustrious seniors seems to have 
had left to him of being permitted to serve his coun- 
try afloat in the West Indies in the war with Spain 
was based upon his willingness to waive his rank and 
“acquiesce in the arrangement made” to put his 
junior over him. 

Four commodores, viz., John A. Howell, George 
C. Remey, John Crittenden Watson, and Winfield 
Scott Schley — all of whom had served with much 
greater distinction, ability, and experience in the Civil 
War, and afterwards, than had Sampson — were 
given the opportunity to serve under their junior, or 
not at all. They were all men of unblemished per- 
sonal character, and of distinguished professional 
ability and standing. 

Howell had served faithfully and almost continu- 
ously on the blockade; took part in the Battle of 
Mobile Bay, as the executive officer of the Ossippee, 
and was highly commended by his captain (the late 
Rear Admiral William E. Lexoy) for efficient per- 
formance of duty in that great contest. He was re- 
called from command of the European Squadron at 
the beginning of the Spanish War, having relieved 
Selfridge, on the latter’s retirement. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 35 


Remey was in many fights with Confederate bat- 
teries at Charleston, S. C. ; was taken prisoner in the 
gallant naval attempt to recapture Fort Sumter, Sep- 
tember 8, 1863, and suffered a long and harassing 
Imprisonment. 

Watson had stood by Farragut’s side as his flag 
lieutenant in nearly all of the great admiral’s battles 
and many minor engagements, constituting an almost 
continuous fight for many months on the Mississippi 
River ; and had been wounded by an exploding shell. 

In Farragut’s report of the battle of Mobile Bay 
(wherein the best and most formidable forts, com- 
manded by officers who were the most skillful of our 
countrymen, were fought, torpedoes run, and iron- 
clads encountered and rammed by wooden ships) the 
great admiral said: ‘‘My flag lieutenant, J. Critten- 
den Watson, has been brought to your notice in 
former despatches. During the action he was on the 
poop, attending to the signals, and performed his 
duties, as might have been expected, thoroughly. He 
Is a scion worthy the stock from which he sprang, and 
I commend him to your attention.” 

This from Farragut, who notoriously was not 
prodigal with compliments to his subordinates, was 
high praise. 

Hardly had the sound of the Battle of Santiago 
ceased, when the Department placed Watson in com- 
mand of the “Eastern Squadron,” to be sent to the 
coast of Spain to encounter and finish up what Dewey 
and Schley had left of the Spanish navy; which, 
under Admiral Camara, was steaming aimlessly about 
In the Mediterranean or Red Sea. When Dewey 
gave up his command at Manila, Watson was sent to 
take and fill his place, which for about two years he 
very ably did. Watson was succeeded in turn by 
Remey, whose conduct of our naval operations In the 
trving situations and complications of the Chinese 
(Boxer) War contributed so much to give us our 
leading position among the allies there. 


CHAPTER IX 


COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY 

Commodore Winfield S. Schley comes of eminent 
Maryland stock. His family has furnished great 
lawyers, a Governor of Georgia, and many men dis- 
tinguished in every walk of life. His maternal grand- 
father was captain of the crack military company of 
riflemen that Maryland contributed to the defense of 
the State in the War of 1812-15, ranking then as the 
Fifth Maryland Regiment does at the present time. 

That is the State which produced both the poet 
and the occasion that called forth our anthem, “The 
Star Spangled Banner,” which to-day brings all 
Americans who hear it to their feet with bared heads, 
almost realizing for them Webster’s description as 
applied to England’s drum-beat: “Whose morning 
reveille, following the sun, circles the whole earth 
with one continuous and melodious strain of the 
martial airs of England.” And who can tell what 
patriotic impulses they may have stirred in that old 
ancestor’s heart, to be transmitted from him to the 
grandson ? 

Winfield S. Schley was born October 9, 1839, near 
the city of Frederick, Md., where the family had 
lived for several generations, honorable, and honored 
by all their contemporaries. He was appointed mid- 
shipman and sent to the United States Naval Acad- 
emy at Annapolis in September, 1856, and was grad- 
uated thence in June, i860. 

When the Civil War broke out he was serving 
abroad in the frigate NiagarUy and when she ar- 
rived in the United States he promptly continued his 
allegiance to the Union, in which course he had the 
approval and support of his family. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 37 


During the war he faithfully and zealously per- 
formed all his duties. As early as May 12, 1861, 
when Schley was not yet twenty-two years of age, so 
highly was he regarded by his captain (McKean) 
that the latter appointed him prize-master of a ship 
that the Niagara had captured. A few months later 
he behaved with gallantry in the attack upon and 
capture of a vessel attempting to run the blockade 
at Mobile, and was highly commended for such gal- 
lantry by Commander Francis Winslow. He was in 
many of the engagements on the Mississippi River, 
part of the time in command of U. S. S. Monongehela 
(a command far above his rank as lieutenant), in the 
almost daily fights which preceded and resulted in the 
fall of Port Hudson; and during the whole struggle 
he merited and received the commendation of his 
superior officers, notably of Admiral Farragut. Dur- 
ing the whole Civil War he, continuously afloat, cred- 
itably performed all his duties during that conflict. 


\ 


CHAPTER X 

SCHLEY IN AN ASSAULT ON A KOREAN FORT 

In June, 1871, Schley took part in an assault upon a 
fort in Korea, one of the most dangerous and desper- 
ate ever made by officers and men, sailors and marines 
of any navy. He was the second person to scale the 
parapet and enter the fort. Lieutenant W. W. McKee 
being first by a few feet. McKee was mortally 
wounded, and the Korean who struck him down 
sprang with the same spear upon Schley, and made a 
thrust at him that ran between his arm and left side, 
pinning his coat sleeve to his coat, whereupon Schley 
shot him dead. 

The late Rear Admiral Lewis A. Kimberly, then 
a commander, commanded the whole of the forces 
engaged, and of Schley’s conduct on that occasion 
Kimberley’s report says : 

“The gallant and brave McKee, the first to enter 
over the parapet, fell mortally wounded with two 
wounds. He has since died, and the navy has lost 
one of its bravest and noblest sons. Lieutenant Com- 
mander W. S. Schley was the next officer in the fort, 
and killed the Korean who wounded McKee. 

“To Lieutenant Commander Schley belongs the 
credit of organizing the expedition and carrying out 
the several details which went far to prevent confu- 
sion and induce success. His arrangements of the 
boats, his superintendence of the various labors on 
shore, in destroying the guns and forts, encouraging 
the men, and setting them a brave example in being 
second in the fort at its storming, and being in po- 
sition to render assistance where most needed, render 
praise unnecessary. The facts of his labors, judg- 
ment, and system speak for themselves.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 39 


Kimberly evidently did not think It any part of 
his duty to withhold from his subordinate the praise 
and commendation that were the due of that sub- 
ordinate. 

Of that assault Schley (signing himself ‘‘Acting 
Adjutant General”) In his report said: 

“The assault was made through a deep ravine, full 
eighty feet deep, with 350 sailors and marines. The 
approach was without any covering, and the fire of 
the enemy most terrific and severe. Nothing could 
withstand the men. The Impetuosity of the charge 
was met by b’*ave men In the fort, who contested Inch 
by Inch, and fought hand to hand. 

“The honor of gaining the first foothold Inside 
fell to Lieutenant McKee, who was at once charged 
by the enemy. But a moment had elapsed until I 
gained the Inside, and went to his aid In his desperate 
fight with the enemy. In a moment he fell, mortally 
wounded by a musket ball In the groin and a spear 
stab In the side. 

“The same brave one who had wounded McKee 
rushed upon me, but the spear passed between my 
left arm and the body; and before he could with- 
draw It he was shot dead and fell lifeless at my feet.” 

Schley does not say who shot him. That’s his 
usual way of telling of his own exploits. 

He adds : “I should not do proper justice If I failed 
to mention those men (sailors) whom I recognized 
as the first to gain the Inside of the fort.” He then 
mentions several of them by name, and continues: 
“The officers of the whole battalion behaved with 
great gallantry and decision. It would require a bet- 
ter pen to praise properly, or do justice to their dash 
and courage.” 

Rear Admiral John Rodgers, the commander-In- 
chlef of the Asiatic Squadron, who was himself one 
of the most gallant and efficient and distinguished 
commanders of the Civil War, — who commanded 


40 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


the Galena in the battle with Drewry’s Bluff, on the 
James River (or Fort Darling, as we called it), — 
said in his report of the assault on the Korean fort: 
“The fighting inside the fort was desperate; the cour- 
age of the Koreans was unyielding; they expected 
no quarter; and probably would have given none; 
they fought to the death ; and only when the last man 
fell did the conflict cease. It gives me the greatest 
satisfaction to say that our officers and men defeated 
a determined enemy in a desperate fight, with a pa- 
tience and courage most admirable. A victory was 
won of which the navy may well feel proud.’’ 

Such praise and commendation from John Rod- 
gers mean more than that of most other officers, for 
no man ever displayed more courage in the most 
dangerous and trying circumstances than he, and he 
was a good judge of that characteristic which we call 
bravery. 


CHAPTER XI 


THE GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION OF 1 884 

ScHLEY^s next important service was rendered as 
commander of what Is known as “The Greely Relief 
Expedition of 1884.’’ 

In that service all the characteristics of the fully 
equipped naval officer were required — ability for or- 
ganization; judgment in selection of ships, officers, 
and men ; skill, self-reliance, and ability in execution. 
Schley displayed in the highest degree the qualifica- 
tions necesary in fitting out, and accomplishing with 
complete success and remarkable promptness, the ob- 
ject of the expedition, which was to seek and rescue 
Lieutenant Greely and his surviving men lost in the 
Arctic regions. 

Two previous expeditions had failed to accom- 
plish that purpose. 

The full nature and extent of the responsibilities 
imposed upon Schley were lucidly set forth in the fol- 
lowing letter from the Honorable Secretary of the 
Navy: 

“Navy Department, Washington, 

February 18, 1884. 

“Sir. — Having been selected for the command of 
the Greely Relief Expedition of 1884, will make 
Immediate and full preparations for the performance 
of your duties. You will Investigate the circum- 
stances of Lieutenant Greely’s voyage to Lady Frank- 
lin Sound, in 1881; and of the attempts to relieve 
him in 1882 and 1883; incidentally familiarizing 
yourself with the whole subject of Arctic exploring 
and relief expeditions. 


42 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


‘‘You will examine the Thetis and Bear^ and all 
other ships which may be designed for the expedition, 
and co-operate with the chiefs of bureaus in strength- 
ening and equipping them; giving particular atten- 
tion to all the special articles of outfit necessary in 
Arctic voyaging, including boats, sledges, dogs, 
houses, clothing, navigation instruments, and the 
whole material of the expedition. 

“You will also consider and assist in the selection 
of the subordinate officers and enlistment of the 
crews; and on all points indicated, and concerning 
any steps which might be taken to give success to the 
expedition, you will from time to time make to the 
Department all suggestions and recommendations 
which may occur to you as useful or important. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. E. Chandler, 
^^Secretary of the Navy. 

“Commander W. S. Schley, 

“Washington.” 

By the above letter Schley was clothed with full 
responsibility for the fitting out and conduct of the 
expedition. That responsibility was fully met. In 
about two months and a half the expedition was 
ready, and the first ship sailed May i, 1884. 

In his final letter, dated April 21, the Secretary of 
the Navy said: “No detailed instructions will be 

given to you. Full confidence is felt that you have 
both the capacity and courage, guided by discretion, 
necessary to do all that can be required of you, by 
Department or the nation, for the rescue of our im- 
periled countrymen.” 

That “full confidence” was not misplaced; but was 
entirely warranted by results. Fifty-three days after 
the expedition sailed from New York Lieutenant 
Greely and the survivors of his party were found and 
rescued. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 43 


The Secretary of the Navy, when he received 
Schley’s despatch from St. John’s, Newfoundland, 
announcing the successful result of the expedition, 
replied In words that found an echo in all hearts: 

“Commander W. S. Schley: 

“Receive my congratulations and thanks for your 
prudence, perseverance, and courage In reaching our 
dead and dying countrymen. The hearts of the 
American people go out with great affection to Lieu- 
tenant Greely and the few survivors of his deadly 
peril. Care for them unremittingly, and bid them be 
cheerful and hopeful on account of what life has yet 
in store for them. Preserve tenderly the heroic dead; 
prepare them according to your judgment, and bring 
them home. 

“W. E. Chandler, 

Secretary of the NavyJ^ 

The living and dead were “tenderly cared for, and 
brought back home,” the ships arriving at Ports- 
mouth, N. H., August 2, 1884, where they were re- 
ceived by the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by Rear 
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the ships of which were 
dressed out as for a joyful holiday; and with three 
cheers for Schley’s ships, they passed to their an- 
chorage. 

On the 4th, through the streets of Portsmouth, 
there was a grand parade of the naval brigade from 
Luce’s fleet. A public reception of Schley and his 
officers and men, by the citizens of Portsmouth, fol- 
lowed, and the whole world resounded with justly 
earned praise of Schley, his officers, and men. That 
a new and brilliant page of our naval history had 
been written by him and them was a feeling universal 
in our country. 

Congratulations and commendations poured In 
upon him from representative bodies and distin- 


44 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


guished citizens throughout the land. The legisla- 
ture of Maryland, by a joint resolution of thanks, 
and the present of a gold chronometer-watch, marked 
its appreciation of her son. 

In his official report Schley gives unstinted praise 
to all his subordinates, saying in a general order that 
was read to the assembled officers and men of each 
ship : 

“Greely’s relief was made possible. First, by the 
promptest activity and unwearied energy of the Hon- 
orable Secretary of the Navy and Honorable Secre- 
tary of War. Secondly, by the unceasing vigilance 
and readiness of officers and men; their alacrity in re- 
sponding to orders; their cheerfulness at all times, 
day or night, in the performance of their duties, 
which demanded promptness, endurance, and cour- 
age. My confidence grew daily, in noting that the 
spirit of those who fitted this expedition had been 
caught up by the officers and men who were to use it 
to accomplish its purpose.” 

There is not a word in that order or report of 
claim of credit for himself. He had not learned, ap- 
parently, how to exalt himself by disparaging, belit- 
tling or ignoring the efforts of those under him, or 
by magnifying his own. 

Rear Admiral George W. Melville, who had been 
a most conspicuous figure in the ill-fated Jeanette ex- 
pedition, as chief engineer of that vessel under Lieu- 
tenant George W. De Long, and was also Schley’s 
chief engineer of his flagship Thetis, said to the 
writer, concerning Schley’s vigilance and work in the 
expedition: “How the man found time for his meals 
and sleep was a marvel to me, for it seemed to me 
that every time I looked at that crow’s nest he was 
in it.” 

Inasmuch as the laws gave no promotion for such 
services, the President of the United States (Mr. 
Arthur), as a mark of his appreciation and approval. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 45 


personally tendered to Commander Schley the ap- 
pointment of Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and 
Recruiting of the Navy Department, a position that 
had generally been given only to captains in rank. 

Schley served in this capacity for four years, intro- 
ducing many reforms and improvements in those de- 
partments of the service. He did much to perfect the 
apprentice system, then in its infancy, also in estab- 
lishing in the navy the principle that promotion for 
merit to the highest rank should be open to anyone 
who deserves and is fitted for it, as it was and is in 
the army. It certainly is anomalous that (as in the 
case of Lieutenant General Chaffee) one in the army 
can attain the highest rank, even though enlisted as 
a drummer boy or private, while in the navy one who 
does not come in through the Naval Academy can- 
not hope for any such advance, no matter how high 
his merit or attainments or distinguished his conduct. 

Schley’s next most conspicuous conduct was when, 
in command of the cruiser Baltimore, he carried to 
Sweden the body of John Ericsson, the great in- 
ventor, to be buried in his native land. This duty 
was performed with the approbation of the people of 
both countries. In the ceremonies and receptions 
tendered to him and the officers and men of his ship 
by the Swedish authorities and people, he exhibited 
a facility of speech, and readiness and felicity of 
manner, that made his visit memorable to all who took 
part in those ceremonies. 


CHAPTER XII 


RECORD OF SAMPSON^S SERVICES 

WiLLLiAM T. Sampson- entered the Naval Academy 
as midshipman in September, 1857, and was gradu- 
ated first of his class in June, 1861. 

During the Civil War nearly all of his service was 
performed at the Naval Academy, then located at 
Newport, R. I. Probably he chafed under his de- 
tention at that warlike spot, and would gladly have 
been sent, sooner than he was, to the seat of war at 
the front, where there were greater dangers to be en- 
countered than the fire of the eyes of the young ladies 
who congregated in that charming New England re- 
sort. 

But it was not until October, 1864, that he was 
sent to the front, as executive officer of the monitor 
Patapsco, on board of which vessel he served until 
January 15, 1865, on the night of which day she 
was sunk by an enemy’s torpedo while on picket duty 
in Charleston harbor, when his commanding officer 
commended him for ‘‘coolness and intrepidity.” In 
that great struggle this was all the mention that was 
made of him that I have been able to find by a dili- 
gent search through the twenty-odd volumes of re- 
ports which the Navy Department has published. 

Subsequent to the war he had been chief of the 
Bureau of Ordnance in the Navy Department for 
eight years. He was undoubtedly among the leaders 
in that branch of professional knowledge, but that 
did not necessarily make him an officer to be chosen 
over all the commodores and rear admirals of the 
navy for the important position that subsequently was 
assigned to him. 

The foregoing records of fighting and other ser- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 47 


vices have been given to show that all those commo- 
dores and other officers named were at least the 
equals, personally and professionally, of Sampson. 
And their services and experiences as fighters were 
all vastly superior to his, because they had had better 
opportunities than he. 

As a matter of fact Sampson had never been in any 
fight whatever, and he died without any such expe- 
rience, except “firing a few shells at one of the Span- 
ish torpedo boats at Santiago de Cuba,” and at San 
Juan, Porto Rico. 

The best illustration of the impropriety of the 
action of the department in placing him over his 
seniors will be found in the mere statement of the 
fact that if George Dewey had not, fortunately for 
himself and the country, been already in command of 
the Asiatic Squadron he would in all probability have 
had the same opportunity given him that his brother 
commodores had, of “expressing ready acquiescence 
in the arrangement made.” 


CHAPTER XIII 


Sampson's appointment without warrant of 

LAW, AND CONTRARY THERETO 

The Secretary of the Navy in his letter to the 
Senate of the United States (Ex. Doc. D. 6.) refers 
to the selection of Sampson as being in the “exercise 
of discretion in the assignment of officers, which is 
authorized by law”; but he failed to cite the law 
which gives such authority. 

It is quite correct to say that the department has 
a discretion to choose, for the performance of par- 
ticular duties, from among its officers of the requisite 
rank, those deemed best fitted for such performance. 
It might have selected any of the rear admirals or 
commodores of the navy to command the North At- 
lantic Station; and while there might have been dif- 
ference of opinion as to the wisdom of the particular 
choice, there could have been none as to the right 
of choice. Having made such choice, the department, 
with entire propriety, might have detailed those four 
commodores to service under the officer of its selec- 
tion, even though not lineally outranked by the new 
appointee. 

As has been already said, it is quite easy to show 
that the appointment of Captain Sampson to be rear 
admiral and commander-in-chief of the North At- 
lantic Station was not only without warrant of law or 
the Constitution of the United States, but was also 
a violation of one positive prohibition of law, and 
against the provisions of the Constitution. 

Prior to December 21, 1861, the highest rank in 
the navy of the United States had been that of cap- 
tain. A captain might be assigned to duty as com- 
mander-in-chief of a squadron, and while so com- 
manding was — by courtesy only — styled “commo- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 49 


dore,” and hoisted a commodore’s broad pennant; 
but it gave him no command over his seniors on the 
list of captains. If any chance brought into his com- 
pany one of those seniors — in command of a single 
ship even — down would come his broad pennant, and 
he obeyed for the time being that senior’s orders. 

On December 21, 1861, Congress enacted: Sec. 
1454, Revised Statutes: “The President may select 
any officer not below the rank of commander on the 
Active List of the Navy and assign him to the com- 
mand of a squadron with the rank and title of flag 
offleeTj^ etc. 

Under this section many officers were assigned to 
command squadrons with that rank and title; and 
this continued to be the case until July 16, 1862, when 
Congress enacted “An act for the reorganization of 
the navy,” which for the first time established the 
grades of admiral, vice admiral, rear admiral, and 
commodore. These were all flag officers. 

While the Act of December 21, 1861, was not, in 
terms, repealed by the Act of July 22, 1862, there is 
no court in the land that would not apply to it the 
maxim of Lord Coke: Leges posteriores priores 

contrarias ahrogantJ^ 

No “flag officer” was ever appointed after the pas- 
sage of the Act of July 22, 1862. During the rest 
of the war acting rear admirals were appointed, and 
the practice was continued for a time subsequent. It 
had been given up later, because of its illegality, and 
when Dewey and Howell were assigned to command 
of their respective squadrons it was in their lineal 
rank as commodores. Dewey was only a commodore 
when he fought the Battle of Manila. 

It cannot be claimed with any show of propriety 
that anyone could be assigned to command as rear 
admiral under an act which authorized only the title 
of “flag officer.” 


4 


50 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Sampson was not assigned with the title of “flag 
officer” or “acting rear admiral,” but as rear admiral; 
and he never signed his name as acting rear admiral. 

Sec. 1366 of the Rev. Stat. (which was part of 
the Act of July 22, 1862) is as follows: 

^'‘During war^ rear admirals shall be selected from 
those officers on the Active List not below the grade of 
commander who shall have eminently distinguished 
themselves for courage, skill, and genius in their pro- 
fession; but no officer shall be promoted tinder this 
provision unless^ upon recommendation of the Presi- 
dent by name, he has received the thanks of Congress 
for distinguished serviceP^ 

No language could be clearer; and that section is 
conclusive against the legality of Sampson’s appoint- 
ment, because : 

First, He had not “eminently distinguished himself 
by courage, skill, and genius in his profession.” 
Second, He had not “been recommended to Con- 
gress by the President by name,” for its thanks; and. 
Third, He had not “received the thanks of Con- 
gress for distinguished service,” or any service. 

It is undoubtedly true that the President has un- 
restricted power, under the Constitution, to “nom- 
inate” all officers; but he cannot “appoint” any offi- 
cer without “the advice and consent of the Senate.” 
Sampson was not nominated to the Senate; and its 
advice and consent to his appointment were never 
asked for or given, as required by Art. II, Sec. 2, 
par. 2 of the Constitution of the United States. 

The ad interim (so-called) clause does not help 
the matter out, because that applies only to “vacancies 
that may happen during the recess of the Senate.” 
There was no vacancy in the list of rear admirals, 
and the Senate was in session, when the appointment 
was made. 


^ The italics are, of course, mine. — J. P. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 51 


It Is a further fact that war had not been declared 
(although it was subsequently, on the 25th, declared 
as of the 21st). And Sec. 1366 provides that “dur- 
ing peace, vacancies in the grade of rear admiral shall 
be filled by regular promotion from the list of com- 
modores, subject to examination according to law.” 
So that by that section, Sampson, being only a cap- 
tain, was not eligible for promotion to the grade of 
rear admiral. 

This matter has been dwelt on at such length, not 
from any desire to disparage Sampson, who, through 
no effort of his own, was placed In that position by the 
Navy Department, to the exclusion of many of his 
seniors (notably the four commodores above named) 
who had “distinguished themselves by courage, skill, 
and genius in their profession”; but because his pro- 
motion was a fundamental wrong that was sure to 
revenge Itself, as it did, by results. 

If attention shall thereby be called to the considera- 
tion that the fundamental rules of naval subordina- 
tion, precedence, and command cannot be violated 
with impunity, or without evil consequences, the 
author’s purposes will have been accomplished. 

Having been placed in such humiliating position, 
it is greatly to the credit of those four commodores 
who have been named that they preferred to serve 
their country, under the flag that had “braved for 
many years the battle and the breeze” over them, 
even while they felt the humiliation of the situation, 
rather than to stand for their own right and dignity 
under the well established rules of the navy; and 
thus deprive the country of their services. They 
should be honored for preferring performance of 
duty to any considerations of self or official pride; 
and there has been no pretense they did not as loyally 
support Sampson as they would have done had he 
been their lineal superior officer. 


CHAPTER XIV 


SAMPSON^S FIRST DAY AS REAR ADMIRAL, COM- 
MANDER-IN-CHIEF 

The same despatch boat that brought to Captain 
Sampson his assignment to command as rear admiral 
brought him also the following telegraphic order: 

‘‘Navy Department, April 21, 1898. 
“Sampson, Key West: 

“Blockade immediately coast of Cuba from Car- . 
denas to Bahia Honda. Blockade Cienfuegos, if it 
is considered desirable. Issue a proclamation of 
blockade, covering blockaded ports. Do not bom- 
bard, according to my letter of April 6. 

“Long.^^ 

Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, at page 410 of 
his book, “A Sailor’s Log,” describes the meeting of 
the captains that was held in the cabin of the flagship 
New York, at which these telegrams were read; and 
most fitly states the feeling that was inspired in them 
all by the situation : “Then, with serious and thought- 
ful faces, we said ‘Good-night’ to the admiral and 
each other, and returned to our ships.” 

It was an occasion for serious thoughtfulness. 

In obedience to the last order the fleet with great 
promptness sailed next morning (22d) at 6.30 A. M. 
for the coast of Cuba, shaping course for Havana. 

At the hour for hoisting colors, Sampson broke 
out his rear admiral’s flag at the mast-head of his 
flagship New York; and with the inspiring strains 
of the “Star Spangled Banner” sounding over the 
sparkling waves of the Gulf Stream, and the roaring 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 53 


of the guns in salute to his flag, he began the first day 
of the war with Spain. 

The situation was most remarkable and anomalous. 
Here was a captain in the navy of the United States, 
lifted over the heads of all the distinguished veterans 
of the Civil War, rear admirals and commodores 
put in command of the finest fleet that ever flew 
the flag of our country, and sailing at the head of 
that fleet under orders from the President to inaugur- 
ate war with Spain. 

One would think that he would have been so im- 
pressed by the importance and solemnity of the re- 
sponsibility thus laid upon him, that nothing could or 
would divert or deter him from the full performance 
of the duty involved. 

Rear Admiral Evans, in his book already referred 
to, at pages 412 seq, has given such a graphic and 
full account of the events of that day that I venture 
to quote from it, and refer the reader to the whole of 
it. He says: 

“In the late afternoon the land about Havana was 
made out in the distance, and every preparation was 
made for battle in case the enemy fired at us. Shortly 
after we sighted the land a vessel was seen, well in- 
shore, attempting to escape to the eastward, and the 
New York left her place in the column, and gave 
chase, at the same time flying the signal : ^Disregard 
movements of commander-in-chief J 

“I, as next in rank to Sampson, hoisted the guard 
flag; and, as senior officer present, held the fleet to 
its course, direct for the Morro Castle at the entrance 
of the harbor of Havana. 

“The New York soon ran out of sight, and I saw 
no more of her until about two o’clock the next morn- 
ing, when she rejoined, having in the meanwhile 
captured the Spanish steamer Pedro, and sent her into 
Key West as a prize.” 

Thus that great fleet was in effect abandoned by 


54 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


its newly made rear admiral commander-in-chief, and 
the inauguration of the war with Spain was left, by 
him, to Captain Evans. The latter, as in duty bound, 
and in accordance with the regulations of the navy, 
at once assumed the command, and its responsibilities, 
by virtue of being “the senior officer on the spot.’’ 

Captain Evans continues the relation of the 
methods he pursued, and tells how, like the man who 
exclaimed, “My soul’s in arms and eager for the 
fray,” he “hoped that the Spaniards would fire upon 
our ships; how some guns were fired, but he saw no 
splash of the shot, for, unfortunately, none came. 
They were only signal guns to announce our arrival.” 
And, finally, he says: “L continued on my way and 
established the blockade, and night settled down. 
General Blanco and the City of Havana were in a 
grip that was to make them very tired and hungry 
before it relaxed.” 

Evans seems to have been greatly and very prop- 
erly impressed by the responsibility that rested upon 
him. He tells of his anxieties while he was on the 
bridge during the entire night; of having made up 
his mind that the Spaniards would attempt some- 
thing in the way of a torpedo attack, and how every 
breaking sea was, to his imagination, a torpedo boat. 

o “Shadows that night did strike more terrors 

^ To the soul of Richard than could the substance 

Of ten thousand soldiers.’’ 

He tells of the signals he made to the fleet during 
the night, of its prompt maneuvering in obedience 
thereto, and he winds up his interesting account, by 
saying : 

“Between two or three o’clock in the morning of 
the 23 d the New York rejoined, and the responsibili- 
ties of command shifted to the able shoulders where it 
belonged.” 

That responsibility must therefore have been upon 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 55 


Evans’ shoulders until it shifted back to the “able 
shoulders” of Sampson. 

That Evans had no doubt as to who was in com- 
mand that day and night is shown by the number of 
pronouns “I” and “my” which adorn his narrative, 
there being no less than fourteen of these in* a little 
more than a page of his story. 

An interesting question here obtrudes itself. Sup- 
pose that during the time that the commander-in- 
chief was out of sight and signal distance a Spanish 
fleet or those apprehended torpedo boats could have 
emerged from Havana and made an attack upon our 
fleet; suppose that, with Evans in command as “senior 
line officer on the spot,” a great victory- — as com- 
plete as that secured at Santiago de Cuba on July 3, 
1 898 — had been secured by our fleet : would the honor 
of such victory have belonged to Sampson, the com- 
mander-in-chief, who in his flagship had gone off 
chasing possible prizes, or would it not have been 
properly given to Evans, “the senior line officer on 
the spot,” in actual command? 

There can be no doubt as to the answer to that ques- 
tion; and those who know “Fighting Bob” know 
that from his well-known disposition to “claim every- 
thing” in sight he would have been prompt and vocif- 
erous in claiming, and properly claiming, all the 
credit and honor that belonged to the commanding 
officer of the victorious fleet. 

When one reads such a statement as that of Evans, 
one instinctively wonders if there is not some mistake 
about it. 

There is no mistake, however. The story has 
been carefully verified by myself as to the movements 
of the New York, by examination of her log-book, 
which tells of her hoisting that signal: ^^Disregard 
movements of Commander-in-chief and what she did 
after making that signal, and confirms and verifies 
Evans’ statement. 


56 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


A disgression by way of anticipation may be par- 
doned at this point of the narrative. That signal, 
^^Disregard movements of commanderdn-chieff* is 
the same that was made by Admiral Sampson on the 
morning of July 3, 1898, when he went away to the 
eastward to make an official visit to General Shafter 
at his headquarters up in the country back of Siboney 
(leaving Commodore Schley in command as “senior 
line officer on the spot’’ ) . 



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Diagram I. — “ It has not been possible to procure a fac-simile copy, but the appearance of that 
part of the log-book of the Ne7V York for that day is, as nearly as possible, as shown by 
Diagram I.” 


CHAPTER XV 


WHAT THE FLAGSHIP “nEW YORK” DID WHILE 
ABSENT FROM THE FLEET 

It has not been possible to procure a fac-simlle copy, 
but the appearance of that part of the log-book of 
the New York for that day is, as nearly as possible, 
as shown by Diagram I. 

As the log was originally written and signed by 
Lieutenant Mulligan, it ended with the words “state 
of blockade,” which were at the end of the last line 
above the line on which his signature was written. 
The words, “None of the vessels of the fleet were 
within signal distance at the time of the capture of 
Spanish steamer Pedro/^ while they are in the same 
handwriting as that of the rest of the log-book, were 
evidently written In (as they appear) some time after 
he signed the log-book, because the ink and pen used 
were different from those used in writing the body 
of the remarks. The ink is much darker, the words 
are not consecutive with the other remarks relating 
to the capture of the Pedro, and, inasmuch as there 
was no room to write them in between the top of those 
capitals and the last line above, they had to be run 
through the top of those capitals as they appear in the 
log. 

It will be natural and proper to ask : 

Why did Admiral Sampson, charged as he was 
with the inauguration of the war with Spain, leave the 
command of his fleet and the performance of that 
duty on so important an occasion to one of his sub- 
ordinates, while he in his flagship went off in chase 
of a peaceful merchant steamer, to make a prize of 
her? 


58 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


He had several light vessels that he might just as 
well have sent after the Pedro. 

The suggestion might arise that he was after prize 
money but for the fact that it made not a cent’s differ- 
ence to him whether the New York or some other ves- 
sel of his fleet made the capture, because the prize law 
provided that ‘‘the commanding officer of a fleet or 
squadron shall receive one-twentieth part of all prize 
money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his 
immediate command,” and so self-interest could not 
have been his motive. 

But there was another officer on board the New 
York who had a large pecuniary interest at stake, 
and that was the fleet captain (chief of staff) and also 
captain of the ship. Captain French E. Chadwick. 

The prize law contained a further provision: “The 
fleet captain shall receive one one-hundredth part of 
all prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels of 
the fleet or squadron in which he is serving.” Under 
this provision, if the New York had remained with 
the fleet to do her duty as flagship, and some other 
of the light cruisers had been sent to make the cap- 
ture, a beggarly one per cent, would have been all 
that Chadwick would have been entitled to. 

But the prize law contained two other provisions 
that were of great import to Captain Chadwick. One 
of these was as follows: “To the commander of a 
single vessel shall be awarded two-twentieths part of 
all the prize money awarded to the vessel under his 
command,” etc. The other provision was: “All ves- 
sels of the navy within signal distance of the vessel 
or vessels making the capture shall share in the 

• n 

prize. 

Manifestly it was therefore to the interest of Cap- 
tain Chadwick, first, that the New York should chase 
and capture that prize; and, second, that no other 
vessel of the fleet should be “within signal distance” 
at the time of the capture. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 59 


The last consideration nicely accounts for that in- 
terlineation in the log-book. As a matter of fact the 
proceeding made a cash difference to Captain Chad- 
wick of more than ten thousand dollars, because the 
Pedro was subsequently condemned and sold as a 
prize, and the New York got all the prize money to 
the exclusion of the rest of the fleet. They were left 
to do the duty and reap the glory of inaugurating the 
Spanish War. The cash profits were the New York^s 
alone; and the biggest share went to Captain Chad- 
wick. 

Whose was probably the dominant mind on this 
occasion? 

Before leaving this subject, I wish to express my 
admiration for that most remarkable book, “A Sail- 
or’s Log,” written by Rear Admiral Robley D. 
Evans. No such entertaining work of “fiction 
founded on fact” has appeared since the “Tales by the 
Baron Munchausen” were given to a wondering 
world. I advise everybody to read it. It will no 
doubt become a nautical classic for the same reason 
that the Baron’s adventures are so famous, viz., be- 
cause of the marvelous imagination displayed by its 
author. 


CHAPTER XVI 


THE SEARCH FOR CERVERA^S FLEET 

The Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pas- 
cual Cervera had rendezvoused at Puerto Grande, In 
the Island of St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Group, and 
consisted of the cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa (flag- 
ship), Viscayay Almirante Oquendo, and Cristobal 
Colon, and destroyers Pluton, Furor, and Terror, 

This squadron sailed from St. Vincent on April 28, 
1898, but its destination not having been given out 
by Admiral Cervera, the Naval Board set its wits to 
work to find out where it had gone, but without much 
success. All that could be learned was that it had 
‘‘gone to sea,” so there was nothing to be done but 
await Its appearance from the “deep bosom of the 
ocean-.” 

There were several minor engagements between 
our small ships and batteries on the north side of 
Cuba, in one of which Ensign Worth Bagley and 
three enlisted men were killed and several others 
wounded — the first victims of the war. At other 
points there was some cable cutting. In all these en- 
gagements officers and men displayed great gallantry 
and skill, as was to be expected from them. 

The first operation of any magnitude occurred on 
May 12, when Admiral Sampson, in his flagship, to- 
gether with several of the fighting vessels of his fleet 
under his immediate command, made an attack upon 
the defenses of San Juan, Porto Rico, lasting about 
three hours. Concerning this attack, Sampson’s re- 
port (A. 368)^ says: 

“Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none 
of the Spanish vessels was in the harbor. I was 
therefore considerably in doubt whether they had 


^ Appendix to Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1898-9. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 6i 


reached San Juan and again departed for some un- 
known destination, or whether they had not arrived. 
As their capture was the object of the expedition, and 
It was essential that they should not pass to the west- 
ward, I determined to attack the batteries defending 
the port. In order to develop their positions and 
strength. Then, without waiting to reduce the city 
or subject it to a regular bombardment — which would 
require due notice — turn to the westward. The 
attack was without result, except that one of our men 
was killed and seven were wounded.” 

How the capture of Cervera’s ships was furthered 
by this attack is difficult to see because It could be 
seen from Sampson’s flagship that Cervera’s fleet was 
not in that port. 

On that very day Cervera’s squadron arrived off 
Martinique, sent one of the destroyers {Terror) Into 
port for repairs, and passed on towards Curacao, 
where It arrived on the 14th, on which day Sampson, 
then on his way back towards Key West, sent from 
Puerto Plata, San Domingo, to the consul of the 
United States at Curacao, a cablegram of Inquiry as 
to Cervera’s whereabouts. On the i6th, at noon, he 
received a reply as follows: ^^Maria Teresa and Vis- 
caya in harbor coaling. OqiiendOj Crisobal Colon, 
Furor and Pluton outside. Only two admitted at 
time. Short of coal and provisions; dirty bottoms; 
and leave 15th at 6 P. M. Destination unknown.” 

Sampson also received a cable from the department 
confirming this news, and also Informing him that 
Schley, with the Flying Squadron, had been ordered 
south. Schley at the same time received orders to 
proceed to Key West, but nothing was said to him 
about Cervera’s arrival at either Martinique or Cura- 
cao. 

In his article published over his own signature In 
the Century Magazine for April, 1899, at page 
894, Sampson says: “It now seemed probable that 


62 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Cervera’s objective was either Santiago or San Juan.” 
On same page he adds: “It is possible that he (Cer- 
vera) had learned of our bombardment at San Juan 
almost at the same time it was taking place, and, If 
so, that he decided to give up any thought of going 
to San Juan.” 

A very probable supposition. 

Sampson further says (same page) : “This news 
confirmed in me my previous determination to return 
to Key West, it seeming to me to be the proper thing 
to fill up our bunkers, and not to permit Cervera to 
get between me and Cuba.” 

This last expression does not appear very lucid. 
It is quite clear that Sampson could. In thirteen hours, 
have placed his fleet between Cervera and Cuba, be- 
cause all he had to do was to run down off Santiago 
de Cuba, and thence send out his scouts, who would 
have found Cervera on the i8th without much doubt. 
But how Cervera could come some 650 miles, pass 
around the east end of Cuba and get between Sampson 
and Cuba passes common understanding. 

There was absolutely no reason why Sampson, Im- 
mediately on receipt of the news that Cervera had 
left Curacao two days previously, should not have 
gone down off Santiago. His force, consisting of the 
New York (armored cruiser), lowa^ and Indiana 
(battleships), Amphitrite and Terror (monitors), 
Detroit^ Montgomery ^ and W ampatuck (light 
cruisers), and torpedo boat Porter^ was greatly 
superior In numbers and fighting power to that 
of Cervera, or even to the Flying Squadron 
as It was then constituted. And as for coal, his 
ships had enough in their bunkers to steam back to 
Key West (a distance of about five hundred miles), 
which It took nearly three days to do, at a speed of 
9.3 an hour. With care they had enough for a week’s 
blockade off Santiago, and within that time colliers 
could have reached them. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 63 


No imputation against Admiral Sampson is in- 
tended when I contend that he lost the opportunity 
of his life when he failed to go down off Santiago, 
instead of taking his whole force back to Key West, 
leaving Cervera’s way into Santiago clear and un- 
obstructed. 

Cervera evidently thought it probable that he 
would encounter some of our ships on the voyage be- 
tween Curacao and Santiago, because in the captured 
log-book of the Cristobal Colon appears the follow- 
ing: “May 17-18 — Flagship signaled, ‘Admiral in- 
tends to make port of Santiago; be prepared for ac- 
tion to-night, in case the enemy appears.’ ” 

We don’t know how much Cervera knew of our 
naval movements, but he knew that, with all the fast 
vessels we had at command, it was probable that 
scouting vessels were on the lookout for him. 

As soon as Cervera appeared in the West Indies, 
and the Flying Squadron had been ordered south, 
Sampson, on May 17, at 6 P. M., received while on 
his way back to Key West one of its misleading dis- 
patches from the Navy Department, as follows: 

“Department has just heard that the Spanish fleet 
have munitions of war essential to the defense of 
Havana, and the order of the Spanish fleet is impera- 
tive to reach Havana, Cuba, Cienfuegos, or a rail- 
road port connected with Havana, at all hazards; 
and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port ful- 
filling the conditions, Schley, with the Brooklyn^ Mas- 
sachusetts and Texas, to arrive at Key West morning 
of 1 8th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as soon as possible. 
So Admiral Sampson take or send his most suitable 
armored ship to join Schley, and hurry with remainder 
of his heavy ships to Havana blockade.” 

So strongly was the department impressed with the 
idea that Cienfuegos was the port Cervera was aiming 


64 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


to reach, that on the 14th It sent the following order 
to Sampson (A. 462) : 

‘‘On account of presence of Spanish fleet near Cura- 
cao, send with all possible dispatch swift vessel to 
direct all except smallest blockading vessel off Clenfue- 
gos to return to Key West.” 

This was done, and Captain McCalla, with his 
division, promptly abandoned the blockade of Clen- 
fuegos, on May 16, and started for Key West. 


CHAPTER XVII 


THE FLYING SQUADRON AND SAMPSON ARRIVE AT 

KEY WEST 

The Flying Squadron arrived at Key West during 
the night of May 17, some hours in advance of the 
Navy Department’s expectation; and on the morning 
of the 1 8th, after saluting the flag of Commodore 
Remey (who was Schley’s senior officer) , Schley went 
on shore to make him an official visit. 

While on shore he was informed by several resi- 
dent Cubans that the province of Cienfuegos was most 
thoroughly occupied by Spanish troops (I. 1348), 
and therefore he had best be careful about attempt- 
ing intercourse with the shore there. 

Sampson, in his flagship New York, arrived about 
4 p. M. of the 1 8th, and after saluting Sampson’s flag 
Schley went on board to report to him. While there, 
as would naturally be the case, the two officers dis- 
cussed the situation, and Sampson showed, or stated 
to Schley, the contents of a number of despatches or 
other communications from the Navy Department, 
including the one last above quoted. 

Sampson had that day received the following : 

‘‘Navy Department, May 17, 1898. 

“Flying Squadron, after being increased by the 
armored vessels commander-in-chief North Atlantic 
Station considers most suitable, proceed with despatch 
utmost] off Cienfuegos. The remainder of the 
leet to blockade Havana closely. Sampson to have 
choice the command of Havana or at Cienfuegos. 
Schley, in either case, to remain with his own squad- 
ron. The commander-in-chief is authorized to make 


5 


66 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


such change of detail in this plan as he may think 
proper. 

“In general, the object is to engage and capture the 
enemy off Cienfuegos, if possible; or otherwise block- 
ade him in that port.” 

Sampson informed Schley that he (Sampson) had 
chosen the blockade of Havana. He also verbally 
delivered to Schley the confidential instructions found 
in the Department’s Confidential Circular of April 6 
(A. 171), “that our ships were not to be risked 
against the fortified places on the coast of Cuba until 
after the Spanish squadron had been disposed of.” 
They looked over charts together, and agreed that 
Cienfuegos came most directly in accord with Cer- 
vera’s supposed instructions. 

A most remarkable circumstance is that, although 
Sampson had been informed on the i6th that Cer- 
vera’s fleet had arrived at Curacao, whence Sampson 
believed he would make for Santiago de Cuba, he 
never said a word to Schley about that fact. 

Of course, the fact that Sampson was Schley’s lin- 
eal subordinate officer could not but be in the minds 
of both of them. Sampson could not very well have 
asked Schley whether he accepted their new relation. 
Indeed, there was no occasion to do so, because 
Schley’s salute had done that; but Schley voluntarily 
said to Sampson that he wanted to assure him “at the 
outset that he would be loyal, absolutely and unre- 
servedly, to the cause they were both representing” (I. 

1344)- 

Chadwick, the chief of staff, testified (I. 540) : 
“My only distinct recollection is Commodore Schley’s 
statement to the admiral that he would be perfectly 
loyal; and that he was very pleased to be under his 
command; that the admiral could be sure he would 
be perfectly loyal in all his conduct.” But we may 
doubt whether Schley said he was “very pleased to 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 67 


be under his junior’s command.” Schley was not 
called upon to give any assurances of the kind; and 
we may be certain that if he had not meant what he 
said, he would not have said it; and if he had felt 
pleased to be under Sampson’s command he would 
have said that. 

Schley testified before the Court of Inquiry (I. 
1344) that at this interview he asked Sampson if 
any means of communicating with the Insurgent 
Cubans had been established, to which Sampson re- 
plied that he did not know; but when he got the 
situation better in hand he would write him. 

Captain Chadwick, before the Court of Inquiry, en- 
deavored to deny much of Schley’s statements relative 
to that interview between Sampson and himself, but 
most of his denials are of the non mi ricordo charac- 
ter. There Is every probability that Sampson would 
do and say what It was his plain duty to do and say in 
order to give Schley all the information he had, and 
communicate all instructions he had received from the 
department which might affect or control the block- 
ade about to be established at Clenfuegos, by the Fly- 
ing Squadron. It would manifestly have been highly 
improper for Sampson to send Schley In command of 
the Flying Squadron on the Important duty assigned 
to It, and leave the commodore In Ignorance of any- 
thing essential, or which might contribute to the suc- 
cessful performance of that duty. It Is not possible 
to believe that he Intentionally did so. 

The matter of communication with the friendly in- 
surgent Cubans might become, at any time, of great 
moment, and what more natural than that Schley 
should inquire whether any means of such communi- 
cation had been arranged; and, inasmuch as no such 
arrangement had been made, that Sampson should re- 
ply that he did not know, but would write the com- 
modore when he “got the situation better In hand”? 


68 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


There was absolutely no reason for anything but the 
most perfect confidence and frankness between the two 
officers, and there is no evidence whatever of any lack 
of such frankness and confidence. 


CHAPTER XVIII 


THE FLYING SQUADRON SAILS FOR CIENFUEGOS 
SCHLEY’s SAILING ORDERS 

After coaling with prompt rapidity, the Flying 
Squadron sailed the next day, May 19, between 7 
and 8 o’clock A. M., under the following order from 
Admiral Sampson : 

“No. 5. “U. S. Flagship New York, 

Key West, May 19, 1898. 

“Sir: — I send you a copy of a telegram received 
last night from Secretary Long, concerning a vessel 
which was to sail on the 15 th, and carrying a large 
amount of specie; and is supposed to be going to 
land it at Trinidad, or to the east of Cienfuegos or 
even Havana. 

“The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with 
the two torpedo boats following them. As soon as 
the Iowa is coaled, she will follow you. 

“It is unnecessary for me to say that you should es- 
tablish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possi- 
ble delay, and that it should be maintained as close 
as possible. 

“Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in 
that vicinity, and finding you on the lookout attempt 
to come around the island, either east or west, please 
send me word by the best vessel you have for that 
purpose as to their direction, that I may be prepared 
for them at Havana. I will try and increase the 
number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that 
you may have them to send with messages to me, 
should you desire to do so. After I have the situa- 


70 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


tion in hand, I will write you, and give you any in- 
formation that suggests itself. 

“Yours respectfully, 

“William T. Sampson, 
^^Rear Admiral, 

^^Commander-in-chief, N. A. Station, 

“Commanding Officer, 

“Flying Squadron.” 

The important part of the foregoing letter is the 
sentence: “It is unnecessary for me to state that you 
should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the 
least possible delay, and that it should be maintained 
as close as possible.” 

It was a remarkable coincidence that Cervera’s 
squadron entered the harbor of Santiago de Cuba 
almost at the same hour the same morning that Schley 
sailed from Key West; and Sampson received the 
news from the department at 12.30 A. M., of the 20th. 
He could not therefore have given Schley that inform- 
ation before that time, because he did not have it to 
give. But as soon as he learned it he should have 
sent a fast vessel to overtake Schley and give him the 
information ; and, by the same vessel. Captain Chad- 
wick, chief of staff, could have sent the signal system 
(to be spoken of hereafter) of communication with 
friendly Cubans about Cienfuegos, which would have 
enabled Schley to learn, four days before he did, that 
Cervera’s fleet was not at Cienfuegos. 


CHAPTER XIX 


SCHLEY MEETS m’CALLA’s DIVISION 

On the morning of May 19, a few hours after leav- 
ing Key West, the Flying Squadron met the Division 
of vessels commanded by Captain Bowman H. Mc- 
Calla, In the Marblehead, returning from the blockade 
of Clenfuegos. 

It does not appear that Schley had any knowledge, 
before this meeting, that McCalla had been at Clen- 
fuegos. McCalla signaled, as Is usual on such oc- 
casions, for permission to proceed, but he sent one of 
his vessels (the Eagle, commanded by Lieutenant 
Southerland) to communicate with Commodore 
Schley “and give him such Information as they had.” 
The Scorpion (Lieutenant Marix) was sent by Schley 
to meet the Eagle. There was a difference of recol- 
lection between these two commanding officers as to 
what passed between them by means of the mega- 
phone, but Marix, at that time, caused an entry of 
what Southerland had said, to be made In his log- 
book. This entry Is of course the best evidence. All 
that was communicated to Schley was that the “mes- 
sage communicated by the commanding officer of the 
Eagle, from Captain McCalla to Commodore Schley, 
was to the effect that Captain McCalla had left Clen- 
fuegos with his ships, and did not believe that Cer- 
vera’s fleet had arrived there when the Marblehead 
had left” (I. 500) . 

An effort was made to show that Schley should have 
gone after McCalla, to find out If he had communi- 
cated all he knew through Southerland; but It Is 
plainly preposterous to claim that a commodore In 
command of a squadron, or any other superior officer, 
must himself run after his subordinates for any pur- 
pose whatever. He has the right to assume that they. 


72 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


as is their duty, will give him all the information they 
have; and they, and not he, will be blamed for any 
consequences resulting from failure so to do. 

There was some peculiar practice by the Judge Ad- 
vocate of the Court of Inquiry (Captain Samuel C. 
Lemly) relative to the testimony of Lieutenant Com- 
mander Marix, who had commanded the Scorpion on 
the occasion last referred to. The record shows (I. 
PP* 79.9“6oo) that on August ii, 1901, a month be- 
fore the court convened, the Navy Department, no 
doubt at the instance of Lemly, had cabled to Rear 
Admiral Remey, then commanding the Asiatic Fleet, 
to take the statement of Marix as to the meeting be- 
tween the Scorpion and Eagle on May 19, 1898, and 
cable it to the Department. On August 18 this was 
done, and Manx’s deposition was on that day put 
into the hands of Lemly. He kept it in his posses- 
sion, and said nothing about it until October 10 — 
which was the nineteenth day of the sessions of the 
court. He had put in the testimony of Lieutenant 
Southerland, to the effect that the latter had told 
Marix about having communicated with insurgent 
Cubans near Cienfuegos, and, having Marix’ state- 
ment to the contrary in his possession, he deliberately 
suppressed it until Schley’s counsel placed him in such 
a situation that he could no longer withhold it. Then 
he produced it. 

Inasmuch as a court of inquiry is convened only for 
the purpose of bringing out the whole truth, there 
can be no justification for keeping back from the court 
anything hearing upon the subject of inquiry; but if, 
on the contrary, concealment or perversion of the 
truth is the object, then holding back evidence is in 
order; and one of the most efficacious methods that 
can be employed to that end. Who can doubt that 
that was the intention of Lemly; or that he would 
have promptly produced Manx’s deposition if it had 
sustained Southerland? The man who steps into the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


73 


open with a false statement is entitled to the credit 
of manliness; but he who suppresses the truth adds 
cowardice to his wrongdoing. 

After this communication with McCalla’s division 
the latter continued on to Key West, where it arrived 
about three hours later. 

The Flying Squadron continued its voyage towards 
Cienfuegos, and in the neighborhood of Cape San 
Antonio fell in with the Cincinnati^ Captain Colby M. 
Chester. The latter came on board the Brooklyn, 
and in the interview between him and Commodore 
Schley, which lasted about an hour, they discussed 
coaling facilities and possibilities in the waters near 
Cienfuegos and on the south side of Cuba. 

Captain Chester asked that his ship be ordered to 
continue on with the Flying Squadron, but Schley 
did not feel authorized to grant Chester’s request. 
The Flying Squadron then continued its way, and at 
4.20 P. M., of the 2 1 St, as is recorded in the log-book 
of the Brooklyn, “heard the report of two great 
guns to Sd & Ed,” which was in the direction of 
Cienfuegos. 

Commodore Schley happened to be on deck at the 
time, and also heard the reports, as he testified (I. 
1347), “six or seven, fired with the cadence of a sa- 
lute.” Of course, every indication of that sort sug- 
gested the possible presence of the Spanish fleet, since 
none of our vessels was known to be in that neighbor- 
hood. 

The squadron arrived as near the port as in the 
commodore’s opinion, prudent navigation at night per- 
mitted, at midnight of the 21st, and stopped to await 
daybreak of the 22d, when it steamed in as near to 
the entrance of the harbor as was thought proper by 
the commodore. It certainly would have been very 
imprudent, with such a fleet, to approach at night an 
unlighted port with which no one in the fleet was 
familiar. Any landsman knows that. 


CHAPTER XX 


THE ALLEGED DELAY IN THE VOYAGE OF THE FLYING 
SQUADRON FROM KEY WEST TO CIENFUEGOS 

It will be remembered that Schley’s “sailing orders” 
from Key West, on May 19, signed by Admiral 
Sampson, contained the following: “It Is unneces- 
sary for me to say that you should establish a block- 
ade at Clenfuegos with the least possible delay, and 
that it should be maintained as close as possible.” 
Before the Court of Inquiry was organized no 
official or public criticism of Schley in reference to 
the speed maintained by the Flying Squadron on Its 
passage from Key West to Clenfuegos had ever been 
made, and the Precept under which the court was or- 
ganized contains no reference to that subject. But 
the majority of the court seems to have been so anx- 
ious to find something to censure, that they In effect 
added another count to the Precept; and In order to 
condemn it was necessary that the order under which 
Schley sailed shoidd he misstated. 

In the majority’s first “Finding of Fact” they say 
“Flying Squadron sailed with orders from the Navy 
Department, and from the commander-In-chlef of the 
North Atlantic Station, to proceed with despatch 
[utmost] off Clenfuegos.” 

Now, the only order that Commodore Schley re- 
ceived before sailing for Clenfuegos was that No. 5, 
quoted in full on page 69, and that word ^^utmosf^ 
is not to be found in it. Indeed, there was not a word 
of evidence, written or oral, before that court that 
Schley had any order from the Department about 
going to Clenfuegos ; and In fact he had no such order. 
He testified (I. 1417) that he had never seen the de- 
spatch to Sampson containing the word “utmost.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 75 


The majority of the court therefore interpolated 
into Schley’s “sailing orders” the important word 
“utmost” and then proceeded to find fault with him 
because of it — and this without giving the commodore 
any opportunity to be heard about it. Nothing could 
be more unfair and unjust, and that opinion, being 
without foundation of fact, is mere ^^brutum fulmenJ^ 

Commodore Schley had absolutely no reason or 
purpose of delay on that passage. On the contrary, 
he had every motive for all proper haste, and there 
can be no reasonable doubt that he made all speed 
consistent with the best results as to keeping his com- 
mand in the highest condition of efficiency. 

An examination of the log-books will show that 
the speed (ten knots) he maintained on that passage 
was the same as that subsequently made by the Iowa ' 
(with the exception of three hours, during which the 
latter made one knot an hour more), and “perish the 
thought” that the valiant Captain Robley Dunglison 
Evans (“Fighting Bob”) , who commanded the Iowa, 
did not do his utmost to get into the presence of the 
enemy in the least possible time. 

Higher speed, as everybody knows, means greatly 
increased consumption of coal. The opinion, there- 
fore, of Admiral Dewey, that “the passage from Key 
West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron 
with all possible despatch. Commodore Schley having 
in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with 
as much coal as possible in the ships’ bunkers,” will 
stand as the only justifiable opinion. It is common 
sense as well as good judgment. 


CHAPTER XXI 


THE BLOCKADE OF CIENFUEGOS BY THE FLYING 

SQUADRON 

On the forenoon of the 22d the torpedo boat Dupont^ 
Lieutenant Wood commanding, arrived from Key 
West, whence she had sailed May 20, at 11.45 A. M. 
She brought despatches from Admiral Sampson, but 
what. Lieutenant Wood didn’t know. The lieutenant 
was worn out by the ‘‘great fatigue of commanding 
officer’s service in torpedo boats,” saying he was al- 
most exhausted; and hoped that the commodore 
would give him an opportunity to get four or five 
hours sleep” (L 977). Some of his men were tem- 
porarily transferred for rest on board the Brooklyn, 
where they remained until the Dupont sailed back to 
Key West on the 24th. Notwithstanding his fatigue 
and sleepiness, the gallant lieutenant seems to have 
kept at least one sharp eye on the commodore, and 
was able, three years later, to give a minute descrip- 
tion of what had appeared to him to be the state of 
the commodore’s nerves. 

The Iowa, Captain Evans, arrived at 1.30 p. M., 
on the 22d, having left Key West May 20 at 1 1 A. M. 
She also brought despatches. None of the testimony 
makes it clear what despatches these two vessels re- 
spectively brought. 

As soon as night came on, the commodore arranged 
his ships in column, with the Dupont on picket close 
to the entrance, and so blockaded the port. Lights 
on shore were seen that night, but they did not seem 
to be in the nature of signals, and no one on board 
the flagship so understood them. 

On the morning of the 23d, at 8.15, the torpedo 
boat Hawk, Lieutenant Hood, arrived from Havana, 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 77 


bringing further despatches from Admiral Sampson; 
and on the same day the Castine and collier Merriniac 
joined. On this day, also, the British steamship 
Adula arrived from Jamaica, and brought report that 
the Spanish squadron had left Santiago de Cuba on 
May 20, which was before the Flying Squadron had 
arrived off Cienfuegos; and, if it had been the fact, 
Cervera’s ships had had time to arrive at Cienfue- 
gos before Schley did. 

The Adiila also reported that on the night of May 
18, after she had left Santiago de Cuba bound for 
Jamaica, she had met seven ships, seventy miles south 
of Santiago, bound to the northward. 

All this tended to convince Schley that Cervera was 
in the port of Cienfuegos, and he permitted the 
Adula to enter the port upon promise that she would 
come out next day, when Schley could learn from her 
passengers whether Cervera was or was not in the 
port. 

Admiral Dewey approved the action of the com- 
modore in permitting the Adula to enter, by his find- 
ing that ‘‘Commodore Schley in permitting the 
steamer Adula to enter the port of Cienfuegos ex- 
pected to obtain information concerning the Spanish 
Squadron from her when she came out.” 


CHAPTER XXII 


THE SIGNALS AT CIENFUEGOS ARRANGED BETWEEN 
CAPTAIN m’cALLA AND INSURGENTS 

On the night of the 23d lights on shore were seen, 
which were apparently signal lights; but no one on 
board the flagship knew their significance. So much 
has been said about these signal lights, in the effort 
to find fault with Schley for not having understood 
them, and for not having immediately opened com- 
munication with the Cuban friendly insurgents, that 
a full statement concerning them, when, how, and 
by whom they were established, and what had been 
done about them by the various officers who had 
knowledge of them, is advisable. It furnishes a re- 
markable illustration of what was a series of blun- 
ders that ought never to have been permitted to occur. 

It will be remembered that Commodore Schley, 
while at Key West, had been warned by friendly 
Cubans that the country around Cienfuegos was most 
amply supplied by Spanish troops, and that therefore 
to him every person, certainly every military person 
thereabout, was presumably a Spaniard. 

Captain Bowman H. McCalla, as everyone who 
knows him is aware, was an officer who, without being 
in the least foolhardy, was disposed to take rather 
more than ordinary risks in the performance of any 
duty laid upon him, or which he thought it incumbent 
upon him to undertake. He had been blockading 
Cienfuegos from the 7th to the i6th of May, with a 
few days interval, and, as he testified before the Court 
of Inquiry (I. 303), did not make any effort to com- 
municate with people on shore, except one on the 
east of the port, which failed because there were no 
Cubans there. In fact he had no such communica- 
tion until the afternoon of May 15, when a boat was 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


79 


descried at some distance to the westward of the en- 
trance. The Eagle was sent to capture it, which she 
did. It was found to contain five Cubans of the pa- 
triot army, who, as Lieutenant Southerland (A. 350) 
stated, had ‘‘been forty (40) hours in the boat,” and 
they were sent on board the Marblehead to Captain 
McCalla. 

The log-book of the latter vessel tells of the sight- 
ing of the boat, the sending of the Eagle after it, and 
gives the names and rank of the Cubans who were in 
it, “bearing a letter from Colonel Rodriguez, com- 
manding (insurgents), requesting arms and ammuni- 
tion. They had been in the small batteau for 30 
hours without food or water.” 

The Eagle was then sent with four of the Cubans 
to a Cuban camp located thirteen miles to the west- 
ward of the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos, and 
after landing them and six thousand rounds of am- 
munition, and communicating with Colonel Rodri- 
guez, the Cuban officer in command, she returned. 

What further resulted from this visit of the Cu- 
bans was stated by Captain McCalla before the Court 
of Inquiry (I. 277), as follows: 

“On the 15th and i6th of May, 1898, I had been 
in communication with three Cuban officers and two 
privates, on board the Marblehead; and I had ar- 
ranged with Lieutenant Alvarez, who spoke English 
very well, a system of signals. In case they wished 
to communicate with the Marblehead there were to 
be three lights horizontally by night or three horses 
in line on the beach by day.” 

Captain McCalla regarded this system of signals, 
thus arranged, as of such transcendent importance 
that he locked the knowledge of it up in his own mind, 
and never made any of his officers acquainted with it; 
never made any report of it, and never made it known 
to anyone until after he arrived at Key West, on 
May 19, when he told Captain Chadwick, the chief 


8o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


of staff ; but he was certain he did not Intrust the Im- 
mense secret to the commander-in-chief. McCalla 
said before the court: “It was a secret code, arranged 
by myself, and I did not wish any publicity to be 
given to this code. In order that the Cubans might 
not be betrayed.’’ He seems to have had a fear that 
there might be such betrayal by some of our own 
people. If the code had been made known to any of 
them, which, he said, “was a possible feature of the 
case that was In my [his] own mind at the time.” 

He testified (I. 305) that when he sent the Eagle 
to communicate with Commodore Schley, on the 
morning of May 19, he did not give her commanding 
officer any orders to give the commodore information 
about the signals, for the reason that he did not wish 
to communicate it in writing; and he did not know 
that Commodore Schley was going to Cienfuegos; 
but that, if he had thought that the commodore was 
going there, he certainly would have gone alongside 
the Brooklyn and secretly have given Commodore 
Schley the information about this signal arrange- 
ment.” 

What a pity It was that McCalla, instead of being 
so suspicious even of his own officers, did not, seeing 
that the Flying Squadron was on its way towards the 
locality whence McCalla’s division had just been with- 
drawn, assume that communication with the friendly 
Cubans might at any time become useful, and there- 
fore give the commodore the means of establishing 
such communication. 

McCalla testified (I. 303) that when he gave the 
signal code to Chadwick, It was his (McCalla’s) pur- 
pose that it should go to the commander-in-chlef 
through his chief of staff. Captain Chadwick In his 
testimony (I. 839) said: “My recollection, of course, 
is not particularly definite, because I laid no stress 
upon the matter at all. I did not communicate the 
signals to anyone, not even to Admiral Sampson.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 8i 


If he had done so, it is scarcely conceivable that the 
admiral (who only the day before had been asked by 
Schley if any means of communication with the 
friendly Cubans had been arranged, and had replied 
that “he did not know of any such, but when he got 
the situation in hand would write to him”) would 
have failed to send off that code, and all the informa- 
tion McCalla possessed, to Schley, by the Dupont^ 
when she sailed with other despatches for Schley on 
the morning of the 20th; or by the Iowa (Captain 
Evans), which sailed the same day. If that had 
been done, the code would have reached Schley at 
8.15 in the forenoon of the 22d, and communication 
with the Cubans could have been had more than two 
days before it was, enabling Schley to learn nearly two 
days and a half earlier than he did, that Cervera was 
not in the port of Cienfuegos. 

It is a curious fact that McCalla, in his communi- 
cation with the Cubans, should not have learned posi- 
tively whether or not Cervera was there. But if he 
acquired such knowledge, he locked that up with the 
knowledge of the code, and kept such knowledge a 
secret. If he had told the admiral that fact, Sampson 
would certainly have told the fact to Schley, and not 
have left the latter to find it out for himself. And 
Lieutenant Southerland, though he testified that he 
had learned it from those Cubans, failed to say any- 
thing about it to Marix, when he (Southerland) was 
sent to tell Commodore Schley all they knew. 

As above stated. Captain Chadwick testified that 
he did not communicate the signals to anyone — in 
which statement he was wrong. Captain Evans testi- 
fied that Chadwick told him about them on the 19th 
or 20th, but gave him no directions to inform Schley 
about them. 

Evans further testified (I. 367) that he did not 
tell Schley about them : “It never entered my head 
6 


82 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


that he did not know it. If I had for a moment sup- 
posed that Commodore Schley did not have those sig- 
nals, I would, of course, have given them to him the 
first thing, instantly on my arrival.^ I supposed every 
captain in the fleet had them.’’ 

This last supposition was a very natural one, for 
Evans had the right to suppose that, inasmuch as the 
chief of staff had given him the knowledge of the 
code, he had also sent it to Schley. 

It seems peculiar that, knowing through the sig- 
nals that the insurgents wished to communicate with 
the squadron, and seeing that Commodore Schley 
paid no attention to the signals, Evans should have 
rested tranquilly, without venturing to inquire whether 
the commodore knew or not. It was another act 
in the “comedy of errors” in which they were all play- 
ing parts. 

From all the foregoing it is quite evident that Com- 
modore Schley cannot possibly be faulted for not 
knowing what had been imparted only to McCalla, 
Chadwick, and Evans. No reason can be found why 
McCalla should have been so suspicious of his own 
officers, for the whole signal system of the navy is ac- 
cessible to at least the commanding and signal officers 
of every ship. There was no reason why McCalla 
should not have assumed that the Flying Squadron 
was going where the knowledge of the signals might 
be useful, and have informed Schley about them. It 
was right that McCalla should have given the code 
to Chadwick, and it was plainly culpable in Chad- 
wick not to inform Sampson, as it was his clear duty 
to do. 

Even when McCalla came on board the Brooklyn 
at Cienfuegos, on the 24th, he seems to have been still 
so oppressed by his self-imposed burden of secrecy 
that he forgot to mention the signals to the commo- 
dore. 


^ Which would have been exactly proper. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 83 


Captain Cook (I. 884) in his testimony said: ‘‘I 
was present during a portion of the interview between 
Captain McCalla and the commodore. They talked 
on various subjects at first. I think Captain McCalla 
told him that he had brought mining material for the 
insurgents, and he was going to communicate with 
the Insurgent camp. That brought up the conversa- 
tion about the camp, and where It was. Then the 
commodore said to him: ‘We have had three lights, 
one ahead of the other here, that wc cannot make 
out; and I believe It Is something In connection with 
the Spanish fleet’ Captain McCalla gave a start, 
threw up his hands, and said: ‘Why, Commodore, 
that is the signal from the Insurgent camp. They 
want to communicate with you. I can go and find out 
at once.’ So the commodore told him to go. He said: 
‘Get off as soon as possible, and If you can send a 
party across, send them; and let me know as soon 
as possible.’ ” 

McCalla went off at once, communicated with the 
insurgents, and returned at 4 P. M.^ with Information 
that Cervera’s fleet was not In the port. 

If they had all Intended not to do anything that 
would help the commodore to the knowledge of those 
signals, they could not have more effectually accom- 
plished their purpose than was done apparently by 
accident. 

The chief of staff (Chadwick) was strangely dere- 
lict In the matter. It was of the greatest importance 
that Schley should be able to communicate with those 
friendly insurgents, and, when Chadwick learned 
about them, he should have sent them as soon as pos- 
sible to Schley. If they had gone by the Dupont they 
would have reached the commodore at 8.15 A. M. of 
the 22d; and if she had been sent off with the signals 
on the afternoon of the 19th she would have over- 
taken Schley before he reached Cienfuegos, and he 


84 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


could have known on the 21st that Cervera was not 
in that port. 

There is one thing made apparent by the action of 
the chief of staff, viz., that in that early stage of the 
campaign he had become accustomed to determine for 
himself what information should be given to the 
commander-in-chief, and what should be imparted to 
the commanders of squadrons, divisions, and single 
ships of the fleet. 



/ 


CHAPTER XXIII 


DESPATCHES RECEIVED BY SCHLEY AT CIENFUEGOS 

Of the despatches received by Commodore Schley 
while at Cienfuegos, the first, in numerical order was : 

‘‘No. 6. “U. S. Flagship New York, 

“Key West, May 19, 1898. 

“Sir: — I enclose copy of a memorandum from 
Commander McCalla. 

“2. You will take steps to prevent the enemy from 
continuing work on the new fortifications mentioned 
therein. 

“3. There is a rumor, by way of Havana, that the 
Spanish squadron has put into Santiago. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. T. Sampson, 

^^Rear Admiral!^ 

An indorsement, made at the time by a receiving 
stamp, shows that No. 6 was received on board the 
Brooklyn at 8.15 A. M., May 23, 1898, which was 
the time at which the Hawk arrived. 

The memorandum enclosed was as follows: 

“A good landing place for troops has been found 
13^ miles West of Savanilla Point. The Spanish 
force about Cienfuegos is reported, on good authority, 
to be between 4,000 and 5,000 men. The Cuban 
force, only part of which is armed, is between 2,000 
and 3,000 men. The Cubans need arms for 2,000 
men; and munitions for the whole number. I was 
informed that the Cubans have perfect knowledge 
of what was going on in Cienfuegos, and that a force 


86 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


of our men could be taken to Cienfuegos without the 
knowledge of the Spanish force within that city. 
About men are said to be kept within the vi- 

cinity of the castle. The only battery which fired on 
the ships at all was made of the old guns in the 
castle. 

“They have modern guns, 6 in. and 8 In., I am told, 
but not mounted five days ago. 

“An emplacement is being built on the hill above 
the castle. A line passing through the new emplace- 
ment and the castle leads down the middle of the river 
to the sea. There was working a force of men on 
the ground Immediately below the castle, and I was 
told that a water battery was being erected there. It 
is possible that since the attempt to cut the cables a 
masked battery of small calibre Is being erected on 
Colorados Point. The Insurgents want dynamite to 
destroy the railway. I asked them to devote their 
efforts to cutting telegraph communication between 
Havana and Cienfuegos. They report that the wires 
are repaired as fast as destroyed; while the railroad 
is Intact. The Cuban forces In the San Juan moun- 
tains control the highway between Cienfuegos and 
Trinidad, so that provisions cannot be sent between 
those places. Troops must be prepared for rain every 
day. No resources In the country; all destroyed. 
Fair road leading from landing point to Cienfuegos.” 

It Is quite certain, though McCalla does not say so, 
that all the information contained in this memo- 
randum was given to him by those five Cubans who 
came off in that boat on the i6th of May; but the 
memorandum is marked by Indefiniteness, where it 
might as well have been definite. If, at the end of 
the first sentence, McCalla had Inserted the words 
“where the Insurgents can be communicated with,” 
Schley could have had communication with them 
forty-eight hours sooner than he did. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 87 


“If,” most pregnant of words! 

It will be considered that all this business was a 
new experience to the actors, and that no one could 
foresee the importance of little matters, or words left 
out of or Inserted in despatches, which had a signifi- 
cance not then apparent, but which we now know 
were afterwards to be held, as against the commodore, 
to be of the greatest possible import. 


CHAPTER XXIV 


DESPATCH NO. 7 

Despatch No. 7 is of so great importance that its 
consideration deserves a chapter to itself. It is as 
follows, viz : 

“No. 7. “U. S. Flagship New York, 

“Key West^ May 20, 1898. 

“Dear Schley: 

“The Iowa leaves this morning at 1 1 o’clock, 
bound for Cienfuegos. The collier MerrimaCy in 
company with the Castiney is also bound for Cienfue- 
gos. The Marblehead and Eagle will both be ready 
to depart to-night to join you. 

“Enclosed is a copy of a telegram received at Key 
West dated May 19, marked 

“A. The report of the Spanish fleet being at San- 
tiago dc Cuba might very well be correct; so the 
department strongly advises that you send word im- 
mediately by the loway to Schley, to proceed off San- 
tiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one 
small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the de- 
partment will send the MinneapoUSy now at St. 
Thomas, Auxiliary No. 461, to proceed at once off 
Santiago, to join Schley, who should keep up com- 
munication via Mole, Haiti, or Cape Haitien, Haiti. 
If the Iowa has gone, send order Schley, by your 
fastest despatch vessel.” “Long.” 

After considering this telegram I have decided to 
make no change in the present plan; that isy that you 
should hold your squadron of Cienfuegos.^ If the 


^This telegram is here inserted for convenience. — J. P. 
* The italics throughout are, of course, mine. — J. P. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 89 


Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must come 
either to Habana or Cienfuegos to deliver the mu- 
nitions of war which they are said to bring for use in 
Cuba. 

therefore am of the opinion that our best chance 
of success in capturing these ships will be to hold the 
two points — Cienfuegos and Habana — ^with all the 
force we can muster. If later it should develop that 
these vessels are at Santiago, we can then assemble off 
that port the ships best suited for the purpose, and 
completely blockade it. 

^^Until we then receive more positive information, 
we shall continue to hold Habana and Santiago^ . 

“I enclose a copy of a telegram received at Key 
West May 19, marked B. With regard to this sec- 
ond telegram, in which the consul at Cape Haitien 
says that a telegram from Port de Paix, on May 17, 
reports two ships, etc., it is probably of no importance, 
and the vessels referred to may have been our own 
ships. The statement made by the United States 
minister at Venezuela, contained in telegram of same 
date, is probably not true, because these ships are re- 
ported to have left Curacao at 6 P. M. on the i6th. 
If they were seen on the 17th, apparently heading 
for the French West Indies, they could not possibly 
be at Santiago de Cuba as early as the i 8 th, as re- 
ported. 

“From the first cablegram, marked ‘A’ it will be 
seen that the department has ordered the cruiser 
Minneapolis and Auxiliary No. 461 to proceed for 
Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please send the 
Scorpion to communicate with those vessels at Santi- 
ago, and direct one of them to report to the depart- 
ment from Nicholas Mole or Cape Haitien the 
change I have made in the plan ‘strongly advised’ by 
the department. As soon as this vessel has com- 
municated with the Department, let her return to 


®This word ‘‘Santiago” evidently should be “Cienfuegos.” 


90 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs, and 
report immediately at Habana or Cienfuegos, as he 
may think ^most advantageous. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. T. Sampson, 

**Rear Admiral, etc. 

“Commodore W. S. Schley, 

^^Commanding Flying Squadron!^ 

Enclosure B. “The United States consul at Cape 
Haltlen says that a telegram from Port de Paix, 
Haiti, on May 17, reports two Spanish ships cruising 
off Mole every night two weeks. The United 
States minister to Venezuela says that cable employee 
reports, confidentially, Spanish ships of war seen May 
17, apparently heading for West Indies, French. 

“Long."’ 

Duplicates of No. 7, with enclosures, were sent to 
Schley by different vessels, and were probably re- 
ceived the one on the 22d and the other on the 23d. 

No. 7 Is an almost personal letter, beginning “Dear 
Schley,” Instead of with the formal “Sir” usual In 
official communications. This beginning shows that 
up to that time only the most kindly feeling and con- 
fidence animated both officers. The only positive 
thing that the letter contains is the statement, thrice 
made, that notwithstanding the Department “strongly 
advised that Schley be sent with his whole squadron 
off Santiago de Cuba,” Sampson would adhere to the 
plan already adopted, viz., that Schley should con- 
tinue the blockade of Cienfuegos, while Sampson con- 
tinued that of Havana. 

And, as for the uncertainties that pervaded the de- 
spatch: “// the Spaniards have put into Santiago.” 
later, it should develop that these vessels are at 
Santiago,” etc. ^^Until we then receive more positive 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 91 


information^^ “They could not possibly be at San- 
tiago de Cuba as early as the i8th, as reported.”^ 

One of these two copies of No. 7 had been copied 
into a letter-press copying book, and contained an 
Interlined word In Ink, over an erasure. When they 
came to be made up, sheets of the two were mixed up 
and the interlined word was left out of the one copy, 
showing that the business methods of the staff were 
none too carefully conducted. 

Another peculiarity of No. 7 Is that it directs Schley 
to send the Scorpion off' Santiago de Cuba, with in- 
structions to direct the captain of another vessel, 
which the department had ordered to join Schley 
there, to go to Mole St. Nicholas, and thence inform 
the department of the change that he (Sampson) had 
made In the plan “strongly advised’’ by the depart- 
ment. 

Why Sampson should have taken this roundabout 
and expensive and slow way to do this, when he was 
at Key West, in telegraphic communication with the 
department. Is one of the things “that no fellow can 
find out,” as Lord Dundreary expresses It. Perhaps, 
as he couldn’t cut the connection with that famous 
“War Board,” he took that method of keeping it In 
the dark as long as possible. 

There must have been some divided counsel about 
it, because, oddly enough, that very evening, after 
sending off No. 7 to Schley, the Navy Department 
was telegraphed to, as follows (A. 465) : 

“Replying to department’s telegram of the 20th: 
After duly considering the information contained, I 
have decided to follow the plans already adopted, to 
hold position Clenfuegos with Brooklyn, Massachu- 
setts, Texas, and the Iowa, Marblehead, C as tine, and 
Dupont, and two auxiliaries. There remain New 
York, Indiana, and monitors for Havana. The latter 


^All italics are mine. — J. P. 


92 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


very inefficient, and should not be sent from base. 
Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliaries 
at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to de- 
partment from Mole or Cape Haitien; then to return 
to Santiago and report further at Cienfuegos or Ha- 
vana, as he thinks best. Plan may be changed when 
it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago 

Comparing this telegram with No. 7 an important 
difference will be observed. In No. 7 Schley was di- 
rected to “send the Scorpion to communicate with 
those auxiliaries at Santiago, and direct one of them 
to ‘report to the department the change I have made 
in the plan^ ^strongly advised^ by the department^* 
The important words in italics are omitted. 

Someone of the staff, in his testimony, called this 
a “paraphrase’’ of No. 7. Paraphrase is a new defi- 
nition of omission; and why publish a paraphrase 
when the original is to be had, unless it is desired to 
conceal the original which may be part of No. 7 ? 


CHAPTER XXV 


THE REMARKABLE ELUSIVENESS FROM PUBLICITY OF 

DESPATCH NO. 7. 

A VERY remarkable characteristic of that Despatch 
No. 7, and its predecessor No. 6, has been their 
elusiveness from publicity. 

Rear Admiral Sampson made up a long “Report 
of Operations ot North Atlantic Fleet,” dated from 
Guantanamo, August 3, 1898 (just one month after 
the Battle of Santiago), which covers forty-seven 
pages of the Appendix (A. 458-505). This report 
gives a copy of every letter and telegram sent and 
received by him relative to those operations, no matter 
how long or short or apparently unimportant, up to 
July 3, 1898, except those important two, Nos. 6 and 
J, which managed to get omitted; but the memo- 
randum enclosed in No. 6 was put into the report. 

It is not suggested that Sampson was knowingly 
privy to those omissions. Such reports are generally 
compiled by the staff of the commander-in-chief, who 
must trust them to make a correct compilation. He 
could not be expected to keep in mind all the de- 
spatches he had sent and received, or personally make 
the compilation. 

The reason for omission of those two despatches 
is apparent enough, for they are a complete justifica- 
tion of Schley^ s remaining at Cienfuegos as long as 
he did. And a reason for publishing the memorandum 
taken out of No. 6 is just as apparent, for it could 
be used, as it subsequently was, against Schley. 

By the time (August 3) that report came to be 
made by Sampson, the Sampson-Schley controversy 
was raging, and every possible effort was being made 
to throw odium upon Schley. To this end the sup- 


94 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


pressio verV^ was more efficacious than the ^^siiggestlo 
falsi, because harder to detect and expose. 

The letter-press copybook of the commander-ln- 
chief (as already stated) contains a copy of No. 7, 
and the latter is too long and Important to have been 
accidentally overlooked. It shows upon its face that 
it was copied Into such book, and that letter-book was 
in possession of and kept by the staff. The com- 
mander-in-chief would never see it except as he might 
call for It to clear up some doubt as to the contents of 
some letter that had been sent off. 

To say that such an Important despatch In the In- 
terest of a truthful account of Schley’s conduct of the 
Flying Sqadron was accidentally omitted by those who 
made up the report of the commander-in-chlef, is an 
excuse rather more culpable and reprehensible than 
intentional concealment, and it requires rather more 
credulity than the average man possesses to believe 
that it was innocently done. 

Schley brought No. 7 out for the first time by his 
letter to the Senate of the United States (Ex. Doc. D. 
p. 62), but the Department seized It and put it back 
in its secret files, whence, so far as the Department 
could control. It has never since been allowed to es- 
cape into the light of day, except when brought out 
by Schley’s counsel’s demand, before the Court of In- 
quiry. 


CHAPTER XXVI 


THE NOMINATIONS OF SCHLEY AND SAMPSON FOR 

PROMOTION 

More, however, remains to be told of the elusiveness 
of No. 7 from publicity. On August ii, 1898, 
President McKinley advanced Schley six numbers and 
Sampson eight, and gave them each an ad interim 
commission as rear admiral. This placed Sampson 
one number above Schley on the Navy List, whereas 
he had theretofore been two numbers below Schley. 

Schley’s commission, among other formal things, 
contained the following: 

William McKinley 
President of the United States of America 


To All to Whom These Presents May Come: 

Know ye. That, reposing special Trust and 
Confidence in the Patriotism, Fidelity and Abili- 
ties of 

WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY, 

I do advance him Six numbers, and appoint him 
a Rear Admiral in the Navy, for eminent and 
conspicuous conduct in battle, from the loth day 
of August, 1898, in the service of the United 
States. 

William McKinley. 

By the President, 

John D. Long, 

Secretary of the Navy. 


96 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


In addition to this promotion, President McKinley 
had appointed Rear Admiral Schley as one of the 
commissioners to receive from the Spanish authorities 
in Porto Rico the surrender of that island and all 
governmental property therein. Schley most ef- 
ficiently performed the duties thus imposed. 

Admiral Sampson was advanced by the President 
eight numbers and nominated to be rear admiral. 
The writer has never seen a copy of Sampson’s ad in- 
terim commission, but the President could hardly have 
promoted him for “eminent and conspicuous conduct 
in battle,” because he had never been in any battle. 
He was also honored by appointment as one of the 
commissioners to receive the surrender of Cuba. 

On December 7, 1898, Schley and Sampson were 
both nominated to the Senate of the United States for 
its advice and consent to their advancement and pro- 
motion, Sampson’s proposed promotion being such as 
to place him one number on the Navy List ahead of 
Schley, whereas up to that time Sampson had been 
two numbers below Schley, as already stated. 

By these several appointments and proposed pro- 
motions President McKinley set the seal of his ap- 
proval upon Schley’s conduct up to that time. 

When the Senate came to consider the promotions, 
the absurdity of promoting Sampson over Schley was 
so apparent that the Senate, on January 23, 1899, in 
executive session (Ex. Doc. C. i) 

^^Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and 
he is, hereby directed to furnish the Senate with the 
facts and military records in the possession of his de- 
partment affecting the proposal that, under Section 
1506 of the Revised Statutes, Commodore Sampson 
be advanced eight numbers; and Commodore Schley 
six numbers; and the same information with respect 
to other nominations for promotion under the same 
section, and Section 1905, which were sent to the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 97 

Senate with the above nominations, on December 7, 
1898.” 

Secretary Long thereupon appointed a board of 
officers to make up such ‘‘facts and military records”; 
but instead of appointing on that board impartial 
members senior to both Schley and Sampson, he ap- 
pointed Captains Robley D. Evans and Henry C. 
Taylor (Evans’s brother-in-law), who, as was well 
known, were two of Schley’s most pronounced critics. 
To assist them he named Ensign Henry H. Ward, 
another of the same sort, and then, to give an appear- 
ance of fairness, placed on the board Lieutenant 
James H. Sears, Schley’s former flag lieutenant and 
devoted friend. 

No more unseemly, not to say scandalous (in a 
military sense) act was ever done than the appoint- 
ment of that board, and for the two following 
reasons : 

First — It is a universal rule of the military and 
naval services that no inferior shall ever, except in 
case of absolute necessity, be allowed to sit in judg- 
ment upon a superior officer, or express any opinion 
upon the conduct of such superior. 

Admiral Dewey, as president of the Court of In- 
quiry, speaking for the court, stated the rule (I. 
291) : “We have twice ruled that questions calling 
for the opinions of a junior on the actions of a senior 
ought not to be asked.” 

Second — Not one of those officers should have been 
appointed: Evans and Taylor because of their well- 
known antagonism to Schley, and their inferiority 
in rank to him, and also because the record they were 
to make up was to affect their own promotions then 
pending before the Senate; Sears because he was an 
ardent friend of Schley, and Ward because he was the 
superserviceable servant of Schley’s enemies. 

There were plenty of officers from whom the mem- 

7 


98 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


bers of the board could and should have been se- 
lected — all senior to those who were to be affected by 
the report. 

That board made up the record as unfavorably to 
Schley as they possibly could, and the Secretary of the 
Navy sent it to the Senate to be considered by that 
body, in secret session (as he supposed it would be), 
with the statement that “the board report that the 
facts as therein stated correspond with the facts and 
military records in the possession of the Department.” 

But the Secretary failed to inform the Senate that 
Lieutenant Sears had made up an additional, and, in 
some particulars, contradictory report, and upon ask- 
ing if he might send it to the department, was in- 
formed that he might so send it, but that it would not 
be sent to the Senate as part of the board’s report. 

What could a mere lieutenant do against three 
others, two of whom were captains, whose nomina- 
tions were also to be affected by the military records 
upon which they themselves were reporting? 

The board had unlimited access to every record of 
the department, every paper that had been sent it by 
Schley or Sampson, and at Sampson’s letter-books. 
But of course they accidentally or purposely failed 
to send, as part of the record. Dispatches Nos. 6 and 
7, although copies of these were in Sampson’s letter- 
books. Schley’s report of May 30 (A. 402) also 
contains reference to Despatch No. 7, as follows: 
“That day (May 22) the Dupont joined me with 
despatches from Admiral Sampson, directing that the 
blockade of Cienfuegos be preserved, and that the 
Scorpion be sent to communicate with the Minne- 
apolis and Harvard^ off Santiago.” 

When this precious report reached the Senate, the 
overwhelming majority of that body considered it so 
unjust to permit an honorable officer thus to be, as it 
were, stabbed in the back and in the dark, that the 
injunction of secrecy was removed and a copy of the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 99 


report, and of Secretary Long’s letter which ac- 
companied it, was sent to Schley by the Committee on 
Naval Affairs, with the request that he would make 
such communication to the Senate as he might desire. 

In Schley^ s reply (I. pp. 1661-1663) sent to the 
Senate under date of February 18, i8gg, No. 7 was 
for the first time made public. 

It would have slept in some unapproachable stow- 
hole of the Department until the present hour but 
for its production by the commodore, for the depart- 
ment has never yet published it among the other 
records of the Spanish War. 

Its production by the commodore was what in old 
times was called a “shot betwixt wind and water.” 
A blunderbuss fired at a flock of wild ducks would not 
have produced a greater sensation among the ducks 
than did Despatch No. 7 among Schley’s enemies in 
the Navy Department. 

The Secretary made haste to deny that the depart- 
ment had suppressed the despatch. Well, nobody 
had charged that it had suppressed it. Schley stated 
that it had not been published, which was a fact, but 
charged nobody with suppressing it. ^^Qui s^ excuse^ 
s^ accuse^ ^ seems not inapplicable. The Secretary 
should have been above any such suppression, but 
there were plenty of malicious ones surrounding him 
who were none too scrupulous about use of means to 
discredit Schley. 

In this connection, however, it is a noticeable fact, 
which compels some doubt of the accuracy of Mr. 
Long’s disclaimer, to find that in his book, since 
printed, he makes no reference to Despatch No. 7, 
and thus virtually suppresses it, although he makes 
effort to show that Schley’s delay off Cienfuegos was 
unwarranted. 

Ought one who intends to be fair, to suppress or 
keep back any of the orders under which the com- 
modore acted? Only one answer can properly be 
given — Certainly not. 


CHAPTER XXVII 


THE BLOCKADE OFF CIENFUEGOS CONTINUED 

It would seem, from the indorsements made on them 
at the time by the commodore’s secretary (Lieutenant 
Wells), that the same vessel that brought the second 
copy of No. 7 also brought No. 8, which was as fol- 
lows : 

“No. 8 (Received May 23, 8.15 A. M.). 

“U. S. Flagship New York, 

“Key West, May 21, 1898. 

“Sir: — i. Spanish squadron probably at Santiago 
de Cuba — four ships and three torpedo boat destroy- 
ers. If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos^^ 
proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago 
dc Cuba, and if the enemy is there^ blockade him in 
port. 

“You will probably find it necessary to establish 
communication with some of the inhabitants — fisher- 
men and others — to learn definitely that the ships are 
in that port, it being impossible to see into it from 
outside. 

“2. When the instructions sent by the Iowa and 
Dupont (duplicates) were written, I supposed that 
two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, 
but I have since learned that they have been ordered 
by the department to get in touch with theJSpanish 
fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just 
telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicholas 
Mole. 


^The italics are all mine. — ^J. P. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA loi 


“3. Report from Nicholas Mole. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. T. Sampson, 

^^Rear Admiral 

^^Conimanderdn-Chief. 

“The Commodore, 

“Flying Squadron.” 


The fact that the department had sent scouts to 
get in “touch with the Spaniards on the north coast 
of Venezuela” was another exhibition of its uncer- 
tainty of the whereabouts of Cervera. 

The commodore received at the same time with 
No. 8, the Memorandum following, viz: 

“It is thought that the enclosed instructions will 
reach you by 2 A. M., May 23. This will enable you 
to leave before daylight (regarded very important), 
so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at 
Santiago, A. M., May 24. It is thought the Spanish 
squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they 
must have some repairs to make, and coal to take. 

“The St, Paul and Minneapolis have been tele- 
graphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish 
squadron goes westward, one is to keep in touch, and 
one is to go west and meet you. 

“If the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep 
in touch, and the other will go into Nicholas Mole 
to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cay 
Francis, two hundred miles east of Habana. If you 
arrive off Santiago, and no scout meets you, send a 
vessel to call at Nicholas Mole, and get information 
to be left there by scout as to direction taken by 
Spanish in case they have left Santiago de Cuba. 

“The Yale has been ordered to cruise in the Ba- 
hama Channel, until May 24. It is thought possible 
that the squadron, hearing of your departure from 
Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there. If this word 


102 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to 
mask your real direction as much as possible. 

“Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction 
they may take. 

“W. T. Sampson^ Rear Admiral, 

^‘The Commodore, 

“Flying Squadron.” 


In manuscript on the margin of the above memo- 
randum is the following: 

“Our experience has been that ships may be traced 
by their smoke from twenty to thirty miles, and it is 
suggested in case you leave in the daytime to stand 
a good distance to the westward before turning to the 
eastward.” 

As has already been shown by endorsements on 
them, these two papers came together, and were re- 
ceived at 8.15 A. M., several hours after daylight of 
the 23d. The manuscript suggestion on the memo- 
randum was childlike. No one of any sense what- 
ever would have left that blockade in the daytime. 

In addition to the direction contained in No. 7 to 
Schley, to “Hold his squadron off Cienfuegos,” an- 
other condition was now imposed by No. 8, requiring 
him to leave for Santiago de Cuba, only when he was 
satisfied that the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos/^ 

Suppose he had gone away without satisfying him- 
self, and that the Spaniards had been left in that port; 
and, after Schley’s departure, had come out and run 
the blockade into Havana, which, with Sampson two 
hundred miles to the east, at Cay Francis, there would 
have been no difficulty in doing, what a howl of criti- 
cism would have been raised about it ! 

On that same day the British steamer Adula ap- 
peared with her budget of conflicting reports, and 
Schley, who up to that moment had nothing but un- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 103 


certainties from Sampson and the department about 
Cervera’s whereabouts, was not satisfied that Cer- 
vera was not at Cienfuegos. 

Availing himself of the Adiila, he permitted her 
to go Into the port under promise to come out next 
day, so that he could get from her passengers Infor- 
mation as to whether Cervera was there or not. 

Admiral Dewey commended Schley for this ac- 
tion (I. 1830), saying, ‘‘Commodore Schley, In per- 
mitting the British steamer Adula to enter the port 
of Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information con- 
cerning the Spanish squadron from her when she 
came out.” 

It will be remembered that up to this time knowl- 
edge of the code of signals that Captain McCalla had 
arranged with the Cubans near Cienfuegos was still 
slumbering peacefully in the mind of Captain Robley 
D. Evans, who, when Informed that the signals had 
been made, knew that the Cubans were asking to be 
allowed to communicate with the commodore, and 
who, although he saw that no attention was paid to 
the request by the commodore, let the knowledge 
slumber on. 

On the 23d the commodore sent to Admiral Samp- 
son the following despatches: 

“M. 43. “U. S. Flagship Brooklyn, 

“Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

“Sir: — In reply to your letter No. 8 I would state 
that I am by no means satisfied that the Spanish 
squadron is not at Cienfuegos. ♦ The large amount of 
smoke seen In the harbor would indicate the presence 
of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances 
It would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a 
probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported via Ha- 
vana, no doubt as a ruse. 

“I shall therefore remain off this port with this 


104 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


squadron, availing myself of every opportunity for 
coaling, and keeping it ready for any emergency. 

“Regarding the enclosed information from Com- 
mander McCalla, I would state that I went twice 
yesterday close to the mouth of the harbor, the first 
time about two thousand yards, and the second time 
about fourteen hundred yards, but saw no evidence 
of any masked batteries near the entrance. 

“Well up the river, across their torpedo mine fields, 
now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a 
new battery constructed, hardly within range from 
the mouth of the river. 

“The Castine^ MerrlmaCy and Hawk arrived this 
morning, and I send the Hawk back with these de- 
spatches. 

“Last night I sent the Scorpion East to Santiago 
de Cuba, to communicate with the scouts off that 
port, with instructions if they were not there, to re- 
turn to me at once here, and I expect her back day 
after to-morrow. I am further satisfied that the des- 
tination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos 
or Havana. 

“This point, being in communication with Havana, 
would be better for their purposes, if it were left ex- 
posed; and I think that we ought to be very care- 
ful how we receive information from Havana, which 
is, no doubt, sent out for the purpose of misleading 
us. 

^^lowa is coaling to-day, having reached this sta- 
tion with only about half of her coal supply. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. S. Schley, 

^^CommodorCy &c. 

“To THE Commander-in-Chief.” 

The commodore also sent to Admiral Sampson the 
following : 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 105 


“M. 44. “U. S. Flagship Brooklyn, 

“Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

“Sir: — Steamer Adtila, chartered by Consul Dent, 
with proper papers from U. S. State Department, to 
carry neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped off this 
port this morning. She had no cargo, and was per- 
mitted to enter. She reports that she left Santiago 
de Cuba at 4.30 p. M., May 18, and that night she 
saw the lights of seven vessels, seventy miles to the 
southward of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, May 
19, at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at San- 
tiago. Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to 
have left Santiago. Now, on Saturday, May 21, 
when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard 
from the bridge of this vessel firing of guns towards 
Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the 
Spanish fleet; and the news this morning by the Adula 
convinces me that the fleet is here. 

“Latest war bulletin from Jamaica, received this 
morning, asserts that the fleet has left Santiago. I 
think them here, almost to a certainty. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. S. Schley, 

^^Commodore, &c. 

“To THE Commander-in-Chief.” 

One who reads the foregoing despatches from 
Commodore Schley to Admiral Sampson cannot but 
be struck with the doubtfulness and uncertainty that 
pervade them. There is nothing positive in any of 
Schley’s expressions, but, on the contrary, many 
expressions of doubt whether the Spaniards were at 
Santiago de Cuba. 

Remembering that the only information received 
through Sampson as to the whereabouts of Cervera 
had come through Spanish sources, and what Schley 
knew in addition was what the Adula had brought 


io6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


him, can there be any doubt that he was correct in 
saying in No. 43, to Sampson, “It would be ex- 
tremely unwise to chase a probability at Santiago de 
Cuba, reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse”; and 
“I think we ought to be very careful how we receive 
information from Havana, which is, no doubt, sent 
out for the purpose of misleading us”? 

If Admiral Sampson had thought it advisable to 
change the “plan strongly advised by the depart- 
ment,” all he had to do was to give Schley a positive 
order to leave Cienfuegos and go off to Santiago de 
Cuba. He was wise not to do this, leaving to Schley, 
who was on the spot, the responsibility of finding out 
whether Cervera was at Cienfuegos. 

The Navy Department’s despatch said, “The re- 
port of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba 
might very well be correct.” Yes, so it might; and it 
might just as well be incorrect. 

On May 22 Sampson issued to that part of his 
fleet on the north coast of Cuba, then off Havana, an 
“Order of Battle” (A. 469), which he began as fol- 
lows : 

“It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now 
off Havana will meet the Spanish ships [naming 
them]. 

“These vessels are supposed to be now in Santiago 
de Cuba, where they are taking coal and provisions. 
The squadron of Commodore Schley will probably 
leave Cienfuegos to-morrow, bound east in pursuit of 
the Spanish ships ; and it is anticipated that they will 
leave Santiago de Cuba on the same day that Com- 
modore Schley leaves Cienfuegos, to reach Havana 
by north coast of Cuba ; in which case the blockading 
squadron off Havana will attempt to intercept them, 
by going east about two hundred miles beyond the 
junction of the Santaren and Nicholas channels. The 
object in view (A. 470) is to occupy the Nicholas 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 107 


Channel in such manner as to prevent the approach 
of the Spanish squadron from the east towards Ha- 
vana.’’ 

On the morning of the 24th he received from the 
Navy Department the despatch following: 

“Washington, May 23. 

“The information of the department all goes to 
indicate that the principal aim of the Spanish fleet 
and government is to introduce a supply of munitions 
of war and food to Blanco by Havana and Cienfue- 
gos. This is for your information. 

“Allen, Assist , Secy ^ 

“Cienfuegos !” “Cienfuegos !” “Cienfuegos !” was 
always the cry. 

Schley’s despatches, M. 43 and M. 44, above given 
in full, were sent to Admiral Sampson by the Hawk, 
delivered by her commander to the Dolphin, and by 
the latter vessel were delivered on board the flagship 
New York, at some distance to the eastward of Ha- 
vana, on the 26th of May. When these despatches 
were received the situation was naturally and properly 
discussed in the cabin of the flagship New York be- 
tween the admiral and other officers of rank. 

From an officer of high rank (whose declarations 
import, in the navy, absolute verity) the following 
statement has been received: 

“There were present, besides myself. Admiral 
Sampson, Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, and per- 
haps others. Chadwick was animadverting upon 
Schley’s proposed delay at Cienfuegos. I said: ‘Let 
us see the orders that have been sent to him.’ These 
were brought in, and as they were read aloud I saw a 
surprised look come into Chadwick’s face, and he said 
to the admiral, ‘I didn’t know that you had sent such 


io8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


orders to Commodore Schley.’ ‘Yes,’ replied the ad- 
miral, ‘he is only obeying his orders.’ ” 

Captain Chadwick testified before the Court of 
Inquiry (I. 854) relative to that Order No. 8, — 
which, it will be remembered, contained the Instruc- 
tion: “If you are satisfied that they [the Spanish 

fleet] are not at Cienfuegos, then proceed, but cau- 
tiously, to Santiago de Cuba” — “I did not read the 
original despatch until the answer was brought by the 
Hawk, That was on May 26, when the ship \^New 
York^ was at a point between Havana and Cay 
Francis, and in the vicinity of Cay Pedros.” 

Chadwick thus partly confirms the statement 
above. 

The Impartial mind. In view of the foregoing, will 
be satisfied that Commodore Schley was right in doing 
just what he did — to obey in letter and spirit the or- 
ders he had received from Rear Admiral Sampson 
with regard to remaining off Cienfuegos, until he 
(Schley) was “satisfied that the Spanish ships were 
not there, and then proceed, but cautiously, to Santi- 
ago de Cuba.” 

Having finally learned from Captain McCalla the 
significance of the signals that he had noted along 
shore for some time, Schley promptly sent the Marble- 
head and Eagle to communicate with the Cubans, 
from whom it was definitely learned that Cervera’s 
fleet was not in that port. The vessels did not get 
back until about 4 o’clock p. M. Commodore Schley 
then wrote to Commodore Rcmey, at Key West, that 
he would leave for Santiago de Cuba next day (25th) ; 
but instead, as soon as night set In, having meanwhile 
arranged his squadron for the purpose, he started at 
about 8 o’clock p. M. of the 24th, for that port. 
That he had a right to change his mind about the 
time he would leave Cienfuegos cannot be questioned, 
and particularly when the change was for an earlier 
departure. 


CHAPTER XXVIII 


THE CHARACTER OF SCHLEY’s BLOCKADE OF 

CIENFUEGOS 

The majority of the Court of Inquiry expressed the 
opinion that ^‘Commodore Schley should have main- 
tained a close blockade of that port” (Cienfuegos) . 
They do not say that the blockade was not effective. 
All authorities agree, however, that If a blockade is 
‘‘effective,” It Is a “close blockade.” 

What constitutes an effective or “close blockade” 
has been much discussed by writers on international 
law, but the following from the work of Rear Ad- 
miral Henry Glass, of the Navy, Is as clear a state- 
ment of the requisites of a “close” (in the sense of 
effective) “blockade” as can be found: 

“The doctrine of the Paris Conference of 1856, 
that blockades, to be obligatory, are to be effective; 
that is to say, maintained by a sufficient force to shut 
out the access of the enemy’s ships and other vessels 
in reality, is now a recognized principle of interna- 
tional law.” 

Mr. Madison, Secretary of State under Thomas 
Jefferson, stated to our minister to England, Mr. 
Charles Pinckney that “the law requires that to con- 
stitute a blockade there should be the presence and 
position of a force rendering access to the prohibited 
place manifestly difficult and dangerous.” 

The Navy Department instructed the flag officer 
commanding the United States naval force in the 
Pacific in 1846 that “a lawful maritime blockade re- 
quires the actual presence of a sufficient force situ- 
ated at the entrance of the ports sufficiently near to 
prevent communication.” 

Admiral Glass further says-: “The doctrine that 


no SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


has been laid down by the English and American 
courts, which is approved by English and American 
writers, and which is embodied in the policy of both 
countries, requires that the place shall be watched by 
a force sufficient to render the egress or ingress dan- 
gerous; or, in other words, sufficient to render the 
capture of vessels attempting to go in or come out 
most probable.” 

Admiral Sampson himself issued to his fleet 
“Squadron General Order No. lo,” in which he says 
(A. i68) : “A blockade, to be effective and binding, 
must be maintained by a force sufficient to render in- 
gress to, or egress from, the port dangerous.” 

Tested by these principles and definitions, the opin- 
ion expressed by Admiral Dewey, that “the blockade 
of Cienfuegos was effective,” has common sense as 
well as international law to back it, while the opinion 
of Admirals Benham and Ramsay is without warrant 
of either. 

During his three days there Commodore Schley, in 
the daytime, let his vessels “loll about” in positions 
near the entrance where they could be seen, so as to 
give the impression of a want of preparation for 
battle, in hopes that the enemy might thereby be 
tempted to come out. When night came they were 
formed in line of battle, in complete readiness, with 
the lighter vessels that he had available, on picket 
duty, much nearer to the entrance. 


CHAPTER XXIX 


THE VOYAGE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON FROM 
CIENFUEGOS TO SANTIAGO 

It will be remembered that Order No. 8 of the com- 
mander-in-chief to Commodore Schley was (A. 
466) : ‘‘Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de 
Cuba. If you are satisfied they are not in Cienfuegos 
proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago 
de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in 
port.” 

And in his memorandum he added: “Follow the 
Spanish squadron, whichever direction they take.” 

It is a fact of some significance that up to this time 
the Flying Squadron had never been formally placed 
under the command of Sampson; but on May 24, 
1898, this telegram was sent to Sampson, by the 
Navy Department: “Until further orders the Flying 
Squadron is under your orders, and Schley will be so 
informed. — Long.” 

And to Schley: “Till further orders the Flying 
Squadron is under the orders of Sampson, Com- 
mander-in-Chief North Atlantic Station. — Long.” 

Schley did not receive this order until after his ar- 
rival off Santiago de Cuba, but he had already, on the 
1 8th of May, and since, recognized Sampson as his 
commanding officer. 

The evidence and log-books of the vessels show 
that on the voyage towards Santiago de Cuba the 
commodore proceeded as fast as he could and yet 
maintain the integrity of his squadron ; that is to say, 
without abandoning his smaller vessels and the collier 
Merrimac, The distance was about 340 nautical 
miles. 

Admiral Sampson, in his Century article, says, “It 


1 12 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


was a day’s run.” To have run It In a day would 
have required an average speed of more than fourteen 
knots an hour, and none of the vessels except the 
Brooklyn could make that speed except upon a spurt 
of an hour or so. 

The log-books of the ships show that on the 25 th 
the weather and sea were rough, with stiff to fresh 
breezes from the east (these were head winds) . 

Rear Admiral HIggInson testified (I. 36) : “The 
weather was rough; not rough for a battle-ship, but 
It was rough for small vessels.” Rear Admiral 
Evans (I. 361 ) : “The weather on the evening of the 
24th was squally, raining and squally. On the 25th 
the weather changed, and we had a long swell from 
the southeast. On the 25th the weather got worse. 
In the afternoon the squalls were fresh; there was a 
good deal of rain, and a long swell from the south- 
east.” 

The log-book of the Marblehead: “May 25th, 
commences overcast, cloudy, drizzling and squally. 
Fresh breeze from E. S. E. Rough sea from S’d and 
Sd. & Eastward. The port lower boom was unship- 
ped and carried away. Stiff to fresh breezes from 
E. N. E., rough sea.” 

Log-book of the Vixen: “Fresh breezes from 
E. S. E. ; overcast and cloudy with frequent and 
heavy rain, and moderate gale In squalls. Moderate 
to heavy sea, breaking over forecastle occasionally. 
About 7.05 A. M. an unusually heavy sea was taken 
on board, and washed C. Buehler (Ch. G. M.) from 
the forecastle to the main deck. Inflicting thereby a 
severe flesh wound In his thigh.” 

All through that day this log-book shows “stiff to 
fresh breezes, heavy head sea; ship pitching and roll- 
ing uncomfortably.” 

The log-books record slowing to allow the Eagle, 
which had dropped astern, to come up. That of the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 113 


Texas: “Stopped to allow the Eagle to rejoin squad- 
ron.” The collier Merrimac also fell behind. 

Enough has been quoted from those log-books to 
show that while the weather and sea were not such as 
to interfere very much with the large vessels of the 
squadron, they did interfere very greatly with the 
speed of the smaller vessels. 

The testimony of Captain Francis S. Cook, with 
respect to the weather on that voyage, should be ac- 
cepted without question. He commanded the flag- 
ship Brooklyn, and was acting as chief of staff to the 
commodore, and, as such. It was his duty to keep an 
eye over all the other ships of the squadron and regu- 
late the speed of his ship so as best to keep the squad- 
ron together. He testified (I. 887) : “We had a fair 
run the night of the 24th. The weather gathered 
during the night, and the next day It was squally, 
stormy; and there was from a moderate to a rough 
sea. The 25th was a bad day. On the 26th the 
weather had moderated so far as the wind was con- 
cerned, but there was a long, nasljy sort of a sea, and 
the ships rolled a good deal.” 

While on the subject of the weather, it may be said 
for the benefit of the non-professional reader that It 
Is quite true that there may be a heavy sea 
running while there is little or no wind; and when 
steaming against such a sea a small vessel would have 
a very rough time of It. Even so large a vessel as the 
Marblehead lost one of her swinging booms by It. 
The Vixen was being boarded by heavy “green seas,” 
one of which swept one of her petty officers from the 
forecastle and severely injured him, and the Eagle 
fell so far behind that she was lost sight of by the 
rest of the fleet. 

The majority of the court expressed the opinion 
that Commodore Schley “should not have permitted 
the Eagle to delay the progress of the squadron,” 

8 


1 14 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


but they ignore the fact that it was not the Eagle alone 
that had to be considered. The Vixen and the collier 
MerrimaCy and to some extent the Marblehead also, 
were a cause of delay. 

It is a mere opinion, after all, about which there is 
room for difference, and it may well be doubted if 
either Benham or Ramsay, or any other of Schley’s 
critics would have done very differently if any of 
them had been there in command. 

That Commodore Schley would not have been jus- 
tified in abandoning those smaller vessels and his col- 
lier seems really not open to dispute. They were a 
necessary part of his force, and he required them for 
scouting, for picket duty. Like Lord Nelson’s frig- 
ates, they were the ‘‘eyes of his fleet.” Nelson said 
that when he died they would find the word “frigate” 
engraved on his heart. If perchance, and that was 
one of the possibilities, Schley had met Cervera’s fleet, 
the smaller vessels might have been a great protection 
against the torpedo-boat destroyers of the enemy. 

Of course, as the commodore said in his letter to 
the Senate, if he had known with any certainty that 
the Spanish fleet was in Santiago harbor, no consider- 
ation of the Eagle or any other vessel would have 
prevented him from getting off that port, with his 
heavier ships, at the earliest possible moment.” 

Admiral Dewey’s opinion, expressed in the finding 
of the Court of Inquiry (I. 1830), that “the pas- 
sage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two 
miles south of Santiago was made with as much de- 
spatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a 
unit,” is abundantly justified by the facts above 
shown. 


CHAPTER XXX 


THE EVENTS OF MAY 26, 27, AND 28 

These embrace what has been called the “Retrograde 
Movement”; and will be treated, not apologetically, 
for rightly considered they need no apology, but 
candidly and fairly, with a view to their explanation 
in the interests of truth and justice. 

Admiral Schley, in his letter to the Secretary of 
the Navy asking for the Court of Inquiry, said (I. 
4) : “I admit the right of fair criticism of every pub- 
lic officer.” 

On the evening of May 26, at about five o’clock, 
the Flying Squadron had arrived at a point about 
twenty-two miles S. S. E. from the entrance to the 
harbor of Santiago de Cuba. 

The scouts Yale (Captain William C. Wise), 
Minneapolis (Captain Theodore F. Jewell), and St, 
Paul (Captain Charles D. Sigsbee) had been cruis- 
ing off the harbor and in the vicinity for several days 
prior to that time. 

Captain Jewell testified before the court (I. 351) 
that on the 23d the captains of all those vessels were 
on board a fourth (the Harvard, Captain Charles 
W. Cotton), and “had some talk.” 

Here were four vessels commanded by extremely 
capable officers, whose duty it was to find the Spanish 
fleet, if possible, and they had been diligent, but en- 
tirely unsuccessful. 

Captain Wise testified (I. 212) : “My ship and 
the St, Paul were off Santiago all day of the 2 2d. 
Together we reconnoitered Santiago very carefully 
and closely. Could see nothing. I saw nothing, ex- 
cept around the corner of Cay Smith, where some 
small vessel was anchored, either a torpedo boat or 


ii6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


a small gunboat; I could not determine which it was. 
There was nothing in sight whatever. So the St. Paul 
and my vessel cruised all that day and that night, the 
St. Paul to the eastward, while I took to the west- 
ward. 

“On the 23d the Harvard joined us, and she took 
the course to the westward, the St. Paul to the east- 
ward, and I took to the southward. We observed 
carefully and reconnoitered, going in as closely as 
we could, but we could see nothing.” 

Captain Sigsbee testified (I. 406) : “I proceeded 
for Santiago, where I arrived early in the morning 
of the 2 1st. Within a few days the Yale^ Harvard^ 
and Minneapolis arrived. On the 25th captured the 
British steamer Restorval, coal laden, bound into 
Santiago de Cuba.” 

Now the testimony of all these officers (except 
Cotton of the Harvard) is to the effect that, although 
they all believed at the time that the Spanish squad- 
ron was in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, none of 
them expressed that belief to anyone outside of them- 
selves, or, so far as the testimony given shows, even 
to each other; and they left the commodore in ig- 
norance of their belief, and of whatever reason for 
such belief any of them had. 

There is a remarkable fact about these scouts. As 
stated by Captain Sigsbee, his vessel {St. Paul) cap- 
tured the British steamer Restorval on the 25th. 
Now the log-book of the Cristobal Colon (of Cer- 
vera’s fleet) shows that on the morning of the 25th 
she came down from the inner harbor and took po- 
sition in plain sight from outside the harbor entrance. 

I quote from her log-book as follows : “Anchored at 
7 A. M. At this time the vessels of the enemy were 
discovered off the mouth of the harbor. Morro made 
signal to begin firing; but in a short time it was seen 
that it would be obstructed, as an English steamer 
was about to enter the harbor.” That was the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 117 


Restorval, The Colon could see our ships and the 
Restorval; but our ships could not see the Colon. 

As soon as those scouts were discovered by the 
Flying Squadron the latter ‘Vent to quarters” (which 
is the nautical expression for made ready for battle), 
but it was soon discovered that they were not enemies. 
At 6.20 p. M., in obedience to signal, Captain Sigs- 
bee went on board the Brooklyn^ to make report to 
the commodore. 


CHAPTER XXXI 


THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN SCHLEY AND SIGSBEE 

What occurred between those two officers at that 
meeting was of the greatest importance, because 
Schley immediately acted upon what Sigsbee had said. 

Sigsbee testified (I. 458) : “I knew nothing posi- 
tively about the Spanish fleet at that time. I re- 
ported the situation generally to Commodore Schley. 
I did not say I believed the Spanish fleet was not 
there. I said I had not seen it.” Sigsbee did not 
clairri to have expressed the belief that it was there. 

Commodore Schley testified (I. 1356) : “The 

first thing that I asked Captain Sigsbee when he 
came over the side” — and I want to say before I 
make this statement, that I do not believe that Cap- 
tain Sigsbee would misstate anything for his com- 
mission. I do not believe he is capable of stating 
what Is not true; I think that in this, instance his 
recollection is in fault, and not his veracity — “I said 
to him, ‘Captain, have you got the Dons here,’ or ‘in 
here’? He stated to me: ‘They are not in here. I 
have been in very close.’ He said, ‘They are not 
here, they are only reported here.’ I said to him, 
‘Have any of the other vessels seen them, the Yale 
or Minneapolis?^ He said, ‘No; they have not; they 
have assured me so.’ I assumed from the communi- 
cation with Captain Sigsbee that he was bearing to 
me the assurance of all of them. 

After this conversation Captain Sigsbee went on 
board his ship. • 

Ensign Ralph N. Marble testified (I. 1902) : “I 
heard a conversation between Captain Sigsbee and 
Commodore Schley, on board the Brooklyn, on the 
afternoon of the 26th of May, 1898, when we met 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 119 


the three scouts off Santiago. Captain Sigsbee came 
on board and reported to the commodore. As Cap- 
tain Sigsbee came aft Commodore Schley asked him : 
‘Have we got them?’ (or something to that effect),' 
meaning the Spanish ships as I took it. Captain 
Sigsbee answered: ‘No, they are not here. I have 
been here for about a week, and they could not be 
here unless I knew it.’ [I. 1094.] I do not say 
those are the exact words. That is the text of what 
I heard. I think they are almost the exact words. 
The incident was recalled to my mind less than a 
year later, by some article that was printed in a news- 
paper, with Captain Sigsbee’s signature. I was not 
more than seven or eight feet from them.” 

The judge advocate asked Marble if Captain 
Sigsbee may not have said: “I have been here about 
a week, and have not seen any of them ; or words to 
that effect?” to which Marble replied, “No, sir. As 
I remember, he said, ‘They could not be here unless 
I knew it.’ ” 

The commodore’s orderly (Cronin) testified (I. 
1^35) * heard the commodore ask something of 
Captain Sigsbee. I could not tell exactly what it was. 
I couldn’t quite understand. But I heard Captain 
Sigsbee answer, ‘They are not in there; the Spanish 
fleet are not in there.’ ” 

Mr. George E. Graham, a correspondent of the 
Associated Press (who had been on board the 
Brooklyft since March 29, 1898), testified (I. 1223) : 
“I saw Captain Sigsbee on board the Brooklyn on 
May 26. Heard him in conversation with Commodore 
Schley. After he had reached the quarterdeck by 
the gangway, he stopped, and Commodore Schley 
said to him : ‘Have we got them, Sigsbee?’ He said: 
‘No, they are not here. I have been here for a week, 
and they are not here.’ He went from there back on 
the quarterdeck, and he continued the conversation. 
Commodore Schley said: ‘Are you sure they are not 


120 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


in there?’ He said: ‘I have been very close to the 
harbor entrance two or three times; and Cotton has 
been in and cut the cable; and they are not there.’ I 
heard Captain Sigsbee say that. I took some sort of 
a part in the conversation; I can’t tell exactly what. 
There were several officers near the gangway when 
he made his first statement, I believe; and when we 
went aft there were simply the commodore, Captain 
Sigsbee, and myself. 

‘‘I made a report of our conversation at the time. 
Captain Sigsbee knew I was a newspaper man and 
was there looking for information, and Captain Sigs- 
bee later took a despatch written by me, and vised 
by Commodore Schley. I described the fact that 
the fleet was not there, I think; it was open and un- 
sealed.” 

Three days later (on the 29th) Sigsbee wrote to 
the department (A. 41 1) : 

“This morning, while in towards the coast, after 
chasing, I saw the smoke of a number of vessels to 
the westward; and at once made for the Santiago 
entrance, believing it possible that the strangers were 
the Spanish squadron approaching that portJ^ 

Now, it is pertinent to inquire, how, if eight days 
after the Spanish were reported to have entered Santi- 
ago harbor Captain Sigsbee believed (as he now says 
he did) that the Spaniards were in there, he could 
three days later have believed it possible that they 
were outside and “approaching the port”? Such a 
dilemma “puzzles the will.” 

While there is not the slightest intention of sug- 
gesting any purposed change of statement on the 
part of Captain Sigsbee, it must be said that the fore- 
going testimony shows “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
that Captain Sigsbee’s memory was in fault; and 
that he did say, in substance, to Commodore Schley 
what Schley says he did; and that he stated to the 
commodore that the Spaniards were not in Santiago 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 121 


harbor at that time. And, whatever his language, 
he certainly conveyed that Impression to the commo- 
dore. 

In addition to what SIgsbee said, he had brought 
with him a Santiago pilot, Eduardo Nunez, who testi- 
fied (I. 914) : “I was asked by the commodore If I 
knew the Spanish vessels were then at Santiago? I 
replied that I doubted If they were In yet, because 
they were very large vessels, and the water was not 
deep enough, and the channel was too narrow.’^ 

Captain SIgsbee, In a letter written to the depart- 
ment on February 24, 1899, said: “In my position 
as commanding officer as a scout It would have been 
a great mistake to have stated to Admiral Schley 
that I did not believe Admiral Cervera’s fleet was In 
Santiago harbor.” 

It Is difficult to accept that proposition. A scout 
Is defined by Webster, as “One employed to gain In- 
formation of the movements of an enemy,” and Mil- 
ton says : ’ 

“Scouts each coast light-armored scour, 

Each quarter to descry the distant foe.” 

According to Captain SIgsbee, when they have 
“descried,” or failed, or have acquired such Informa- 
tion as gives them an opinion as to the whereabouts 
of the foe, they must keep silent until particularly 
asked by the commander-In-chlef before It would be 
proper to Impart to him the tidings they may have 
gained of the movements of an enemy, or the opinions 
they have formed of his whereabouts. 

Such a conception of the duty of a scout seems pre- 
posterous to the common mind. The Idea that a 
scout should stand dumb and require the senior officer 
to worm out of him by adroit questionings such In- 
formation and opinions as he may have acquired and 
formed. Is original with Captain SIgsbee. It would, 
on the contrary, seem to be the duty of a scout to give 


122 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


to the commanding officer present all the information 
he may have obtained, and to express any opinion he 
may have formed. 

If his opinion was that Cervera’s fleet was in San- 
tiago Bay, it was his clear duty to say so; and if he 
had said so, no one could have supposed that he had 
expressed to Schley the opinion that it was not there. 

But whatever was or was not said, the result was 
not to remove from the commodore’s mind the un- 
certainty and doubt indicated by the telegram from 
the department to Sampson, which had been sent him 
by the admiral in that Despatch No. 7, which up to 
that time was all that Schley had concerning the 
whereabouts of the Spanish fleet. 


CHAPTER XXXII 


THE COALING PROBLEM 

It should be remembered that prior to the war with 
Spain coaling in the open sea was a problem that had 
not been solved. To the sailor nothing seemed more 
dangerous than to attempt to bring two heavy ships 
close enough alongside of each other at sea to en- 
able one to coal from the other. As soon as the 
collier Merrimac arrived off Cienfuegos coaling 
efforts were begun, but without much success. 

Admiral Sampson, in the article printed over his 
own signature in the Century Magazine for April, 
1899 (at page 898), well says: “Schley had become 
greatly disquieted by the difficulty he experienced in 
coaling his ships, and by the fear that, with a continu- 
ance of bad weather, he might become short of coal, 
although he had the Merrimac in company, with 
about four thousand tons aboard. Only those who 
have experienced the anxiety caused by such a doubt 
can appreciate its wearing effects.”^ 

Having the coal on board the Merrimac was well; 
but to get it out of her holds into the bunkers of the 
fighting ships was the problem to be solved. 

Captain Cook’s testimony (I. 892-3) states the 
exact conditions: “Until dark of the 27th, when the 
weather indications decidedly moderated, we [himself 
and the commodore] were both watching the weather 
pretty closely. I did say at that time that they could 
coal, as it had moderated, and he evidently thought 
so himself, as he made signal to them to coal. The 
weather overhead had been good, as I recollect it, for 
twenty-four hours, and the sea was moderating. At 
that time the sea was getting quite moderate; and. 


^The italics are mine. — J. P. 


124 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


as I knew that the commodore wanted to coal as soon 
as he could, I spoke to him at that time. The signals 
were made, and the Marblehead commenced coaling 
at once, first with boats,^ and then they got the ship 
alongside to coal. Signal was made to the Texas^; 
that was the only ship I thought he was particularly 
anxious about, and I knew that on board the Texas 
they were very anxious, and I presumed they were 
watching the weather, too. But they had not asked; 
and he signaled — wigwagged. They did try; and 
they succeeded and got coal. 

Captain Philip, commanding the Texas ^ was cer- 
tainly as anxious to fill up his ship’s bunkers as any- 
one else could possibly be. A modern battleship 
without coal is like a sailing ship with her masts and 
sails gone, and if he had not been doubtful, Philip 
would undoubtedly have answered “Yes,” and not, 
“We can try.” 

The judge advocate of the court of inquiry 
(Lemly) made persistent effort to show, by Captain 
Cook, that Schley did not order the coaling until 
after Cook suggested it to him; but Cook testified 
further (I. 893) : 

“I really couldn’t say whether the order was given 
after that conversation. I wouldn’t like to say that 
he was controlled by anything I said, because I knew 
that his anxiety was mine. He had the responsibility, 
and I did not. I don’t say the sea was smooth. I 
say the sea was better. There was always a long 
swell there. It was a new experience entirely.” 

The judge advocate put the following question: 
“This matter of coaling at sea is not a very easy 
matter, under any conditions. Captain, so far as you 
know?” To which Cook replied: “No, I think after 

“This would not have been done if it had been thought safe to 
go alongside the collier. — J. P. 

® The signal record is as follows : ‘‘7 P. M. Do you think you could 
coal to-night? Ans. 7.01. We can try. 7.02. Brooklyn to Texas, 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 125 


experience, perhaps, changed our opinions a good 
deal; but I must say that in coaling down there, 
I never did see as bad a sea as we had at that time. 

“We never had anything like It afterwards, accord- 
ing to my recollection — a sea that made it so trouble- 
some to go alongside a collier. The 25th was a very 
bad day; I don’t think it was practicable at all, to 
coal. The next day (26th) was a bad day, and up 
to the 27th. I think that, possibly, if the Texas had 
made the trial a little before on the 27th, she could 
have done so. They coaled all night of 27th, and 
part of next morning, the 28th; and at noon we 
started for Santiago.” 

Lieutenant Harlow, of the Vixen (I. 1320), 
clearly stated the coaling problem thus: “I should 
say that, in the light of all the experience we had 
during the war, no one would have attempted to coal 
ship on the 26th. In the early part of the 26th no 
amount of experience would have warranted in coal- 
ing ship. In the after part of the 26th, with the ex- 
perience we had at that time. It is doubtful whether 
they would have tried it. But with experience we 
learned a good many things.” A most pregnant re- 
mark which the ancients expressed by the two words : 
Experientia docet. 

It Is worthy of notice that. In a report made by 
Admiral Cervera (published by the Navy Depart- 
ment), that officer states that the weather (“storm,” 
he calls it) on the 26th was such as to prevent the 
Spanish squadron from putting to sea, as had been 
resolved upon for the day. 


CHAPTER XXXIII 


THE EVENTS OF MAY 26, 27, AND 28 CONTINUED 

The interview with Captain Sigsbee had not re- 
lieved the uncertainty of the situation, and the coal- 
ing problem was pressing for solution. Therefore, 
acting in accordance with his best judgment; without 
any certain knowledge of the whereabouts of that 
Spanish fleet; after having been informed by the 
scouts that, although they had all been off Santiago 
for a week, they had seen nothing of It, and knew 
nothing of its movements or whereabouts since It had 
left Curacao; after having been assured by Captain 
Sigsbee that he did not believe It was In Santiago; 
and knowing that as the sea and weather then were 
it would be impossible to coal his squadron off the 
port. Commodore Schley deemed it best to return, 
via the south side of Cuba and the Yucatan Channel, 
to Key West, to fill up his ships bunkers with coal and 
be ready for any emergency. And so on the night of 
the 26th, at 9.50, he started to the westward with 
his whole squadron. 

The collier Merrimac had broken down and had 
to be towed, and but little progress could be made; 
and so after standing west for two hours and a half, 
and for a distance at the most of 16.5 knots, the 
fleet was stopped by signal from the flagship, at 1 1 
to enable the collier to make repairs. Great difficulty 
was experienced by the Yale In towing her, and the 
log-book of the latter shows , that all that night, and 
next day up to 1 1 o’clock A. M., was passed in various 
efforts to get the Merrimac In tow ; also that the sea 
was “rough and confused.” Meanwhile the fleet 
drifted. 

At 9.30 A. M. of the 27th the Harvard (scout) 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 127 


arrived from St. Nicholas Mole. She brought a de- 
spatch from the Navy Department, which was in the 
following words : 


“Washington, May 25, 1898. 

“Harvard, St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti: 

“Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also 
the senior officer off Santiago, as follows : All depart- 
ment’s information indicates Spanish division is still 
at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you 
to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does 
not leave without a decisive action. 

“Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say there 
are landing places five or six nautical miles west from 
the mouth of the harbor; and that there insurgents 
probably will be found, and not the Spanish. 

“From the surrounding heights can see every ves- 
sel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify depart- 
ment whether enemy is there. Could not squadron, 
and also Harvard^ coal from Merrimac leeward of 
Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel, or Mole Haiti? Re- 
port, without delay, situation at Santiago de Cuba.” 

The above despatch is the one upon which the 
charge of “Disobedience of Orders by the Commo- 
dore” was based. 

The Secretary of the Navy, in his letter of Febru- 
ary 6, 1899 (Ex. Doc. 3, p- 3)^ to the Senate, gives 
to the despatch a significance which it does not import. 
He reads into it a word which it does not contain, and 
speaks of it as “directing Schley to remain at Santi- 
ago and ascertain whether the enemy is there or not.” 
This may have been in the mind of the Secretary, but 
it is certainly not in the despatch. 

In the first place, it is not addressed to Schley, but 
to the Harvard, There is no order in it, except to the 
Harvard “to proceed immediately and inform 


128 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Schley,” and also the commanding officer off Santi- 
ago, who — as the despatch shows — was thought to be 
some other than Schley, what the department’s infor- 
mation ‘‘indicated” as to Cervera’s fleet. There is 
no order to Schley to “proceed” to, or remain off, 
Santiago de Cuba, or anywhere else. The word “re- 
main” is not in the despatch. It will be observed that 
the despatch was dated and sent on May 25. It 
therefore was not sent because Schley had started 
back towards Key West, inasmuch as he did not so 
start until May 26, at 9.50 p. M. As a matter of 
fact, the department did not learn of the start back 
until it received Schley’s despatch announcing it, which 
was dated the 27th, and was sent by the Harvard to 
Jamaica, to be cabled thence to the department, as it 
was on the 28th, after 9 A. M. (A. 406) , and received 
same day. 

It must have been received by the department 
about the time Schley started back to Santiago, after 
the coaling problem had been solved. 

That despatch which the Harvard had delivered 
to Schley on the 27th was characterized by the same 
uncertainty that up to that time was manifested by 
all the department’s despatches with respect to Cer- 
vera’s whereabouts. Its language was: “All the de- 
partment’s information indicates.” “The department 
looks to you to ascertain the facts, and that the enemy, 
if therein, does not leave without a decisive action.” 
“As soon as ascertained, notify Department whether 
enemy is there.” Everybody knows now that the 
enemy was there ; but the question that must be faced 
in forming any judgment upon Schley’s action is, 
“What did Schley know or believe then”? Nobody 
can have the slightest belief that, if he had then 
known or believed that Cervera’s fleet was in Santi- 
ago harbor, he would have turned his fleet away 
towards Key West or anywhere else. 

In truth the despatch suggests that “under Cape 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 129 


Cruz,” or in ‘‘Gonaives Channel,” or at “Mole, 
Haiti,” the squadron might go to coal; but to go to 
any of those places would leave Santiago harbor as 
open as it had been left since Cervera had arrived 
there. 

The despatch delivered by the Harvard^ on the 
27th, gave no new information as to Cervera’s 
whereabouts. The coaling difficulty still continuing, 
Schley did not then change his plan of procedure, but 
sent the despatch (A. 397) to Jamaica by the Har- 
vard to be cabled thence to the department. The de- 
spatch, as shown by the commodore’s letter-press 
book, was as follows: 

“Off Santiago, May 17, 1898. 

“Secretary of the Navy, Washington. 

“Received despatch of May 25th, delivered by 
Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimad s engine 
is disabled, and she is helpless. Am obliged to have 
her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely un- 
able to coal the Texas, Marblehead, and Brooklyn 
from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous 
weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn is the 
only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal 
to reach Key West. Impossible to remain oft Santi- 
ago, in present state of coal in the squadron. It is 
not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in sum- 
mer, owing to southwest winds. Harvard just re- 
ports to me she has only sufficient coal to proceed to 
Port Royal. Also reports that only small vessels 
could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti. 

^'‘Minneapolis has only enough coal to reach Key 
West, and same of Yale, which will tow Merrimac. 

“It is to be regretted that department’s orders can- 
not be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that 
end. I am obliged to return to Key West, via Yuca- 


9 


130 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


tan Passage for coal. Can ascertain nothing con- 
cerning enemy. Was obliged to send Eagle to Port 
Antonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty- 
seven tons of coal on board. Will leave St. Paul 
here. Will require 9,500 tons at Key West. 

“Schley."'' 

As to the charge of “disobedience of orders” grow- 
ing out of this despatch and the one to which it is a 
reply, it is to be said that disobedience is an act of 
commission or omission done with disobedient intent. 
That the commodore had any intent to be disobedient 
will not be pretended. The state of facts, as they ap- 
peared to him (just as on the i6th they had appeared 
to Sampson) , seemed to require a return to Key West 
for coal; and, so after stating the necessity, he ex- 
pressed his regret for it. There is no disobedience 
in that, absolutely none. 

Not a word of suggestion of disobedience was ever 
made by the Navy Department until after Schley’s 
request for a court of inquiry, when the department 
came to frame the Precept, and then it required the 
court to “Report the reasons for the disobedience of 
the orders of the Department contained in its despatch 
dated May 25, 1898.” 

The commodore (I. 5), wrote to the depart- 
ment asking that “Par. No. 5 be modified so 
as to omit the department’s expression of opinion, and 
thus leave the court free to express its own opinion on 
that matter” ; but the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (Mr. Hackett) declined the request, saying: 
“The Precept treats certain matters as established, 
among which is the fact that you disobeyed orders.” 
But the department further said: “Inasmuch, how- 
ever, as it is the Department’s purpose that the court 
shall be absolutely free to report, if such shall be 
found to be the case, that you [Schley] did not wil- 
fully disobey the orders, or that you were justified 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 13 1 


in disobeying them,” the two letters would be sent 
to the court. 

It Is a fact that the majority of the court did not 
find that the commodore had disobeyed, but merely 
expressed the opinion that he ‘‘should have promptly 
obeyed the Department’s order of May 25.” 

Well, there Is room for difference of opinion; but 
common sense teaches that “the man on the spot” Is 
probably the best judge as to what should be done. 

After the Harvard's departure the same condition 
as to coaling, of the Merriniac^s disability, and of 
inability, owing to rough seas, to take her in tow, 
continued until about 4 P. M. of the 27th, when the 
Yale at last got the collier in tow. The squadron 
then started to the westward, but after proceeding 
about twenty-three knots the sea had so calmed down 
that coaling seemed possible. The commodore made 
signal to the Texas at 7 o’clock: “If collier is cast off 
do you think you could coal to-night?” Texas re- 
plied: “We can try.” Brooklyn at 7.02 replied: 
“Try.” At 7.20 commodore signaled to Texas: “Go 
alongside Merrimac/^ 

The Texas and Marblehead continued all night to 
take coal, and up to 1.20 P. M. of the 28th. 

The coal problem having been solved, the commo- 
dore had made up his mind as early at 8.05 A. M. of 
the 28th to return to and remain off Santiago de Cuba, 
because at that hour he signaled to the Minneapolis 
(which vessel had the collier in tow) : “We are 

going to hold on here as long as coal lasts.” One of 
the engines of the Massachusetts had become disabled, 
but it was repaired at 12.25; and at 1.20 P. M. the 
signal was made to the squadron, “Form column in 
regular order, course E.^N., speed 6 knots.” 

The squadron proceeded on that course until about 
6.30 P. M., when it stopped for the night, with the 
works at entrance of Santiago de Cuba in plain sight. 


CHAPTER XXXIV 


THE RETURN TO SANTIAGO 

This return movement was made by the commodore 
entirely of his own motion, without any communica- 
tion from the Navy Department or Rear Admiral 
Sampson, or influence or suggestion from any officer 
or man in the squadron. 

A strong effort was made by the judge advocate 
of the court of inquiry to show otherwise; but the 
effort was unsuccessful. 

Captain Cook was asked (I. 893) : “Did you have 
any conference with the commodore before starting 
back for Santiago de Cuba, with respect to that?” 
and he replied: “None whatever. I don’t recollect 
anything at all, until I knew that the order was given. 
I saw him on deck afterwards, and asked him if that 
was his intention ? That was all. After he started 
for Santiago we had a little talk. He started as soon 
as he found that the Texas had enough coal; and my 
Impressions — I can only state them as Impressions — 
arc that he said he should go to Santiago, and If he 
found it practicable to coal from colliers, there he 
should stay; and If he got short of coal he would go 
to Gonaives Bay and try there, or elsewhere.” 

Effort was also made to show by the testimony of 
Commander Mason, who had been the executive 
officer of the Brooklyn, of Lieutenant-Commander 
Sears (then flag lieutenant) and Lieutenant Wells 
(flag secretary) that they had exerted some Influence 
over the commodore towards beginning the coaling 
and returning to Santiago, but without success. They 
all said that the commodore had acted entirely of his 
own motion, without Influence from anybody, in all 
the movements of those two days. 

Harsh criticisms of the so-called “retrograde move- 




I 


HACING 133 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 133 

merit” are utterly unwarranted. It is absolutely im- 
possible to place one’s self in the commodore’s place; 
to invest one’s self with the sense of responsibility 
that he then felt; to divest one’s self of the after 
acquired knowledge that we have, but he did not have ; 
to feel the effect of the ‘‘serious doubts” in relation 
to coal and coaling mentioned by Admiral Sampson 
in his Century article (before quoted), that, as he 
says, “can only be felt and appreciated by those who 
have experienced them in command.” 

We think that Vv^e have already shown “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” that there was no purpose on the 
commodore’s part to disobey any order; that the de- 
spatch brought by the Harvard on the 27th was no 
order to Schley to return or remain at Santiago de 
Cuba, because it was issued on the 25th, before the 
retrograde movement was begun, and merely stated 
that he or the senior officer oft Santiago was expected 
to find Cervera; and to “see that he did not escape 
without a decisive action.” 

Both of these things Schley unquestionably did. 
He found Cervera, and as to escaping without a de- 
cisive action — all of Cervera’s ships were destroyed; 
nearly all his officers and men were killed, drowned, 
or captured; the poor old admiral came on board 
of our ships clad in a pair of drawers and an under- 
shirt, without hat to his head or shoes to his feet. 
“Decisive action.” Could any action have been more 
so? 

Granting, however, for argument’s sake, that there 
was a disobedience of orders, the ethics of the situa- 
tion were settled by the Savior of Mankind, in His 
parable of the man who had two sons, to the elder of 
whom he said: “Son, go to work to-day in my vine- 
yard,” who answered and said: “I will not,” but af- 
terwards he repented and went; and to the second son 
he said : “Son, go work to-day in my vineyard” ; and 
the second son said : “I go, sir,” and went not. 


134 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Even the chief priests and elders, unfriendly as 
they were, could see that the first, though nominally 
disobedient, so far as expression went, did the will of 
his father, and was entitled to praise. But the chief 
priests and elders of the Navy Department (includ- 
ing Rear Admirals Benham and Ramsay) were not 
willing to concede the same praise to Schley. 

A disobedience of orders from which no evil results 
flow is of no consequence whatever, especially where 
the alleged disobedience is a mere exercise of judg- 
ment. A disobedience from which good results flow 
is to be commended. Earl Jervis acted upon that 
principle with Nelson, after the Battle of St. Vincent, 
to be alluded to hereafter. 

Neither the Navy Department nor Admiral Samp- 
son, up to July 10 (a week after the Battle of San- 
tiago) , wrote or expressed verbally, so far as appears, 
a word of criticism of Schley’s conduct of the Flying 
Squadron ; and there can be no doubt that but for the 
fact that when the battle took place Sampson, through 
no fault of his own, was “not in it,” such criticism 
would never have been made. It is a further fact that 
neither has ever done so, officially or otherwise, to 
Schley to the present time. 

President Roosevelt, on Schley’s appeal, said: 
“Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in an official letter 
to the Department, alluded for the first time, to 
Admiral Schley’s ‘reprehensible conduct’ six weeks 
previously.” And there is great force in what the 
President adds: “If Admiral Schley was guilty of 

reprehensible conduct of a kind that called for such 
notice from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral Samp- 
son ought not to have left him as senior officer on the 
blockading squadron on the 3d of July, when he 
(Sampson) steamed away, on his proper errand of 
communication with General Shafter.” 

Diagram II shows the whole movement of the 
Flying Squadron during these three days. May 26, 27 
and 28. 


CHAPTER XXXV 


SCHLEY DISCOVERS CERVERA's FLEET IN HARBOR OF 

SANTIAGO 

During the night of the 28th the ships lay off the 
harbor, with the Marblehead and Vixen on the flanks 
of the battle-ships. On the morning of the 29th the 
whole squadron steamed in about six miles towards 
the Morro at the mouth of the harbor, and at 5.30 
discovered two or three of Cervera’s ships lying at 
anchor near Smith Cay. The Cristobal Colon was 
recognized because of the fact that her military mast 
was between her two smoke-stacks. 

The chart opposite shows her position as given by 
her log-book. The positions of the other vessels are 
as given by Lieutenant Jose Miller y Terjiero, of the 
Spanish service. 

Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, in his volunteered let- 
ter of February 24, 1899, to the department (Ex. 
Doc. D. 175) says: “It is possible that the admiral 
saw the Spanish vessels a short time before they were 
sighted by the St, Paul [Sigsbee’s ship]. I had not 
before seen them, or any sign of them.” The Colon^ s 
log-book contains this entry: “At 7.30 enemy’s 

squadron coming from eastward, and steaming in 
column past the mouth of the harbor.” 

Thus the long agony of doubt was ended. Schley 
had discovered the enemy; and had them safely 
blockaded in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. 

Well might the commodore have exultingly said, as 
it is reported he did say, “I have got them now; and 
they will never get home.” 

The St. Paid was at once sent to St. Nicholas Mole, 
to cable the good news to the Navy Department, and 
to Sampson, by the following despatch. 


136 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


“Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 10 a. m. 

“Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colony In- 
fanta Maria Teresa^ and two torpedo-boat destroyers, 
moored inside of Morro behind point. Doubtless the 
others are here. I have not sufficient coal. Making 
every effort to get coal in. Vixen has blown out man- 
hole gasket. I have sent boiler-makers on board to 
repair. Collier repaired, machinery being put 
together. Have about three thousand tons of coal in 
collier; but not easy to get aboard here. If there is 
no engagement In next two or three days, Sampson’s 
squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or 
Port au Prince. Hasten me despatch vessels for 
picket work. The Brooklyn, Iowa, Texas, Massachu- 
setts, Vixen, and Marblehead compose squadron here. 
I am sending St. Paul to communicate with Sampson.” 

“Schley.” 

Between the 25 th and 29th the department’s infor- 
mation that Cervera’s fleet was at Santiago de Cuba 
received almost hourly confirmation, and Its nervous 
anxiety, when on the 28th it received Schley’s despatch 
of the 27th (sent by Harvard, via Jamaica), an- 
nouncing his purpose to return to Key West, was very 
natural; and the cables in every direction were kept 
hot In frantic efforts to reach him. The department 
sent a cable on the 28th as follows (A. 397) : 

“Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: 

“Following must be delivered to Schley as soon 
as possible. Utmost urgency. Unless unsafe for 
your squadron. Department wishes you to remain off 
Santiago. So cannot you take possession of Guanta- 
namo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, 
are authorized to sink collier in mouth of harbor; but 
if not so used, and If necessary to you, it would be de- 
sirable to leave her Nicholas Mole, or vicinity. You 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 137 


must not leave the vicinity of Santiago unless it Is 
unsafe your squadron ; or unless Spanish squadron Is 
not there.” “Long.” 

The department, in getting up the charge of dis- 
obedience of orders, evidently confused the two de- 
spatches of 25th and this one of 28th. It has already 
been shown that the word “remain” Is not In the de- 
spatch of 25th. It appears, for the first time. In that 
of 28th. 

The Harvard did not leave Jamaica until 3.15 P. M. 
of 30th, and arrived off Santiago on 31st at 7 A. M. 
This was Schley’s first despatch from the depart- 
ment, and none of the others reached him until later. 

Without knowledge of Schley’s change of purpose, 
or of his return to Santiago, or of the fact that 
Schley had discovered Cervera, the department on 
the 28th cabled Sampson as follows, viz (A. 398) : 

“Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba he must 
go to Key West with his squadron for coal, though he 
has four thousand tons coal with him in a broken- 
down collier. How soon after arrival of Schley at 
Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba with 
New York, and Oregon, the Indiana, and some lighter 
vessels ; and how long could you blockade there, send- 
ing your vessels singly to coal from our colliers at 
Gonaives Channel, Mole, Haiti, Porto NIpe, Cuba, 
or where? Schley has not ascertained whether the 
Spanish division Is at Santiago de Cuba. All infor- 
mation seems to show that it is there- “Long.” 

“Seems to show.” Doubting, still doubting! But 
not a word of criticism of Schley’s proposed move- 
ment. 

As soon as he received Schley’s despatch announc- 
ing his discovery of the Spanish ships, Sampson, on 
29th, sent to SchJey the following: 


138 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


“Congratulate you on success. Maintain a close 
blockade at all hazards, especially at night. Very 
little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in 
open sea, whenever conditions permit. Send a ship 
to Guantanamo, with a view of occupying it as a base, 
coaling one ship at a time.” 

Captain French E. Chadwick, the chief of staff, 
testified (I. 842) : “I protested [to Sampson] 

against his congratulations. He persisted in putting 
it that way; and when I asked him why, he said, ‘Oh, 
I want to encourage him.’ ” 

This picture, which Chadwick volunteered, of the 
subordinate “protesting” against his admiral’s pro- 
posed action shows the assumption which that sub- 
ordinate had accustomed himself to display; but on 
this occasion the chief of staff does not appear to have 
been “the dominant mind.” 

Why shouldn’t Sampson have congratulated 
Schley? The latter had “discovered Cervera,” and 
whatever credit belonged to anyone for that service 
unquestionably belonged to Schley. 

The writer hereof doubted, at the time Captain 
Chadwick volunteered that statement to the court, 
and still doubts, the correctness of what Sampson was 
stated to have said. Sampson was, unfortunately, 
so Impaired in mind that he could not be brought be- 
fore the court. 


CHAPTER XXXVI 


SCHLEY’s plan of battle and blockade of SAN- 
TIAGO DE CUBA 

Having found Cervera’s fleet in that port, Schley at 
once took measures to prevent them from “leaving 
without a decisive action.” 

Accordingly, at 8.50 A. M. (less than two hours 
after their discovery) the commanding officers of all 
ships were summoned, by signal, on board the flagship 
Brooklyn, to a conference with the commodore. 

What occurred there Is best told by the following 
statement of Captain McCalla, of the Marblehead, 
which he caused to be entered, immediately after the 
conference, in the log-book of that vessel (A. 426) : 
“Commodore Schley explained to the commanding 
officers that, in case the Spanish ships came out, he 
wished to concentrate the batteries of all our ships on 
a portion of those of the enemy. This was not ex- 
plained as a tactical concentration of our whole force 
on a part of the enemy, but as a division of our whole 
fire on several of the enemy’s ships. 

“During the time the commanding officer was on 
board the flagship Captain Evans asked If it was his 
intention to steam at the enemy’s ships in case they 
should start to come out? Commodore Schley 
answered, ‘Certainly,’ and added words indicative of 
his intention to attack them as they came out of the 
narrow defile/^^ 

Captain McCalla testified (L 299) : “The con- 

ference was with regard to the work of the blockade. 
I can only remember one specific thing, and that was 
that Captain Evans asked Commodore Schley if the 
Spanish ships came out, was he going for them ? He 
said: ‘Certainly,’ and then arranged for a subdivision 


^ Italics are mine. — J. P. 


140 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


of fire from the ships under his command, on the 
Spanish ships, should they come out.” 

Before the Court of Inquiry Rear Admiral 
Evans testified, relative to that conference (L 
385): “Commodore Schley was In the cabin 

when we assembled, and there was a general talk 
about the Spanish fleet having been located, at last. In 
Santiago. I do not recall any special conference. I 
do not think it was In the nature of a conference.^ I 
do not recall now that the officers were asked to ex- 
press any opinion.^ I remember having a conversa- 
tion with Commodore Schley about the effect of 
fighting batteries with the ships, in which I told him 
of the experience that we had at San Juan; and ex- 
pressed the opinion to him that it was not worth while 
to risk ships for fighting shore batteries alone, as 
there was nothing to be gained by It. But In the case 
under consideration, as the Spanish ships were present 
in the harbor, the conditions were changed; and we 
would have to take the risk of fire from the batteries, 
in order to get at them.”^ 

“I remember Commodore Schley remarking 
further, before we left, that he felt that the country 
would hold him responsible; that the ships should 
not be risked under the fire of shore batteries until the 
Spanish fleet was destroyed.” 

This was exactly the rule laid down for Sampson’s 
guidance by the Confidential Circular of April 6, be- 
fore referred to; and confirmed In Sampson’s sailing 
order from department, of April 21, 1898. 

The extract from Captain McCalla’s log-book, 
above given, was then read to Evans, who pronounced 
it “quite correct.” 

The foregoing is substantially the same as the 

^ This is a mere play upon words. — J. P. 

^That did not deter Evans from so doing, as may be noted from 
the sentences immediately following. 

* All this is not mentioned by anyone else who was present. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 141 


“Order of Battle” (so-called) afterwards issued by 
Admiral Sampson on June 2, to be referred to here- 
after. It was the natural, obvious, and indeed the 
only plan of battle that could be pursued under the 
circumstances; and it was pursued on July 3, when 
the enemy tried to escape. 

If that statement by Schley was not an “Order of 
Battle,” it would be difficult to say what was. It was 
in several respects more explicit than the one — so- 
called — given out by Sampson two days later, as will 
hereafter be shown. 

Having only four ships (besides the Marblehead 
and VixeUy which two he was compelled to use as 
picket boats at night) Schley kept his fleet moving in 
column, backward and forward, before the entrance 
to the harbor, at a distance of about four miles from 
the Morro, with the picket boats some two miles 
further inshore. 

His force was thus kept compact, with the ships in 
proper supporting distance from one another, and so 
well in hand that, if the Spaniards had attempted to 
escape, a simple right or left wheel would have en- 
abled him to pursue to the best immediate advantage. 

If he had made the semi-circular disposition after- 
wards adopted by Admiral Sampson, the distance be- 
tween his most easterly and westerly ships would have 
been nearly, if not quite, ten miles, with the two inter- 
mediate ships nearly four miles apart. One does not 
need a nautical eye to see that this last method of 
blockade was out of the question with only four ships. 
And in the judgment of the writer, the circular forma- 
tion made collision between the blockaders not only 
possible, but probable. Captain Clark, of the Oregon^ 
told before the court of a narrow escape from col- 
lision, owing to smoke, between that ship and the 
Texas and Iowa, which occurred during the battle of 
July 3. If that danger could come in the daylight, 
what might have happened if the darkness of night 


142 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


had been added to the smoke ! In the daytime the 
vessels were permited to He about in seeming disorder, 
coaling as opportunity permitted. 

Captain Cook testified in relation to this blockade 
(I. 894) : “I recall that the commodore’s general 

idea was that the vessels were to be kept full of coal, 
and steaming, moving all the time. His idea was to 
keep the vessels at night, in column, at distance, mov- 
ing all the time — because his idea was to get that fleet 
to come out. I think he wanted more to have the 
fleet come out than to keep it in, and his idea was that, 
in moving that way, the squadron was always ready 
for action, and he was sure of that fact. So we 
steamed in a circle. That is the way he expressed 
himself to me.” 

Commodore Schley’s methods in that instance were 
much like those of Nelson, pursued by that great 
commander in the blockade of the French fleet at 
Toulon in 1803-05. Concerning this. Captain Alfred 
T. Mahan (our great naval historian) in his admir- 
able ‘‘Life of Nelson” (p. 577), says: “His [Nel- 
son’s] dispositions were taken rather with a view to 
encourage the enemy to come oiity “My system,” 
Nelson wrote to Admiral Pole, “is the very contrary 
to blockading. Every opportunity has been offered 
the enemy to put to sea, for it is there we hope to 
realize the hopes and expectations of our country.” 


CHAPTER XXXVII 


Sampson’s unofficial statement about schley’s 

BLOCKADE 

No official criticism of Schley’s blockade of Santiago 
de Cuba has ever been made by anyone, so far as ap- 
pears; certainly none has ever been made public by 
the Navy Department. But Admiral Sampson, in his 
article printed over his own signature in the April 
number of the Century Magazine for the year 1899, 
undertook to make such criticism (of course unoffi- 
cially) , saying: 

‘‘The log of the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley’s 
flagship, for the five days from May 26 to June i, in- 
dicates that, whatever might have been the disad- 
vantages under which the blockade had been main- 
tained, it can hardly be described as a close one, of the 
sort desired and expected by both the department and 
myself. 

^^Diiring this period it had been the custom to retire 
from the coast at night for a distance of twenty-five 
milesJ^ 

“The day service had been maintained at a distance 
of about six miles off the coast, the ships moving at 
very slow speed, in column, first to the eastward and 
then to the westward, about four or five hundred 
yards apart, or three times the length of a ship, the 
total length of column being about a mile and a half, 
and the total distance traversed probably about seven 
miles.” 

The whole of that statement is grossly inaccurate, 
and the part italicized (by the writer) is absolutely 
untrue, as will now be shown. 

Admiral Sampson could never have seen the log- 
book of the Brooklyn, for, if he had, he would have 


144 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


known that it indicated nothing of the sort; but pre- 
cisely the contrary. Her log-book and those of all 
the other ships of the Flying Squadron are printed as 
Appendices to the Report of the Court of Inquiry, and 
may be consulted if desired; and there is not a word 
in any of them about going off twenty-five miles. It 
would certainly be in all of them if it had occurred. 

On the strength of this assertion in the Century 
Magazine (for there had been no such statement 
made by anyone else) , the judge advocate put into the 
Precept for the court as Art. 8 : “The necessity, 

if any, and the advisability of withdrawing at night, 
the Flying Squadron from the entrance to Santiago 
harbor, to a distance at sea.” 

He didn’t dare to put in the twenty-five-mile state- 
ment, because he had (or could and should have) ex- 
amined those log-books; and he knew that the state- 
ment about withdrawing twenty-five miles at night was 
absolutely untrue. If it had been true, we can imagine 
the comfort it would have given to Schley’s detractors 
to be able to show that the commodore had done such 
an absolutely foolish thing. 

Before the Court of Inquiry, Admiral HIgginson 
(who had been the captain of the Massachusetts off 
Santiago) testified (I. 38) : “We kept our vessels 

there in sight of the port, and at night we cruised 
up and down in front of the harbor. I think we 
cruised nearer during the night. 

“The vessels were In column, the flagship leading, 
and we would cruise up to the eastward and then 
countermarch and cruise to the westward. We kept 
going round in an elliptical track. I suppose we went 
on perhaps a mile or a mile and a half past the harbor, 
and then turned around and went back. They gener- 
ally turned with a port helm, as nearly as I can re- 
member. 

“The extreme blockading distance was six miles in 
daytime, and ‘closer in at night.’ ” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 145 


Q. Was there ever a time when that fleet went off 
twenty-five miles at night? Ans. No; I can say per- 
fectly clearly, that I have no memory that that fleet 
ever went off further than six miles at night. 

Captain McCalla testified (I. 307) : “To the best 
of my recollection, the fleet at night kept closer to 
shore than It did during the day. The blockade at 
night was maintained four miles off shore, to the 
best of my recollection.” 

Q. Did you ever go off at night to any distance of 
twenty-five miles ? Ans. Never. 

Captain McCalla further testified (I. 635) : “I 

understood that we [referring to the picket boats] 
were always to keep two miles Inside of the larger 
vessels. I estimated that we were about two miles 
from shore at night.” 

This would make the distance of the larger ships 
from shore at night four miles. 

The log-book of the Cristobal Colon (Spanish) 
contains the entry: “May 29, 4 P. M. to midnight. 

American vessels continue to pass by mouth of the 
harbor with their searchlights thrown on the coast.” 
And “May 31, at 9.30 P. M. Six of the enemy’s ves- 
sels passed E. to W., across the mouth of the harbor, 
returning at 1 1.30 the other way.” So that they were 
so close as to make them visible to the Spaniards in the 
harbor. 

Captain Folger (of the New Orleans) testified (I. 
635) : “During the nights of 30th and 31st of May 
and I St of June^ the fleet was generally In a more 
regular and uniform position at night than it was in 
the daytime. It was also somewhat closer. In my 
opinion, to the shore at night than it was in the day- 
time. When we passed the entrance at night we were 
nearer than we generally were In the daytime.” 

The mention of that twenty-five-mlle story served 

^This last being after Sampson’s arrival. 

10 


h6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


to make the judge advocate very anxious, for when 
the question, “Then the story, by whomsoever told, 
that the fleet was in the habit of withdrawing twenty- 
five miles at night. Is not true?” was put to Captain 
McCalla, he viciously objected, and the witness was 
not permited to answer. It was a sore subject. 

The majority of the court utterly Ignored the testi- 
mony given by Higginson, Folger, and McCalla, be- 
sides the statements of the log-books, and found that 
“the Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from 
the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea. 
The blockade was maintained at an average distance 
of about six of seven miles from the harbor entrance 
during the day; and probably somewhat nearer dur- 
ing the night. Two vessels performed picket duty at 
night, two miles Inside the line of vessels.” That 
majority was skillful in “damning with faint praise.” 
There was nothing in the testimony of those gallant 
and capable officers that rested on mere “probability.” 
They stated, not probabilities, but facts. 

The majority of the court expressed no opinion as 
to the “propriety of Commodore Schley’s conduct in 
the premises” (that Is, in that blockade), as the Pre- 
cept required them to do. They could not condemn, 
without condemning Sampson, because he continued 
Schley’s disposition for one night; but It was written 
that nothing that Schley had done was to be praised. 

However, by their finding the court condemned as 
untrue in fact the statement made by Admiral Samp- 
son, over his own signature. In the Century article, 
that “it had been the custom of our vessels during that 
period to retire from the coast at night to a distance 
of twenty-five miles.” 

It Is not Intended to make any reflection upon Ad- 
miral Sampson’s personal veracity In this matter. 
Somebody In whom he trusted deliberately deceived 
him by false statements of the contents of those log- 
books* Butj considering the delicate relations then 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 147 


existing between him and Schley, he should have been 
scrupulously careful not to accept and publish state- 
ments of others as the basis for such a charge. He 
never could have seen the log-books himself. If he 
had, he would never have made such a statement. 

Admiral Dewey’s opinion, expressed in his Special 
Findings of the Court, that “the blockade of Santiago 
de Cuba was effective,” Is supported by all the evi- 
dence given before the court, arid will stand, the 
opinion of the critics to the contrary notwithstanding. 

On May 30 the New Orleans (cruiser). Captain 
Folger, and the collier Sterling arrived, and became 
part of the squadron. Captain Folger brought an 
order from Sampson to Schley, about sinking the col- 
lier in the entrance to the harbor, which will be con- 
sidered hereafter. 


CHAPTER XXXVIII 


THE RECONNAISSANCE OF MAY 3 I, I 898 

The Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon had remained in 
the position (near Smith Cay) In the harbor which 
she had occupied when first discovered on the morning 
of May 29. 

On May 31 (the Brooklyn being engaged In coal- 
ing) , shortly before noon, Commodore Schley shifted 
his flag to the Massachusetts ^ Captain Higginson. 
When he arrived on board the last named vessel and 
communicated his purpose, It was suggested that he 
defer the movement he was about to make until after 
dinner by the crew. Accordingly, shortly after din- 
ner, accompanied by the Iowa and New Orleans^ he 
steamed in towards the entrance of the harbor to make 
a reconnaisance. 

Before discussing this movement, it will be well to 
go back a little. 

The Confidential Circular (before referred to) 
sent to Captain Sampson (as he was then) by the 
Navy Department on April 6, 1898 (A. 171), con- 
tained the following : 

“Second — The department does not wish the ves- 
sels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the 
batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other 
strongly fortified ports In Cuba, unless the more for- 
midable Spanish vessels should take refuge within 
those harbors. Even In that case the department 
would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment 
of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired 
object, viz. : the destruction of the enemy’s vessels 
without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war 
to the fire of the land batteries. The lack of docking 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 149 


facilities makes it particularly desirable that our ves- 
sels should not be crippled before the capture or de- 
struction of Spain’s most formidable vessels.” 

Admiral Schley testified that Sampson, during their 
interview at Key West, on May 18, either showed, or 
told him of, this circular. 

On May 26 the department again wrote Sampson: 
“While the department does not wish a bombardment 
of forts protected by heavy cannon, it is within your 
discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect 
vessels you may desire to attack, if you can do so 
without exposure to heavy guns.” It is claimed, by 
Schley’s critics, that the last quoted direction was a 
modification of Circular No. 6 ; but it is, on the con- 
trary, a renewed caution against attacking “forts pro- 
tected by heavy cannon” and “exposure to heavy 
guns,” and a permission to attack “light batteries” 
only. Schley never heard of, much less saw, that so- 
called modification of Circular No. 6 until several 
days after June i, 1898 ; so that, so far as he is con- 
cerned, it “cuts no ice,” in the matter. 

Commenting on the above extract from Circular 
No. 6, the then Secretary of the Navy, in his book 
published two or three years later, at page 232, says: 
“It would have been the height of recklessness to 
have risked the destruction of one or more of our 
battle-ships while the Spanish fleet was afloat intact.” 
Very good sense that, in the mind of the Ex-Sec- 
retary; but in the same mind it was very bad sense 
when applied by Schley to the situation that con- 
fronted him. 

The purpose of the reconnaissance was so clearly 
stated by Flag-Lieutenant Sears (I. 972) that his 
statement is here given in full : 

“The commodore said to me that he wanted to 
know what the batteries were; that he was going to 
take the ships available, not coaling, and that he had 
fixed upon a distance to pass in front of the fortifica- 


150 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


tions, which was seven thousand yards. We went on 
board the Massachusetts, and the commodore, on ar- 
riving on the quarterdeck, directed Captain Higgin- 
son to make his preparations to pass in front of their 
fire at once.” 

Incidentally, it may here be stated that, as the 
commodore greeted Captain Higginson, he jocularly 
said that he “hoped to pot,” or “expected to pot,” or 
“might pot,” the Colon. This joke would not have 
been mentioned here but for the fact that it was 
made use of to build an insinuation against the com- 
modore. 

Continuing the narrative of Lieutenant Sears : 
“Captain Higginson, I think, after consulting with his 
executive officer, Mr. Schroeder, demurred, and asked 
the commodore to wait until after the men had din- 
ner. The commodore assented, and during the wait 
I consulted with the navigator (Lieutenant Potts), 
by instructions from the commodore, as to ascertain 
that distance. We looked up the height of the Morro. 
He made a table of sextant angles, and made his 
preparations to make that reconnaissance at seven 
thousand yards. After the men’s dinner the squadron 
was formed with the Massachusetts leading, the New 
Orleans following, and the Iowa third. The naviga- 
tor told Captain Higginson about the time we were 
[supposed to be] on the range; and the course was 
changed from the oblique course we had been pursuing 
to a course parallel with the coast; and the moment 
the Colon opened [to view], one of the thirteen-inch 
guns of the forward turret of the Massachusetts 
opened fire. We passed up and back once, and then 
stopped for a time, before turning out. The com- 
modore seemed to be satisfied with the reconnaissance, 
and gave the order to resume the blockade.” 

The forts at the entrance and on the hills, and the 
Colon inside, returned the fire of the ships. 

There was some conflict of testimony about the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 15 1 


ranges at which the firing was done. The commo- 
dore had ordered a range of 7,000 yards, and 
it was the duty of the navigator (Lieutenant 
Templin M. Potts) to inform his captain as soon as 
that range had been reached. It was not the busi- 
ness of the commodore to do anything more than give 
the order to the captain. 

Captain Evans, of the Iowa, testified: “I saw the 
first shot from the Massachusetts fall a long way 
short, and, supposing that she was firing at 7,000 
yards, I gave the range of my guns at 8,000 yards; 
and, when I saw the shots falling short, increased it to 
9,000 yards, as we stood across the harbor.” 

Captain Folger, of the New Orleans , testified: 
“We fired at ranges varying from 8,000 to 11,000 
yards.” 

From all this it would seem that Lieutenant Potts 
was not a very successful range-finder on that occa- 
sion. He testified that the first shot was fired at 7,800 
yards, and “after that he was unable to determine any 
accurate range with the sextant, because it was com- 
pletely covered with powder-smoke.” In his testi- 
mony the gallant lieutenant condemned to a “state of 
innocuous desuetude” and general worthlessness the 
stadimeter, the sextant, and all the other instruments 
which were given to our navy for use in determining 
ranges. 

It is possible that on the occasion in question he 
was so busy watching the personal conduct of the com- 
modore that he could not give proper attention to his 
duty with reference to the range. However, the 
lieutenant, very shortly after he had given his testi- 
mony before the Court of Inquiry, was able to find 
the exact range of the second best position in the gift 
of the Navy Department for officers of his rank, viz., 
that of naval attache to our embassy at Berlin, where 
he luxuriated for about two and one-half years. 

Inasmuch as the ranges for the other two ships were 


152 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


set by the Massachusetts, Mr. Potts got them all 
wrong. 

Several shots from the enemy passed over and be- 
yond our ships, but none of them struck, and the log- 
book of the Colon states that “an enemy’s shell ex- 
ploded near the stern, making dents in the side, and 
cracking some bowls in the round-house.” 

As usual, the Iowa did this damage to the enemy. 
At least Captain Evans claimed that that shell was 
from his ship. 

Commodore Schley on the next day made official 
report of this reconnaissance to the Navy Department 
and Admiral Sampson, and has never had a word of 
official criticism from either concerning it. Later non- 
official criticism has been made in the light of later 
acquired knowledge of the defenses of Santiago 
entrance, and is manifestly unfair. What was then 
known and believed is plainly the only proper cri- 
terion. 

It is said that the Colon could and should then have 
been destroyed. That is matter of opinion, and it is 
not probable that if her safety had been seriously 
menaced she would have remained in an exposed posi- 
tion, but would have shifted to a safer one, as she did 
next day. 

All she had to do was to let go the hawsers from 
her stern to the shore, and the tide in a very few 
minutes would have carried her behind Smith Cay into 
perfect safety. 


CHAPTER XXXIX 


ADMIRAL SAMPSON ARRIVES AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA 

AND ASSUMES COMMAND 

It has been stated, ante, that when the department re- 
ceived Schley’s announcement of his purposed return 
to Key West, but before Schley had discovered Cer- 
vera, it cabled Sampson to know when he could go to 
Santiago. He left Key West on the 30th, with the 
Oregon, Mayflomer, and Porter, and arrived off 
Santiago dc Cuba on the morning of June i, at 6 
o’clock. Commodore Schley, of course, went immedi- 
ately on board the flagship New York to make report 
of the situation to Admiral Sampson. 

Schley testified (I. 1383) : “On the first of June 
Admiral Sampson arrived. He brought with him the 
New York, Oregon, and Mayflower, and steamed 
down to the westward, a little inside of the line of 
blockade. 

“He found us, at that time, just making the turn, 
and I went on board. He was very cordial, very glad 
to see me ; and I explained to him the situation, and 
the facts of the reconnaissance. He seemed very glad 
to find out the situation that was there, and I pointed 
out the Colon to him in the entranced 

At this point in Admiral Schley’s narrative the 
judge advocate endeavored to stop him, and the fol- 
lowing colloquy occurred : 

The Judge Advocate : If the Court please, I 

think we are getting beyond the Court’s construction 
of the scope of the Precept. 

Admiral Dewey: As I understand, he is turning 

the command over to the Commander-in-Chief. 

Admiral Schley: Yes, sir. 

Admiral Dewey: I want to hear it: I should like 
to hear that part. 


154 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


That little colloquy Illustrates the general spirit of 
unfairness displayed by Judge Advocate Lemly 
throughout the whole Inquiry. As soon as anything 
was suggested that might bear upon Sampson, his ob- 
jections became fervent. 

Admiral Schley, continuing his narrative, said: “I 
handed him a number of despatches, explained to him 
the situation and told him the form of blockade I had 
maintained, and I heard no word of complaint from 
him. In fact. In view of the telegram of congratu- 
lation, I supposed, naturally, that everything was ap- 
proved. Admiral Sampson’s relations and mine were 
always very cordial. I never had any difference with 
him. 

“So I turned over the command to him, and my 
squadron was not broken up until the 19th or 20th of 
June. I was still In comrnand of the Flying Squadron, 
and It composed the left half of the blockading line 
at Santiago.” 

The log-book of the New York for June i, 1898, 
contains the following entries : 

“At 6.30 A. M. stopped; the harbor entrance bear- 
ing north. Commodore Schley came on board. In 
passing the harbor entrance sighted two Spanish men- 
of-war Inside; one of the Viscaya class close to the 
westward, and the Cristobal Colon opposite the mouth 
of the harbor, bearing north. 

“The fort fired a shell alongshore; and the 
Cristobol Colon fired one toward uSy which fell short 
about two miles.” 

The log-book of the Colon for June i (A. 433 ), 
contains the following: “4 to 8 A. M. — The enemy’s 

squadron In sight, passing the mouth of the harbor 
from E. to W., afterwards from W. to E. at a great 
distance, and beyond the reach of our guns. They 
appear to have been reinforced by several vessels.” 

In the report that was prepared by Admiral Samp- 
son’s staff for his signature on August 3, 1898, the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 155 


admiral says (A. 479) : ‘‘June i. Immediately on 

arrival I steamed down past the entrance to Santiago 
harbor, and saw, lying close within, the Cristobal 
Colon, and one of the Viscaya class.” 

So that there can be no doubt whatever that these 
two Spanish vessels were distinctly visible to Admiral 
Sampson. 

In his report last mentioned he adds to what Is 
quoted above : “Both of these got up steam and 

moved up Into the harbor out of sight.” 

The time at which they so “got up steam and 
moved up Into the harbor out of sight” Is not given, 
but the inference manifestly Intended to be drawn 
from the statement is that they did so at once. 

But the log-book of the Colon contains the state- 
ment: “At 10.35 got under way, and passed at slow 
speed between Punta Gorda and the bow of the 
Oquendo, Directed our course Into the inner harbor, 
until 1 1.30 A. M., at which time we came to anchor.” 
So that, from all the above. It appears that Ad- 
miral Sampson, as soon as he arrived, at 6 A. M. June 
I, saw the Colon and another of the Spanish fleet 
lying In plain sight just inside the entrance ; that the 
Colon fired a shot at the flagship, which was a direct 
challenge to battle, as much as to say, “Come on, you 
Yankees, If you dare” ; that Schley pointed her out to 
Sampson, as they sat on the New Yorlds quarterdeck; 
that the Colon remained in plain sight for four hours 
and a half before she “got under way and moved up 
into the harbor,” Instead of going at once, as Samp- 
son’s report suggests. 

The ships of the Flying Squadron, and the Oregon, 
were as ready for battle that morning as they proved 
to be on the morning of July 3. Sampson had a better 
chance to destroy the Colon than Schley had had the 
previous day, because he had a larger force, and had 
the benefit of the knowledge of the shore batteries 
Schley had gained by the reconnaissance. But he 


156 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


seems to have been of the same mind as Schley relative 
to risking his ships by attacking unknown batteries, 
even for the chance of destroying the Colony and not- 
withstanding the fact that he had just been challenged 
by her shot fired at his passing flagship. 

The majority of the Court of Inquiry gave its 
opinion that Schley ‘‘should have endeavored to cap- 
ture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the 
entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29 and 30; and 
did not do his utmost with the force under his com- 
mand, to capture or destroy the Colon and other ves- 
sels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31.” 

Part of that opinion Is an absurdity on Its face. 
Only In one way could either of those vessels have 
been captured, and that was by going into the harbor 
of Santiago after them, and nobody can pretend to 
believe that it was Schley’s duty to attempt that. 

Sampson for the whole month of June and part of 
July, with the full approval of the Navy Department, 
refused the importunate demands made by General 
Shafter, backed by the War Department, that he 
should make an effort to force an entrance Into that 
harbor. The Spanish vessels were in there. The fact 
that they could not be seen was of no consequence. 

As for the effort to destroy the Spaniards on the 
31st, there Is room for diversity of opinion as to what 
more, if anything, Schley should have attempted to 
do to that end. It was a matter of judgment, and the 
“man on the spot,” upon whom the burden of respon- 
sibility rested, was the best judge. 

If that criticism of the court Is just, as applied to 
Schley, it applies to Sampson with greater force. The 
fair-minded man will be unable to see any reason why 
one should be faulted and not the other. 

The truth is that neither should be so faulted, and 
so far as the Navy Department or Sampson is con- 
cerned, neither ever wrote a word of criticism. 
Sampson could not criticise Schley for the obvious 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 157 


reason that he had done just what Schley had done, 
and the Navy Department could not criticise the one 
without criticising the other. 

I said that the Navy Department had never done 
so. I beg Mr. John D. Long’s pardon. When on 
February 6, 1899, he sent the report of Captains 
Evans and Taylor to the Senate to be considered in 
secret session (as he expected), he for the first time 
did undertake to fault Schley about it ; but the Senate 
regarded the whole report as “a blow in the dark.” 


CHAPTER XL 


THE SINKING OF COLLIERS IN THE ENTRANCE TO 

SANTIAGO BAY 

The sinking of colliers in the narrow entrance to the 
harbor of Santiago de Cuba, to keep Cervera’s fleet in, 
seems early to have commended itself to the Navy De- 
partment, and also to Admiral Sampson. Both had 
forgotten our experience in the Civil War, when it 
was attempted to close up the main ship channel into 
the harbor of Charleston (the scene of Sampson’s 
only war service of a few months) , by sinking a fleet 
of old New Bedford whalers, laden with stone; which 
attempt was a complete failure. The commerce of 
that port now enters through the same channel, draw- 
ing more water than was ever possible before the stone 
fleet was sunk. 

In its despatch to Schley of the 28th, the depart- 
ment used the language: “If you must leave, are 

authorized to sink collier in mouth of harbor.” 

As has been stated, the New Orleans (Captain 
Folger) arrived off Santiago de Cuba on the 30th of 
May. She came under the following orders : 

“U. S. Flagship New York, 

St. Nicholas Channel, May 27, 1898.. . 

“Sir: You will proceed to Santiago dc Cuba, to 
convoy the collier Sterling, You will communicate 
with Commodore Schley, and direct him to remain on 
the blockade of Santiago de Cuba at all hazards, as- 
suming that the Spanish vessels are now in that port. 
Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier 
Sterling to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part 
leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 159 


that it would be perfectly practicable to steam this 
vessel into position, and then drop all her anchors, 
allow her to swing across the channel ; then sink her, 
either by opening the valves or whatever means may 
be best in his judgment. Inform Commodore Schley 
that the details of this plan are left to his judgment. 
In the meantime he must exercise the utmost care that 
none of the vessels already in the port are allowed to 
escape; and say to the Commodore that I have the 
utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a 
successful conclusion, and earnestly wish him good 
luck. '‘W. T. Sampson, 

^^Rear Admiral^ etc,^ etc. 

‘‘Commandingg Officer, 

“U. S. S. New Orleans.^' 

Schley does not seem to have entered very enthusi- 
astically into this project. We have already seen that, 
following the example of the illustrious Nelson, he 
was of the opinion that the thing most to be desired 
was to persuade the enemy to come out, and not to 
keep him in. 

Schley, in his testimony given before the Court of 
Inquiry (I. 1382), said: “Captain Folger brought 

with him a direction to sink the collier Sterling in the 
fairway leading into Santiago. He brought also some 
verbal explanations of the admiral’s desire to leave 
the matter to me. We had, of course, quite a lot of 
conversation in relation to that matter, and I did not 
understand, at that time, in view of the despatches 
from the Secretary, that it was intended that that 
passage should be blocked, unless we were obliged to 
abandon the port. In that event I rather suspected, 
rather thought, that that was the intention.” 

No neater explanation of a failure to obey an order 
than that has been made since Nelson, at the battle of 
Copenhagen, with his blind eye to the glass, re- 
marked: “I can’t see the signal to discontinue the 


i6o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


action.” And we can almost hear Schley mentally re- 
peat Nelson’s further remark: “Damn the order; 

I’ll not obey it.” 

At any rate, Schley didn’t obey the order; and 
didn’t sink the collier. 


CHAPTER XLI 


THE SINKING OF THE ‘‘mERRIMAC’’ 

As soon as Sampson arrived, on June i, as he says 
(A. 481) : 

“Preparations were at once made for sinking the 
collier Merrirnac in the entrance. The night of this 
day was particularly favorable for the enterprise — the 
tide, the setting of the moon — all conjoining most 
favorably. 

“In consulting Naval Constructor Hobson as to 
the best means of sinking the vessel, he showed him- 
self so Interested, w^orked to such a degree in the 
preparation, and entreated so strongly to be allowed 
to take the ship in, that I consented, though several 
hundred officers and men had volunteered; and many 
begged hard to be allowed to go.” 

The crew finally selected were as follows: Naval 
Constructor Richmond P. Hobson; D. Montague, 
chief master-at-arms of the New York; Mate, Third 
Class, Charette, of the New York; Coxswain R. 
Clausen, of the New York; Machinist, First Class, G. 
F. Phillips, of the Merrirnac; Coxswain O. Deignan, 
of the Merrirnac; and Coxswain J. F. Murphy, of 
the Iowa. 

In the Century article (pp. 898-9), Sampson gives 
the details of the organization and attempted execu- 
tion of the project. They are. In some respects, very 
dramatic. One can imagine the intensity of the in- 
terview, on board the flagship, between the admiral 
and Captain Miller, of the Merrirnac^ when Miller 
learned that it was proposed to deprive him of the 
only chance for distinction that was likely to come to 
him; and to supplant him by a young naval con- 
structor who was not even a line officer. 


II 


i 62 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


The admiral tells us of Miller’s most urgent pro- 
test against being deprived of his command, even 
questioning the admiral’s authority “to remove him 
from a ship where he had been placed in command by 
the Navy Department; and of his positive refusal to 
give up his command to anyone in the circumstances.” 
But the admiral does not tell of the entreaties, the 
arguments, almost (if not quite) the prayers of Mil- 
ler, that this, his one possible opportunity, should not 
be taken from him. 

The admiral was inexorable. He says: “He 

(Miller) had my sympathy, but I succeeded in con- 
vincing him that, in the short time, it would be most 
unwise to make a change in the plans.” 

Hobsdn, in his Century article for December, 1898, 
“The Sinking of the Merrimac^^ puts this matter 
rather differently, and says (p. 247) : 

“Captain Miller had given directions to the officers 
and crew of the Merrimac to prepare to leave the 
ship, and was himself leaving to go and see the ad- 
miral.” 

Again (p. 278) : “Captain Miller, who expected 

to go in, had spoken in high terms of his quartermas- 
ter and coxswain, young Deignan. 

Hobson and Miller then both went on board the 
flagship, and saw the admiral. We have not Miller’s 
statement of this interview, but he returned to his 
ship, evidently believing that he would not be deprived 
of his command. 

Hobson continues the narrative (p. 278) : “When 
I was about to leave, the admiral sent for me and said 
that Captain Miller claimed it as his right to go in 
with the Merrimac; and that he did not see how his 
claim could be disregarded. My answer was, in 
effect, that I should be happy to serve in any capacity, 
but that it must be evident to all that Captain Miller 
could not be anything but a passenger, even if nomin- 
ally in command.” And he used other arguments 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 163 


(all this in Miller’s absence), and finally Hobson said 
to Sampson that ‘‘when the situation was clear to the 
captain, he surely would not insist on going, however 
great his desire, as he could not really consider it right, 
or his duty to go.” 

The result of his argument Vv^as that “the admiral 
concluded that he would not allow the captain to go.” 
Hobson then followed Miller back to the Merri- 
maCy and the preparations were continued far into the 
night. Hobson continues the story : 

“Captain Miller was sitting on the bridge ; Deignan 
was at the wheel. The ship replied well to the 
helm, and the gallant captain told about her steering 
and maneuvering qualities and other virtues, still ex- 
pecting to go in with his ship. He had let me take 
complete charge, and I had not thought it necessary 
to tell him of the admiral’s final decision.” 

When Admiral Sampson came on board, at nearly 
three o’clock in the morning, to make a final inspec- 
tion, Miller was still in ignorance of his coming fate, 
and remained on the bridge, managing his ship, and 
still expecting to go. Hobson continues the story 
(p. 283) : 

“On coming on board, the admiral had gone up 
on the bridge,^ and as he spoke to Captain Miller I 
heard an exclamation of disappointment from the lat- 
ter. The admiral was the last to leave. Though 
bitterly disappointed, the generous captain came up to 
say a kind word, and wish us success.” 

Miller, from Hobson’s account, does not seem to 
have been very strongly “convinced” by Admiral 
Sampson. He obeyed his order to leave the ship, — 
he had to do that, — but as for the admiral’s “sym- 
pathy,” he will no doubt to his dying day regard his 
treatment as the refinement of cruelty. 

Hobson, in that Century article, relates an incident 

^ As a matter of fact, this occurred just before the admiral was 
about to leave. 


i64 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


that is not mentioned in any of Admiral Sampson’s 
reports, but It will bear repeating here. After a 
day of anxious preparation and a sleepless night, Hob- 
son started In to sink the M errimac ; but he was re- 
called by command of the admiral, and early in the 
morning he brought the M errimac out near the flag- 
ship New York, He and his crew were worn out by 
want of sleep and want of food (which in the excite- 
ment of the hour had been forgotten), and the re- 
action of the excitement had set In. 

Hobson, in the January number of the Century 
(p. 427) continues the narrative:. “We stood over 
near the New York, and stopped. The executive 
officer hailed, and said a relief crew would soon be 
over; but asked if we would take care of her until the 
relief crew could get breakfast. We replied that we 
would take care of her as long as might be desired. 
The headway having carried us fomard some dis- 
tance, we put the helm a-starboard to steer across and 
circle back, when suddenly the New York started up, 
her propellor race began to seethe, and she shot by us 
at full speed. We looked ahead, and on the horizon, 
to the southwest, discovered a craft standing towards 
the harbor. Soon the smoke began to pour out of 
the New York^s funnels. The craft stopped, turned 
about, and took to her heels, and a chase was on. 
The quarry was fleet, and had ten or twelve miles 
start. She drew hull down, and then disappeared. 
The New York stood straight on, and gradually dis- 
appeared; and for a long time the two columns of 
smoke told of hot pursuit. The Porter stood out at 
full speed to join in, and we saw her cut over the hori- 
zon. 

“There would be hours of chase; and hours for 
return. 

“A scorching sun rose high in a cloudless sky; not 
a breath of air stirred; a blinding glare came out of a 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 165 


glassy sea; and a day of waiting lay before us. We 
remained there until late in the afternoon.” 

What a picture is thus presented ! 

Without food, until late in the forenoon (when by 
accident Ensign Gherardi learned of their condition 
and brought relief), and without relief, those brave 
fellows were left, and compelled to wait, until the 
commander-in-chief in his flagship could get back 
from chasing a possible prize again out of sight 
and signal distance of the rest of the fleet. It was 
nearly two o’clock in the afternoon when she got back. 

That story is but a repetition of the one already 
given of the chase of the Spanish steamer Pedro on 
April 22, and it seems almost incredible. But the 
following extracts from the log-book of the New York 
completely verify the statements of Hobson. 

‘‘June 2. Midnight to 4 A. M. — The commander- 
in-chief visited the Merrimac from 2.25 until 3.20, 
when he returned with working party from the vessel, 
and Commander J. M. Miller. 

“4 to 8 A. M. — About 4.30 the Merrimac started in 
for harbor under command of Naval Constructor R. 
P. Hobson, U. S. N., to be sunk in the channel; but 
was recalled by order of the admiral. 

“At 5.55 sighted smoke of a steamer hull down to 
the Wd. Set out in pursuit, added another boiler, 
and increased speed to 17 knots. 

“8 A. M. to Merid. — Standing to Wd in chase of a 
steamer, until 8.50, when we overhauled her. At 
9.20 set course; and stood back to rejoin squadron, 
until 1.50; when stopped near the 

The log-book also shows that the New York 
steamed thirty-one miles from her station before she 
caught up with the steamer. 

A further and very significant extract from that log- 
book on that same day is the following: “At 2.30 
p. M. Commodore Schley came on board from the 
Brooklyn, and was received with the honor due his 


1 66 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


rank, viz., full guard of marines, and band.” This 
is the officer whose conduct up to that time Admiral 
Sampson subsequently characterized as reprehensible ! 
What absurdity ! 

Suppose that, while the commander-in-chief was off 
chasing that possible prize, with Schley left as “senior 
officer on the spot,” present In front of Santiago, Cer- 
vera had taken the opportunity to try and escape ; and 
that his destruction had been as complete as It was on 
July 3 ) whose would and ought to have been the glory 
and credit of that destruction? There can only be 
one name given in reply, and it would not be “Samp- 
son.” 

Cervera had a better chance to escape that morning 
than he ever had again, for by some misunderstanding 
the Oregon went off chasing, during the absence of 
the New York, and the Marblehead was sent after 
her, and they did not get back until 7 p. M. 

The Merrimac went in on the night of June 2, and 
was sunk, but the attempt to block the channel was 
a complete failure. 

The writer may be pardoned the expression of his 
opinion that It was very fortunate for the country that 
Captain Miller was not allowed to take the ship in. 
Miller was a good sailor, while Hobson, brave and 
able as he otherwise undoubtedly was, was not a 
sailor, and was therefore lacking In that readiness of 
resource In emergencies that comes only from long 
experience in handling vessels as a sailor. 

So long as everything went according to the pre- 
arranged plan, all was well; but when the plan was 
broken there was none of the ability that was needed 
to adapt Itself to the unexpected situation. The 
writer does not mean to disparage Hobson, in assert- 
ing the belief that Captain Miller would probably 
have made more successful the effort to block the chan- 
nel. 

The sinking of the Merrimac has furnished occa- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 167 


sion for the thanks of Congress to Hobson and his 
men who undertook it. Their bravery was not ex- 
ceptional. When volunteers were called for, pretty 
much all the young officers and men of the fleet re- 
sponded; but there should be and is no wish or pur- 
pose to detract in the least from the praise their 
bravery has rightfully received. 

But one cannot help the feeling that it was a new 
proceedure on the part of an admiral in the Navy of 
the United States, to put any obstruction whatever 
between his ships and the ships of an enemy. 

Imagine, if one can. Admiral Farragut, when the 
progress of his wooden ships up the Mississippi be- 
low New Orleans was obstructed by Forts St. Philip 
and Jackson, by two or three ironclads, by fire-ships 
and rafts, by booms and chains, all commanded by 
officers who had been brought up in the navy of the 
United States, deliberately sinking a vessel in the nar- 
row channel left open by the enemy, and through 
which only he could get at that enemy. Or at Mobile 
endeavoring to block up the narrow channel for the 
same purpose. Imagine, if possible. Admiral Dewey 
endeavoring to block up the entrance to Manila Bay, 
to keep Montojo’s fleet in, and necessarily, to keep 
his own fleet out. Imagine Nelson endeavoring to 
block up the channel leading into Toulon, to keep the 
French fleet in there ! Imagine any of these things ! 
Impossible ! 

If Admiral Sampson could thereby have persuaded 
Admiral Cervera to come out, he should have sent 
a message to him that he would do as the French 
colonel did, when he exclaimed to the English regi- 
ment confronting his own in a battle: ^^Aprez vouSy 
Messieurs And have allowed Cervera to fire the 
first broadside. 

The attempt to obstruct the channel, fortunately, 
proved utterly futile. Its best success was its com- 
plete failure. 


CHAPTER XLII 


SAMPSON^S ORDER OF BLOCKADE 

Schley’s method of blockade was continued by Samp- 
son until the night of June 2. On that day he issued 
the following (A. 481), which was styled, 

“Order of Battle 

‘‘The fleet oflf Santiago will be organized during 
operations against that port, and the Spanish squad- 
ron, as follows : 

First Squadron (under the personal command of 
the commander-In-chlef ) , New York, Iowa, Oregon, 
New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter, 

Second Squadron (Commodore Schley), Brook- 
lyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, 

“Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by 
the commander-In-chlef. The vessels will blockade 
Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles 
from the Morro In the daytime, and closing In at 
night, the lighter vessels well Inside. 

“The first squadron will blockade on the east side 
of the port; and the second squadron on the west 
side. 

“If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close, 
and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink 
his vessels, or force them to run ashore In the channel. 

“It Is not considered that the shore batteries are of 
sufficient power to do any material Injury to battle- 
ships. 

“In smooth water, the vessels will coal on station. 
If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the 
blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle 
thus left vacant.” 


-7^ [To accompany order of battle, dated June 2, 1893.) 

^ C^n ct}n. /// . 

^ D. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 189S, 


Morro. 



Or^^on/ 



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SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 169 


Accompanying this Order of Blockade was a dia- 
gram showing the position each vessel was expected 
to maintain. It is here reproduced, Diagram III op- 
posite. The ships were placed in a semicircle, the * 
radius of which was six nautical miles, with the 
Morro, at the entrance of the harbor as the center. 

The distance in a straight line between the May- 
flower^ on the extreme right, and the Vixen^ on the 
extreme left, was nearly twelve miles; and between 
Commodore Schley’s flagship Brooklyn and Admiral 
Sampson’s flagship New York was nearly seven miles. 

These distances evidently were found embarrassing, 
in the matter of reading signals, because, on June 15 
(A. 514) the admiral directed: 

“If, at any time, the flagship makes a signal which 
is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once 
approach the flagship, or repeating vessel, to a point 
where she can read the signal.” 

The blockade was thenceforth maintained in this 
order, but the distance from the Morro was subse- 
quently decreased In daytime, to about four miles. 
No hungry cats could have watched a hole out of 
which a rat was expected to come with a more sleep- 
less and persistent vigilance than was displayed by that 
whole blockading force during the whole period be- 
fore the day of the battle on July 3, and when the 
Spaniards did come out, “There they come” ! was an 
almost simultaneous cry from the lookouts of those 
ships whose station permitted them to look into the 
entrance. It was expected that this should be, and it 
was most efficiently done; and there should be noth- 
ing but praise about it. 

Commodore Schley’s flagship Brooklyn faithfully 
performed her share of the arduous duty. Others of 
the ships went to Guantanamo to coal, but she re- 
mained and did her coaling on her blockading station, 
ever alert and ready for any emergency, as the event 
proved. 


170 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


The only order that Admiral Sampson ever gave, 
after his assumption of command at Santiago de 
Cuba, which bears any semblance of an ‘‘Order of 
Battle” with Cervera’s fleet, is found in the last pre- 
ceding order. It is here reprinted in parallel columns 
with the order, or direction, that had been given by 
Admiral Schley to his captains on the morning of 
May 29, within two hours after Cervera had been 
discovered. 

COMMODORE SCHLEY’S 
ORDER 

Commodore Schley explained 
to the commanding officers that, 
in case the Spanish ships came 
out, he wished to concentrate 
the batteries of all our ships on 
a portion of those of the enemy. 

This was not explained as a 
tactical concentration of our 
whole force on a part of the 
enemy, but as a division of our 
whole fire on several of the 
enemy’s ships. 

During the time that the com- 
manding officer was on board 
the flagship. Captain Evans 
asked Commodore Schley if it was 
his intention to steam at the 
enemy’s ships in case they came 
out? 

Commodore Schley answered 
“certainly,” and added words 
indicative of his intention to 
attack them as they came out 
of the narrow defile. 

The above statement of Schley’s “order,” direc- 
tions,” or “views” (whichever it may be called). Is 
the statement made by Captain McCalla^ In the log- 
book of his vessel (the MaTblehead) within a few 
hours after Commodore Schley gave them. They are 
in accord with what the commodore had said to his 
officers while at Hampton Roads, in April previous. 

If Sampson had summoned his officers on board of 


ADMRAL SAMPSON’S 
ORDER. 

If the enemy tries to escape, 
the ships must close, and en- 
gage as soon as possible ; and 
endeavor to sink his vessels, or 
force them ashore in the channel. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 171 


his flagship, on the morning of June i, and there dis- 
cussed with and explained to them his views, instead 
of writing that order, he would have done what Nel- 
son did before the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar; 
and just what Schley did on the morning of the 29th, 
as soon as he had discovered Cervera. 

Aside from verbal difference, the orders of both 
Schley and Sampson were: “If the enemy tries to 
escape, we will attack and try to sink them in the nar- 
row channel.” That was the natural, and in fact the 
only general direction that could have been given, for 
neither officer expected that our ships would do any- 
thing else than attack the enemy as soon as he ap- 
peared; and the giving of any formal order was 
about as necessary as it would have been to say to the 
cats watching the rat-hole: “Now, if that rat at- 

tempts to escape, you must go for him.” That was 
cat nature; and it is the nature and education of the 
officers of the navy of the United States to ‘‘go” for 
the enemy as soon as he appears. 

Nelson’s rule of battle: “No captain can go very 

far wrong if he puts his ship alongside that of an 
enemy,” has always been the rule of our navy. 


CHAPTER XLIII 


EVENTS DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE 

The month of June was not entirely uneventful. On 
the 6th a part of the fleet bombarded the batteries at 
the entrance to the harbor of Santiago de Cuba for 
about two hours and a half. The admiral then 
cabled the Navy Department (A. 485) : ‘‘Have 

silenced the works quickly, without injury of any kind. 
If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be 
ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration 
demands Immediate army movements. If delayed, 
city will be defended more strongly, by guns taken 
from the fleet.” 

General Shafter had on that very day embarked 
his army at Tampa Bay, Fla. 

Ex-Secretary of War General Alger, in his book, 
“The Spanish-American War,” at page 72, says: 
“During all night of the 7th the transports moved 
down the bay towards the gulf, on their way to Santi- 
ago; but just at that moment the phantom Spanish 
fleet revealed Itself a second time.” 

The first revelation of this phantom had been dur- 
ing the month of April, or first part of May, when the 
whole New England coast got frantic with apprehen- 
sion about it; and the then Secretary of the Navy 
(being from Massachusetts) sent Schley’s two 
cruisers {Minneapolis ^ and Columbia) away from the 
Flying Squadron to “search for and descry” the im- 
aginary foe. 

Shafter’s transports were stopped until the “phan- 
tom” could be laid, but finally (as General Alger 
facetiously says, “When the navy thought it safe to 
furnish an escort”) sailed on June 14 for the seat of 
war, and, in due time, with the assistance of the boats 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 173 


and steam launches of the navy, and under the man- 
agement of Captain Caspar F. Goodrich of the navy, 
the troops were all safely landed (except two or three 
soldiers drowned) at Daiquiri and Siboney, two small 
villages to the east of the entrance of Santiago Bay. 

The ten thousand men (it was fifteen thousand) 
were there, but the city was not ‘‘ours,” for several 
periods of forty-eight hours, because then began a 
series of misunderstandings and bickerings between 
Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, of which the 
least said the better. The views and strictures of each 
upon the other are set forth on pages 86-89 of Gen- 
eral Alger’s book. 

To sum it up, Shafter insisted that Sampson should 
force the fleet into the harbor of Santiago, which 
Sampson, with full approbation of the Navy Depart- 
ment, refused to try to do. He declined to risk his 
battle-ships, and insisted that Shafter should first 
capture the Morro and other batteries at the entrance, 
so that the channel might be cleared of torpedoes, 
mines, and other obstructions before attempting an 
entrance. 

The fact is, however undeniable, that no effort 
whatever was made by Admiral Sampson to destroy 
the connections between the Spanish submarine mines 
and the electrical batteries by which they were to be 
exploded; or to do anything whatever looking to- 
wards the forcing an entrance. 

The admiral had had one very frightful experience 
with torpedoes, during the Civil War, when the 
Patapsco was blown up under him at Charleston har- 
bor in 1865. He was wise in his wariness to subject 
his battle-ships to any such risk. 


CHAPTER XLIV 


THE OCCUPATION OF GUANTANAMO 

On June lo a battalion of marines that had been 
organized at, and sent from New York, under com- 
mand of Colonel Robert W. Huntington, arrived; 
and under convoy of the Marblehead (Captain Mc- 
Calla) and Siiwanee (Lieutenant Delahanty) and 
other small vessels, landed at Guantanamo, and took 
possession of that excellent harbor. The marines were 
attacked vigorously, on several occasions, by Spanish 
troops, but, with their accustomed gallantry, the ma- 
rines maintained their hold, and thenceforth that im- 
portant harbor was occupied by our vessels as a coal- 
ing station.^ 

On June 12, during a very severe attack by the 
Spaniards on the camp. Assistant Surgeon John Blair 
Gibbs, of the navy, was killed. 

On June 15 the Texas (Captain John W. Philip), 
Marblehead, and Suwanee attacked and demolished 
the forts guarding the channel at the head of the bay. 
In this attack the Texas and Marblehead each picked 
up, by their propellor screws, a submarine contact 
mine, containing about one hundred pounds of gun- 
cotton. The screws whirled them over and over sev- 
eral times before they were discovered. Philip 
naively says : ‘‘Owing to Divine care, neither of them 
exploded.” A better explanation is that the incident 
demonstrated that in a short time after they were put 
down the contact mines became useless from cor- 
rosion, and were little to be feared. These had been 
planted only about a month. ^ 

On June 16 another bombardment of the batteries 


^ Under our treaty with Cuba it has become permanently such station. 
^ One of them can be seen at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 175 


at the entrance to Santiago took place. The admiral 
reported that “the batteries were quickly silenced, and 
after firing with great deliberation for some forty 
minutes, the fleet returned to its blockading position, 
without any shot from the batteries following this 
movement. This fact undoubtedly shows the effi- 
ciency of our fire.” 

There can be no doubt of the efficiency of our fire, 
but the failure of the Spaniards to return it is probably 
better explained by lack of ammunition to waste. 
These bombardments were an undoubtedly useless 
waste of our ammunition and straining of our guns. 

The weary blockade continued all through the 
month of June, and until July 3. 


CHAPTER XLV 


THE BRAVERY OF LIEUTENANT VICTOR BLUE, UNITED 

STATES NAVY 

There is a personal incident of that blockade that de- 
serves especial mention, and certainly deserves especial 
commendation. 

Up to June lo Admiral Sampson seems to have 
continued uncertain as to whether all of Cervera’s 
ships were in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and so 
he directed Lieutenant Commander Delehanty (com- 
manding the Siiwanee) to ‘‘communicate with the in- 
surgent forces and obtain, through them, positive in- 
formation concerning the presence of the enemy’s 
ships in the harbor.” 

Delehanty subsequently reported (A. 444) that, in 
order to furnish absolutely reliable information, he 
had sent Lieutenant Victor Blue, that he might pro- 
ceed to the hills north of Santiago, to make the de- 
sired observations. Lieutenant Blue returned and re- 
ported, on June 13, how, “after going through the 
Spanish lines, he proceeded to a hill top, from which 
he had an almost unobstructed view of the entire bay,” 
and “in the bay he counted five large vessels that were 
unmistakably men-of-war. Three of these answered 
the descriptions of Cervera’s vessels.” “I was fully 
satisfied from my own knowledge that the vessels I 
saw were those of Cervera’s squadron.” 

Not satisfied with this, Sampson again gave verbal 
directions to Delehanty “to procure further informa- 
tion of the location of the enemy’s vessels in the har- 
bor,” and a second time Lieutenant Blue was sent 
within the Spanish lines for the purpose. 

Delehanty, in forwarding Lieutenant Blue’s report 
of this second venture, says (A. 445) : “While it is 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 177 


a simple and modest statement of his trip and its re- 
sults, I beg to Invite your attention to the perilous na- 
ture of the trip, and the prompt and satisfactory man- 
ner in which it was performed. This is the second 
time that Lieutenant Blue has successfully undertaken 
this hazardous duty, and while he has only done that 
which is expected of every officer, a due recognition of 
such valuable services is a great stimulation to the best 
efforts of officers and men.” 

Admiral Sampson, on June 27, wrote the depart- 
ment : 

“I desire to recommend to your consideration the 
excellent conduct of Lieutenant Victor Blue, U. S. N., 
who has, on two occasions, at my request, undertaken 
to locate the positions of the Spanish fleet in the har- 
bor of Santiago de Cuba. To accomplish this, it has 
been necessary to travel on one occasion over a dis- 
tance of seventy-five miles, and on another a distance 
of sixty miles, mostly through territory occupied by 
the intrenchments of the Spanish Army. 

think the manner in which he has accomplished 
these tasks is deserving of promotion, and I respect- 
fully recommend that he be advanced ten numbers.” 

On these occasions Lieutenant Blue ‘Vore his uni- 
form and side arms.” 

It was chivalrous for the lieutenant to do this, but if 
he had been captured within the Spanish lines It Is to 
be feared that “his uniform and side arms” would not 
have saved him from the fate of Major Andre or 
Nathan Hale. 

“Promoted ten numbers!” He should have been 
promoted Immediately to be lieutenant commander, 
for if he had been taken by the Spaniards, his reward 
would probably have been the erection, a hundred 
years after his death, of a statue to his memory, such 
as that which stands In the City Hall Park, at New 
Y ork, to the memory of N athan Hale ; for we may be 


12 


178 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


quite sure that those Spaniards would have been 
prompt to take his life away. 

More than a year later the gallant lieutenant was 
advanced for those deeds — five numbers only. The 
statute authorizes such promotions for “extraordinary 
heroism.” If that was not “extraordinary heroism,” 
it would be difficult to say what falls within that defi- 
nition. 


CHAPTER XLVI 


THE MORNING OF JULY 3, 1 898, SAMPSON, IN HIS 
FLAGSHIP “new YORK,” LEAVES FOR SIBONEY 

The signal-book of the flagship New York records on 
the morning of July 3 that the following signals were 
made : 

“8.15 A. M. — New York to Indiana. To Captain 
Taylor. The admiral wishes to know if you will join 
him this morning, in going to see General Shafter? 

“8.37 A. M. — Indiana to New York. Captain 
Chadwick. Work aboard ship previously going on 
prevents me from going with you to-day. Taylor.” 

The log-book of the New' York contains the follow- 
ing entries : 

“At 8.50 A. M. started at full speed under three 
boilers, for Altares (Siboney), accompanied by the 
Hist and Ericsson^ after making signal to the rest of 
the fleet: ‘Disregard movements of the commander- 

in-chief.’ ” 

The signal-book shows that this last signal was 
made at 9.10, so that the flagship had been on her 
way towards Siboney for twenty minutes, at full 
speed, when it was made. 

It is a very significant and important fact that 
neither Admiral Sampson nor Captain French E. 
Chadwick, the chief of staff and captain of the flag- 
ship New Yorky has ever, in the official reports of the 
events of that day, made any mention of those signals, 
particularly of the last and most important one, while 
other unimportant signals are mentioned. 

The failure to mention it was not accidental in both. 
Captain Chadwick probably prepared both reports. 
Why, except upon the principle of ^^Suppressio veri^ 
mention of it should have been omitted passes com- 
mon understanding. 


i8o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


The log-book continues: ‘‘Mustered at quarters at 
9.30. The admiral, captain, and assistant chief of 
staff prepared to land at Altares, to visit the head- 
quarters of the army.” 

In his article printed in the Century Magazine^ 
Captain Chadwick says : “The admiral, having made 
the engagement to consult that morning with Gen- 
eral Shafter, and expecting to ride to headquarters on 
landing, had put on leggings and spurs (as had also 
the assistant chief of staff. Lieutenant Staunton), and 
did not remove them until after the battle; a costume 
that would have surprised the uninformed observer.” 

Certainly it would; but it as certainly shows the 
completeness of the preparation that had been made 
for landing. 

The story of the succeeding events of that day has 
been told, not only in the cold official reports, but in 
the pages of the magazines and in the newspapers by 
their respective correspondents who were on board 
the ships in the action. 

These correspondents shared all the dangers of the 
occasion, and displayed a bravery unexcelled by that 
of any of the trained and disciplined officers and 
crews of the respective ships that took part in the bat- 
tle that ensued on that day. 

Mr. George E. Graham, who was on board the 
Brooklyn, and Mr. Thomas E. Dieuwaide, who was 
on board the Texas, deserve particular mention and 
commendation. 

The stories told by these gentlemen, at the time, 
were carefully vised by the commanding officers of the 
respective ships, and are therefore as reliable in every 
particular as the official statements. There was no 
occasion for controversy, at the time they wrote, about 
what they had seen in the fight, 

Mr. Dieuwaide, constrained no doubt by his rela- 
tions to the New York Sun, afterwards undertook, 
before the Court of Inquiry, to qualify somewhat 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA i8i 


some of the statements that he had made on the very 
day of the battle, while its roar had hardly ceased; 
but such qualifications, made more than three years 
afterwards, are of little worth, especially in view of 
the fact that Mr. Dieuwade had become involved in 
the Hodgson dispute, to be treated of hereafter. 


CHAPTER XLVII 


THE BATTE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1 898. 

In the Century Magazine for May, 1 899, the captains 
of all the fighting ships that took part in the battle 
(except Clark of the Oregon) have told the story of 
the battle as they saw it. Lieutenant Eberle, of the 
Oregon^ told his vessel’s story. Most graphic de- 
scriptions they all are. 

Admiral Sampson also gave his version in the April 
number, 1899, of the same magazine. 

Admiral Schley, up to the time when he told it 
before the Court of Inquiry, had resisted all induce- 
ments (and they were many, pecuniary and other) to 
tell that story, except in his official reports. 

It is now purposed to give it in his own words, as 
testified to before that court, and to supplement it by 
the testimony of other officers of the Brooklyn^ of the 
Oregon and the Vixen^ given under oath before that 
court. 

Before doing this, however, the following from the 
book of the Spanish Lieutenant Jose Muller y Ter- 
jiero (reprinted by the Navy Department), will not 
fail to be interesting. The lieutenant says : 

‘‘If I were to live a thousand years, and a thousand 
centuries, never would I forget that 3d day of July, 
1898 ; nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it. 

“The day dawned beautifully — one of those sum- 
mer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the 
leaves of the trees; when not the smallest cloud is 
visible in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills 
the atmosphere, which was wonderfully transparent, 
so that the horizon could be observed at a great dis- 
tance. 

“Nothing was to be noticed among the ships of our 




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SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 183 


fleet, motionless on the waters of the bay, which re- 
flected their hulls, though inverted, with wonderful 
accuracy. They looked as though they ought not to 
leave an anchoring place where they could remain in 
such perfect safety. 

“To my mind the going out from Santiago harbor 
under the circumstances Cervera did, and as confirmed 
by the commanders of the ships of the fleet, constitutes 
the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to 
go out to certain death, not only with fearlessness, but 
with a clear head; for a man must be completely 
master of himself in order to command a ship with- 
out becoming excited or losing his head.” 


CHAPTER XLVIII 


ADMIRAL SCHLEY’s STORY OF THE BATTLE^ 

Sunday, July 3, broke a perfectly beautiful day. The 
skies were flecked with white clouds, and the breeze 
continued a little longer, off the land that morning, 
than usual; light, it is true. 

After I had gotten my breakfast, I came up to take 
a survey of the situation; to look about, and see what 
could be observed with the glasses. 

We were lying, at that time, possibly three miles, or 
a little bit over, from the land; and I remember to 
have wondered very much why they had permitted us 
to lie so close to the shore — for we were constantly in 
range — and it was a matter of constant inquiry and 
discussion, on board the ship, why the batteries did 
not fire on us. 

At a quarter of nine o’clock my orderly reported to 
me that a signal had been made from the flagship 
{New York) to ‘‘Disregard movements of com- 
mander-in-chief,” and that she had gone eastward. 

I looked over the ground and situation. I did not, 
of course, know where she had gone. 

I sat under an awning that we usually had put into 
position each day as the sun rose, in order that the 
oflicers might collect there. I think we also had one 
forward for the men. 

After having gone below for a little while, I came 
back on deck, with my glasses ; and while I was sit- 
ting in this position, abaft on a hatchway, I heard a 
call from the forward bridge : 

^^Tell the commodore that the fleet are coming 
out!^^ 


^ As told to the Court of Inquiry, I. 1336 et seq. 

^Throughout the course of Schley’s own story the italics are all 
mine. — J, P. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 185 


That was some time after the men had been called 
to quarters; how many minutes I do not now re- 
member; but in the vicinity of 9.35, according to our 
time. 

The ship was at that moment lying with her head in 
toward the land, in the direction of Cabanas; which 
was a little cove to the westward; one of the marking 
points which we used in maintaining our position. 

I looked over the starboard side and saw the enemy 
coming out of the entrance; and, realizing that there 
was very little time, I looked eastward to see the order 
of the ships, as they were arranged. I saw the Texas, 
apparently, I should say, a point or more abaft the 
starboard beam. My recollection now, as nearly as 
I can state it, is that the ship’s head {Brooklyn) , was 
pretty nearly north-northwest, having drifted around. 
The Texas appeared to me to be heading on some one 
of the easterly courses. I saw just ahead of her, to 
the left, the Iowa, She was, of course, to the east- 
ward of the Texas. The Oregon was to the eastward 
of the Iowa; the Indiana was to the eastward of that 
position; and the Gloucester was lying in under the 
land, I thought, in the neighborhood of Aguadores. 

The New York (Admiral Sampson’s flagship) was 
out of sight, and out of signal distance, with glasses. 

I looked at that, in order to determine what my 
position in the action was to be. Of course, if she had 
not been, I should not have given, or made, a signal! 

In the meantime I had gone forward to a little plat- 
form that I had had constructed around the conning 
tower, as my position in battle ; — the position I would 
take in order to be very close in with Captain Cook. 
I had only been there a moment or two when Cook 
joined me. 

In the meantime Mr. Hodgson (the navigator), 
who was on the bridge sang out something to the cap- 
tain about being “connected up,” and all ready; and 
he (Hodgson) said to me about the same time: 


i86 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


, ‘‘Commodore, they are coming right at us.” “Well,” 
I said, “go right for them.”^ 

The helm was put a-port; the ship was started 
ahead; at first at, perhaps, half-speed; I don’t recol- 
lect that. She took her way very quickly; and when 
we headed around, of course I said to Captain Cook, 
“Go ahead, full speed,” and hoisted the signal “Clear 
ship for action.” We generally made that signal, 
because there was around the quarterdeck and fore- 
castle of those ships a little temporary railing, com- 
posed generally of oars and rope, to keep the people 
from getting overboard; and generally an awning of 
some sort or other. 

That signal was followed up by, “Close up,” or 
“Close action.” 

The Brooklyn, as well as the other vessels of the 
squadron, charged immediately in to the entrance, in 
accordance with the original plan of sinking them in 
the entrance, or driving them ashore there. 

We continued directly for the head of the enemy’s 
column, the idea uppermost in my mind being that, if 
we could arrest them long enough for the battle-ships 
to close in and knock them to pieces, that would be our 
best point of attack. 

We continued on this course, porting and starboard- 
ing, to meet the movement of the leading ship, which 
I assumed to be the flagship, from a flag at her mast- 
head; and I suppose that, from the start, as nearly as 
I can recall, we were ten to twelve minutes turning; 
first with port helm, and then advancing directly to- 
wards the enemy. I saw the ships to the eastward and 
westward (of the entrance) closing in. 

I said to Captain Cook: “Close action,” or “Close 
up” has been hoisted; and it means to keep about a 

^ Mr. Hodgson confirmed this statement, and testified (I. 571): 
“I told him (the commodore) that they were evidently making 
for us; and he said, ‘Well, go for them.^ I rang full speed, and 
put the helm a-port.” 




Diagram IV. — “ He replied that it was either ‘a-port,’ or ‘ hard-a-port I think he said hard-a-port. 

FACING 187 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 187 


thousand yards away, so as to be out of their effective 
torpedo range.” 

^^Miich Will depend upon this ship this dayJ* 

Captain Cook was standing close alongside of me. 
He said: “Yes, we will soon be within the cross-fire 
of these ships.” I said: “Yes.” We had advanced 
and were firing. 

The first gun, I think, was fired ( from the port for- 
ward turret) by Lieutenant Simpson, almost directly 
over the forecastle of the ship. I saw the leading 
[Spanish] ship, which apparently had started with 
the intention of ramming, take a most decided sheer 
to the westward, leaving a gap between her and the 
ship following, which subsequently proved to be the 
Vis cay a. We were standing in the direction of the 

Viscaya, when she also, if she had been minded to 
ram, seemed to have given up the intention; and 
turned also to the westward, following the direction 
of the leading ship. 

It then became apparent, as we were steering on 
diametrically opposite courses, that the original plan 
had failed; and that the Spanish fleet in order, and 
apparently at distance,^ had succeeded in passing the 
battle-ship line. 

The new feature of the fight became immediately 
apparent, the first having failed. 

The disposition was to be made then that was to 
control the subsequent battle. 

THE LOOP (so-called) IS MADE 

Immediately Cook gave the order to port the helm. 
I did not. I should have done it in a second. I saw 
the ship’s head swinging very rapidly, and I asked 
him if the helm was hard-a-port. He replied that it 
was either “a-port,” or “hard-a-port”; I think he 
said “hard-a-port.” (Diagram IV shows situations 
at the time.) 


*This means about four hundred yards apart. — ^J. P. 


i88 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


I have never seen a ship turn more rapidly than 
she did; and her turn was absolutely continuous; 
there was no easing of her helm. 

I never saw the starboard side of the Texas at all. 
I only saw her port side, and she never approached 
any position that was within six hundred yards of the 
Brooklyn. She was so distant that she never entered 
my head as a menace or danger. We passed com- 
pletely around the circle. 

The last range [of the Spanish ships] was iioo 
yards, and a feature of the nearness of that ship which 
has impressed Itself on my mind, and will never be 
forgotten, was that I could see, with the naked eye, 
men running from her turret to her superstructure 
deck; and I observed the daylight between their legs, 
as they ran. It was the second ship upon which I saw 
this. We turned immediately about, and I was for a 
long time under the impression that our starboard en- 
gine was backed; but I found out subsequently that 
it was not. 

During the turn Mr. Hodgson (the navigator) 
very properly made some allusion to look out, per- 
haps, for the Texas; I do not recollect what it was; 
but there was never any colloquy of any character 
between Mr. Hodgson and myself. First, he was too 
good an officer to have transgressed one of the 
plainest duties of an officer at that time; and, second, 
if he had undertaken it, I would not have permitted it 
for a second. As I say, that is fiction. There was no 
colloquy. 

Before we turned, the leading [Spanish] ship was 
abeam, or a little abaft the beam. When we had 
turned about she was ahead of us, — that is, on the 
starboard bow, — and all four of the Spanish ships and 
the fort were firing at the same time. I looked over 
and saw the forts firing. From that moment, the next 
ten or fifteen minutes was the most furious part of the 
entire combat. I remember very distinctly seeing. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON >ND CERVERA 189 


from time to time, as my attention was attracted for 
the moment, the jets of water ahead and astern; and 
over and short; and the roar of the projectiles was 
one of the things that can be heard once in a lifetime, 
and never forgotten. 

It appeared to me, at that moment, that all four of 
those ships were at work on the Brooklyn; and up to 
that moment, up to the moment of turning, so far as 
we could perceive, there was not the slightest evidence 
that they had been even injured.^ 

The thought passed through my mind that after all 
our precautions and waiting, those fellows would get 
away. 

At that moment I felt, and I think I remarked to 
Captain Cook, that we were alone; and would per- 
haps have the most of that fight upon ourselves, be- 
cause I did not know then that the battle-ships could 
possibly keep up with their speed; but I said to him: 
“We must stay with this crowd.” I had no idea we 
would escape. I thought, of course, that if they could 
have shot as well as we did, they certainly would 
have gotten us. 

When we had turned around, when we had got 
completely turned around, and on a westerly course, — 
the Spanish ships appeared to have been broken up a 
little, although still in some semblance of forma- 
tion, — just at that moment I saw the Oregon breaking 
through the cloud-envelope. She broke through on 
to the starboard quarter of the {^Brooklyn^ flagship. 
I had hoisted the signals of “Close up” and “Follow 
the flag,” believing that a new disposition was neces- 
sary; and that signal was replied to, and I saw it re- 
peated to our other ships. 

Captain Clark knew very well that it was not in- 


® This same idea impressed itself upon Captain Clark’s mind, who 
said (I. 1335) : “The Oregon ran between the Iowa and Texas, and 
soon after we sighted the four Spanish ships ahead, apparently 
uninjured at the time.” 


190 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


tended for him, because he was “following the flag,” 
so he repeated it to the other ships. 

In a very few minutes after the Oregon broke 
through the cloud of smoke — she was, at that time, 
perhaps four hundred or five hundred yards distant, 
not much farther — the Brooklyn and Oregon were a 
sheet of flame. I never saw such a fire; and never 
realized what rapid gun firing really meant before, 
because both ships were, at that time, a sheet of flame; 
and in a very few minutes after that 1 saw that the 
leading [Spanish] ship was very badly hurt, for she 
lagged astern. I saw the smoke coming out of her 
hatches, and the fact that impressed itself upon me 
was that the columns were going almost straight into 
the air. 

I said to Captain Cook, who was constantly at my 
side, and always in my confidence: “We have got 

one. Keep the boys below informed of all the move- 
ments. They can’t see; and they want to know”; 
and he did throughout the action. Every few mo- 
ments messages were sent below to the men ; and they 
were answered oftentimes with cheers that we could 
hear through the ventilators. 

It appeared a very short interval after that that I 
saw a second one on fire, which proved later to be the 
Oquendo. She had evidently suffered very severely, 
and she started, of course, immediately inshore, leav- 
ing the Viscaya and the Colon. The Viscaya imme- 
diately took a leading position on the bow, and I 
thought for a while that perhaps she would outfoot 
us. The Colon worked inshore, and from the drop- 
ping out of those two ships, until the Viscaya turned 
inward, was a period of perhaps thirty minutes, dur- 
ing which she was abreast of the Brooklyn and 
Oregon. 

I looked to the eastward just before these ships 
turned in, and I got occasional glimpses of the Indiana 
and Gloucester. I could not see very well, for the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 191 


smoke, what they were doing; though I knew that 
they were doing admirable work. I felt that the mo- 
ment those vessels ran on the beach the command- 
ing officers of our ships who could not keep up the 
pace with the leaders would take care of the prisoners, 
and save them from the insurgents as well as from the 
fire that had been started by our gun fire. 

I should say that, as nearly as I can remember the 
time, about thirty minutes elapsed from the time of 
the turning in, or wounding of those two vessels, until 
the Viscaya followed their example. 

The Viscaya was a little forward of the beam of 
the Brooklyn, and I do not think over about 2300 or 
2400 yards distant, at any time. 

She was in most excellent target range, and I re- 
member, on the way out, inquiring from a man in the 
top [one of the marines] who was under this heavy 
fire of the two Spanish ships; and he reported that 
he did not see any of our shots hitting the water; and 
so I imagined that he meant they were striking the 
ships. 


CHAPTER XLIX 


THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YEOMAN GEORGE H. ELLIS 


Yeoman Ellis was the only man killed in the battle, 
and Schley, continuing the narrative, said : 

On the trip outward, after the turn, I was very 
anxious about the ranges, because I did not want the 
Vis cay a and the Colon to get out of good fighting 
range. 

Ellis, who was an expert man with the stadimeter, 
constantly kept the stadimeter on those vessels ; and, 
knowing exactly their heights, he reported to me that 
they were maintaining the same range. I thought, 
however, that my eye was a little bit more sensitive, 
and I said to him, “No, they are evidently gaining.” 
He went from me a second time, and that was the last 
I saw of him. 

In performing this magnificent duty, he lost his 
life. 

I don’t think he was distant from where I was 
standing over eight or ten feet. His brains and blood 
were thrown over a great many people, and some of it 
reached me. He immediately fell to the deck, of 
course, and it was a shocking sight, to men who had 
never seen such things. Lieutenant McCauley and 
Doctor Du Valin were standing between me and the 
tower, and they picked up the body and carried it to 
the side. I just happened to see them through this 
opening, and called out to them, “No, don’t throw 
that body overboard.” I thought that one who had 
fallen so gallantly deserved to be buried like a Chris- 
tian, and his body was laid under the lee of the for- 
ward turret, covered with a blanket, and kept there 
until the battle was over.^ 


^Lieutenant Ryan gave the following account of Ellis’ death. 
“Ellis was forward of the forward turret, perhaps about three 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 193 


He was buried at Guantanamo. 

Just before the Vtscaya turned to run ashore she 
put her helm a-starboard, apparently starting out for 
the Brooklyn or the Oregon^ I don’t know which. At 
that moment she evidently got a severe wound, for I 
saw quite an explosion under her port bow. In a 
moment afterwards she put her helm hard-a-port, 
turning inshore, with smoke coming from all of her 
hatches, and I thought she was going to capsize, as 
she had such a tremendous list to port. 

At that moment I saw a shell strike her,“ which ap- 
peared to me to rake her fore and aft, and I thought 
she would sink in deep water. So I told the signal 
officer to signal to the Texas to look out for her peo- 
ple, and save them. 

The Texas was, however, too far astern to receive 
the message, and I made the remark at the time, 
‘‘Well, Philip Is always sensible; he needs no instruc- 
tions about such things.” 

In the tremendous part of the fight to the eastward, 
all of the signal halyards of my ship were cut, with, I 
think, probably one exception. One of the speed cones, 
that we had hoisted to indicate speed, was cut, and 
came very near striking me on the bridge. It came 
down In front of me and went overboard. 

After the Vtscaya had turned in, on fire, her colors 
down, the Colon had edged inshore, and appeared to 


feet, taking ranges; and, while he had the stadimeter in his hand, 
a shell, from what I thought was the Colon, struck him in the face 
and took his head off instantly. Blood spouted out of his neck, and 
went over all the people about there. We attempted first to drop 
his body overboard, on account of the blood that was around the 
deck, but the commodore said not to throw him overboard, and 
he could be buried on shore.” 

^ Concerning this shell, Schley was too modest to claim that it 
was from his own ship, but Lieutenant Harlow (I. 1330) says: “I 
have a very good reason for believing that the projectiles which set 
on fire the Vtscaya, and compelled her to turn inshore, came entirely 
from the Brooklyn; and that there was, at that time, no other ship 
within range of the Vtscaya.” 

13 


194 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


be following the contour of the coast. I thought at 
the time that, looking astern, and seeing what had 
happened to her consorts, she was looking for the best 
place she could find in order to end the matter at once. 

But from Asseraderos, which is a point some fifteen 
or sixteen miles west of the harbor of Santiago, to the 
Rio Tarquino, is about thirty miles perhaps; and I 
saw she was out of range. So I made the signal to 
‘‘cease firing,” and told Captain Cook to let his men 
come out of the turrets into the cooler air and get 
something to eat; and to hurry up his men from 
below. 

I think I went into the tower myself at that time, 
and sang out to the men below that we had got all 
hands of them [the Spaniards] except one; and I 
thought they could be relied upon to catch that other 
vessel. I heard a good deal -of merriment and rejoic- 
ing. 

I went back to the bridge, and soon realized that 
they were doing their best. There was a jingle to the 
rails and a vibration of the vessel, but I perceived, at 
that time, that the motions of the ship were very slug- 
gish. It developed that one of the after compart- 
ments was filled with water, which we thought at the 
time was due to the fact that we had received some 
injury below the water line. 

The ship’s speed, of course, came up with some 
rapidity. I think the Viscaya had run ashore some- 
where in the neighborhood of eleven o’clock, and 
towards twelve it became very apparent that we were 
gaining on the chase. I said to Captain Cook several 
times during the action, that it would be a good idea 
to edge in a little closer, so that we could finish those 
fellows quicker. He replied that we had them^ in 
most excellent range, and that the guns were doing 
most admirable work.^ 

® Captain Cook confirmed this statement (I. 991) saying: “He 

[the commodore] spoke to me a number of times, asking me if I 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 195 


We were pointing at that time for Tarquino 
Point — not Cape Cruz, It was Tarquino Point, a 
point extending to the southwest. 

My idea was that, in steering that course, if this 
ship [^Brooklynl kept up her speed, the Colon would 
be obliged to come out; and at that time I said to 
Cook, would get up a lot of extra ammunition, so 
that when we come to close quarters it will be a very 
few minutes to knock her out.” 

As we were going out, of course there were various 
signals between the Oregon and myself, some of a 
pleasant character and some official. 

I gave the order (which Captain Clark has testified 
he did not receive) to open fire with her thirteen-inch 
guns.^ 

However, we continued to advance, — the Oregon 
and the Brooklyn. I do not think the Oregon was 
ever farther astern than eight hundred yards, and at 
times she worked up on our quarter. We continued 
in this position until about 12.50 P. M., when we 
realized that we were within range of the vessel, and 
we tried the thirteen-inch and eight-inch guns on her. 
Several of the shots fell short, but I recollect that a 
shot from one of the Oregon^s thirteen inch guns 
passed entirely over the Colon; and one from the 
Brooklyn's eight-inch guns passed over her. I saw 
with my own eyes the jet of water beyond, and 
thought it had gone through her; but it appears that 
it did not strike her. 

couldn’t edge in on them a little. I recollect this distinctly, be- 
cause I was anxious to keep a straight course, believing that we 
gained by that; and we had them at all times under our range. 
We had their range ocmpletely; and our shots were landing, while 
theirs were not.” 

^ Concerning this Lieutenant McCauley, who was Schley’s signal 
officer, testified (I. 1038) : “We ceased firing shortly after the 

Viscaya went ashore, and the Brooklyn chased the Colon; and 
finally, when the signal was made to the Oregon to try the thirteen 
inch guns — or whatever the words were, — I don’t remember the 
words exactly, — she opened fire with her thirteen inch guns. I re- 
member that signal distinctly, and particularly (I. 1041) ; because 
I made it myself.” 


CHAPTER L 


THE “colon” hauls DOWN HER FLAG 

Schley continues the story: At that time the Colon 
being directly under the fire of the two ships {Brook- 
lyn and Oregon)^ there was no question, apparently, 
in the mind of her captain that it would be fatal to 
continue the attempt to escape; and I think he did 
exactly right. The sacrifice of life would have been 
unnecessary. So at 1.15 he fired a gun to leeward, 
and hauled down his flag, and ran in on to the bar at 
Rio Tarquino. 

I signaled at once that the enemy had surrendered, 
and gave the order to cease firing. 

At the time she hauled her colors down I do not 
think she was over four miles from us. We were then 
running in the neighborhood of fifteen knots. 

We hauled up and immediately passed into a posi- 
tion, I should say, of one thousand yards from the 
Colon; and I should say that we arrived in the vi- 
cinity of the Colon certainly at 1.30 o’clock p. M. 

When this surrender took place I naturally felt in- 
terested in the vessels that were following. I was 
then on the bridge, and with glasses saw three vessels 
astern. I could see the masts of two, but only the 
smoke of the third one. 

We lowered out boat, and Captain Cook went on 
board the Colon, 

He asked me, “What were the terms of sur- 
render?” I replied, “Unconditional. Those are 
matters that the commander-in-chief must arrange. 
We can only receive unconditional surrender.”^ 


^The captain of the Colon seems to have had peculiar ideas of 
his duty as one who has surrendered. It goes without saying that 
when an enemy hauls down his flag and fires a gun to leeward, it 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 197 


‘‘About 2.23 the New York came up. We had dis- 
tinguished her. I made signals to her, and one of the 
signals I made she was quite half an hour in answer- 
ing. When she came up I also made signal to her 
that it ^^was a glorious day for our country to which 
the reply was: ^^Report your casualties/^ 

As soon as I could, I went on board the flagship to 
pay my respects to Admiral Sampson. In the mean- 
time Captain Cook, who had been detained some little 
time on board the Colon, started back to make his 
report, and went on board the flagship to make his re- 
port to Admiral Sampson; and did so. When he re- 
turned to the Brooklyn I took the boat and went on 
board the flagship myself. 

There I reported to the admiral substantially what 
had occurred, narrating the features of the battle in 
a hurried way. After making this statement to the 
commander-in-chief, a group of the officers who were 
standing on the opposite side came up to me and asked 
me about the details of the battle, everybody, of 
course, being interested in them; and I rehearsed 
them again, in a hurried way.^ 

means that his ship belongs to the victor; and the defeated party 
has no right to injure or destroy or imperil her. And yet the 
Spanish captain had, after surrendering, run his vessel ashore, opened 
her sea-cocks in such a manner as to fill her with water, and had 
caused all the breech-blocks of her guns to be broken off and thrown 
overboard, so as entirely to disable her battery. 

*The Battle of Santiago was then over, and a complete victory 
won, and with total destruction of the Spanish fleet had been secured 
with Schley as the “senior officer on the spot.” 


CHAPTER LI 


THE ‘‘BROOKLYN” IS SENT TO FIGHT A NEW FOE 

Schley’s story then continues as follows: At that 

time Chaplain Royce, of the New' York, came up to 
me and said: “Commodore, your work is not over 

yet. The Resolute has just arrived. Captain Eaton 
reports that there is a Spanish battle-ship on the coast, 
and the admiral wishes to see you.” » 

I went over, and there I found Captain Clark in 
the presence .of the commander-in-chief. I made 
some suggestion to the commander-in-chief about 
hoisting the flag on the Colon, and said to him that, 
if he had not come, I was prepared to have a force 
of fifty or sixty men mechanics and marines on board, 
to avoid anything like “monkeying with her.” 

He stated to me that he wished me to take the 
Oregon and go eastward to meet this ship. 

I must say that I felt some little delight as soon as 
he said that, because I thought that, after the ad- 
mirable work of the squadron on that day, and the 
part the Brooklyn and Oregon had had in it, there 
was not anything that carried the Spanish colors that 
we should have hesitated to meet.^ 

^ Captain Clark gave the following statement of this episode (I. 
1336) : 

“It was reported by Captain Eaton of the Resolute that a Spanish 
battle-ship had arrived off Santiago, and I think he said he had 
been pursued by her. He was positive he had seen a Spanish battle- 
ship. 

“The admiral did not seem to be much impressed by that; he 
seemed incredulous. I remarked that it must be Camara^s fleet, but 
that they had arrived too late. The admiral did not dissent; he 
did not say anything to that. Presently he said: ‘Well, Clark, you 
will have to go after that ship 

“Believing, as I did, that there really was a Spanish ship there, 
I said: ‘Well, Admiral, in war we want to overpower the enemy, 
if possible. Why should not the Brooklyn go along? He turned, 
and said, ‘Certainly; Schley, you go also!’ 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 199 


I immediately went on board my ship, stopping on 
the way to get the chaplain of the Texas ^ in order to 
bury the man who had been killed. 

I made signal to the Oregon to ‘‘Follow the flag,” 
and started eastward at pretty high speed. After I 
had gone some little time I saw that the Oregon did 
not follow. After I had gotten about an hour 
away, — perhaps a little less, — I saw, coming from the 
eastward, what proved to be the Vixen^ with the flag- 
lieutenant [Staunton] on board. He came up along- 
side of the Brooklyn, hailed me, and said that the 
smoke that I saw on the eastern horizon was that of 
the Pelayo; that he had gone close enough to distin- 
guish her, and make out her colors; and that he was 
sure It was the Pelayo, I told him to go west and 
inform the commander-in-chlef, and that the Brooklyn 
would go east and meet the Pelayo, 

As we approached what was supposed to be the 
Pelayo I must confess that I was a good deal con- 
fused in attempting to distinguish her two colors.”” 


“Then, feeling that I had perhaps assumed too much in speak- 
ing, and suggesting that a commodore also accompany me, I turned 
to the commodore, and said: ‘Commodore, we have knocked out 
several vessels this morning; and we can knock out another, can’t 
we?’ 

“He [Schley] said, ‘Certainly we can; come on.’ And started 
over the side. I started for my boat too — I think on the other side of 
the vessel. 

“What I was impressed with was his cheerful, cheery manner of 
approving of my having mentioned his going; that, as a senior, 
he had no feeling against me for suggesting it; but was approving, 
rather, and cheerful in his manner.” 

To the ordinary mind, the question will suggest itself: 

Why didn’t Admiral Sampson himself go in his flag-ship Ne^ 
York to meet the new foe? 

He had not been able to take any part in the battle, and one 
would think that he would have hailed with delight the approach 
of the new enemy, and gone promptly east with the Oregon, to 
meet her, leaving to Schley the duty of taking care of his prize, the 
Colon. But, no; he preferred the caring for the prize, and sent 
Schley to fight the new enemy. 

^ The Spanish flag consisting of horizontal stripes, red, yellow, and 
red; and the Austrian, red, white, and red. 


^oo SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


She had flags at both mastheads, and that only 
impressed me with the idea that she was cleared for 
action and in battle array. 

We kept our battery trained upon the ship, and had 
reached a position about eighteen hundred yards from 
her, and I had just given Captain Cook the order to 
‘‘stand by” [to fire]. Perceiving, however, that we 
were a little too close inshore to maneuver, and that 
our starboard battery was almost entirely disabled, I 
ported the helm to get a little more room, and to en- 
gage her on the port side, the battery of which was 
almost complete and entire. As I ported the helm she 
did the same, and that only convinced me that she was 
looking for us, as we were looking for her. In a few 
moments my signal officer, Mr. McCauley, said to me : 
“She is making a signal.” It was towards dusk, and 
she had turned her searchlight upon her flags, in order 
to call our attention to them, and that signal was in- 
terpreted by the code to mean that she was an 
Austrian. 

Of course we immediately trained our guns off of 
her, passed under her stern, and stopped. Her com- 
manding officer came on board. She proved to be the 
Infanta Maria Teresa, of the Austrian navy, the sec- 
ond ship of that name that we had encountered that 
day. 

When the Colon surrendered, the battle, of course, 
ended, and there were no other operations. The 
commander-in-chief signaled to me that he would re- 
main and transfer the crew from the Colon to the 
vessels there, and I went on to the eastward, feeling 
that, under the circumstances, the proper position for 
the second in command would be off Santiago. To 
that place I went, reaching the position of the squad- 
ron off the harbor somewhere near midnight. 

At ten or half past, in passing down the coast, just 
when we were abreast of the Vtscaya, an explosion of 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 201 


one of her magazines occurred. We all said, as we 
passed, “Well, that is the final salute.” 

As I approached the Indianay of course all on 
board of her were very anxious to know what had 
become of the Colon, I announced her surrender, and 
there was great cheering. 


CHAPTER LII 


SCHLEY MEETS ADMIRAL CERVERA NO CHEERS 

ALLOWED 

Schley continues : As I passed on, Captain Evans 

(of the Iowa) hailed me, and said that Admiral 
Cervera was on board, and would like very much to 
see me. 

I went over to see him, and found him on the after 
part of the ship. But before approaching him I di- 
rected that there should be no cheering, as I did not 
think it proper to exult over a foe who had fought 
and behaved so gallantly, and that we ought to omit 
that, — which was done.^ 

I went over to see the admiral, whom I found, of 
course, very greatly dejected. I said to him that I 
knew he had lost everything, clothing as well as 

^ Much praise has been properly given to Captain Philip of the 
Texas, for his order given to his crew: “Don’t cheer, boys; those 
poor devils are dying.” But Philip was not alone in his kindly 
expressions towards the beaten foe. 

Major Paul Saint Clair Murphy, of the Marine Corps, who was 
on board the Brooklyn that day, testified before the Court of In- 
quiry (I. 1319) : 

“I remember distinctly, because it made a very great impression on 
me at the time. The Colon had hauled down her flag, and was 
ashore. 

“We were preparing a cutter to take Captain Cook to the Colon, 
to receive the surrender of that ship. The officers and men were 
gathered forward, in the neighborhood of the forecastle, and Com- 
modore Schley addressed the men, cautioning them not to cheer when 
the Spanish captain came on board. He spoke of their gallantry, 
saying they had made a good fig-ht, and they should not be hurnili- 
ated; that we should treat them chivalrously; and not humiliate 
them with cheers. 

“It was a gallant speech, and we all felt it very deeply. The 
commodore made the same speech about midnight of the same day, 
when we were ranging up alongside the loiva. We had learned 
that Admiral Cervera and his officers were on board the lo^a.** 

It is quite evident that vae victis had no place in the commodore’s 
heart. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 203 


money, and that I wanted to say that the object of my 
visit was to inform him that my wardrobe, as well as 
my purse, were at his service. He replied that he 
thanked me very much, and that he had never met a 
sailor who was not a gentleman; that he was very 
much obliged, but that all he wanted was to send a 
despatch to his government, or to the captain general, 
announcing what had happened to his squadron. I 
told him, of course, that there could be no objection 
to that, and the despatch which he sent practically an- 
nounced the destruction of the Spanish squadron, and 
what he had done. I Informed him of the fate of the 
Colon, and that telegram was sent to the Captain 
General.^ 

That ended the battle of Santiago, on the 3d day 
of July, 1898. 

Admiral Schley, closed his story, thus : 

I would like to say, before concluding, that I was 
very much impressed that day with the fact that the 
officers and men who were engaged In that struggle 
fulfilled. In the highest and very noblest degree, the 
traditions of the American Navy. 

Is there any wonder that the close of such a story as 
that, by that sentiment, caused the listeners to break 
out into hearty, vehement, and prolonged applause? 

Not even Dewey’s gavel, and command, could 
prevent. 

^ It was as follows (A. 505): “I went out at 9.30, and sustained 
a very hot battle with the enemy. The defense was brilliant, but 
it was impossible to fight against the hostile forces, which were 
three times as large as ours. The Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and 
Viscaya, all with fire on board, ran ashore and were then blown 
up. The destroyers Pluton and Furor were sunk by shots from the 
hostile guns. The Colon, the Americans say, surrendered after run- 
ning aground. I estimate our losses at six hundred killed and 
wounded. The rest of the crews have been taken prisoners. Villa- 
mil was killed in the battle, I believe also Lazaga. Among the 
wounded are Concas and Eulate. The Americans have allowed the 
latter to retain his sword, because of his brilliant conduct. I must 
state that the American sailors are treating us with all possible con- 
sideration. “Cervera.” 


CHAPTER LIII 


CAPTAIN FRANCIS A. COOK’s STORY OF THE BATTLE 

The testimony of Captain Francis A. Cook, the 
captain of the Brooklyn, given before the Court of 
Inquiry (I. 895) is of very great interest, and Im- 
portance, and is as follows : 

We were to the westward. The bearing of the en- 
trance from us was about N. E. by N. 

The Spanish fleet came out south; and turned, as 
they left the entrance, about four points southwest; 
so that they turned in our direction. 

As soon as I saw this fleet, and saw that they were 
heading southwest, they seemed to be coming straight 
for the Interval between the Texas and Brooklyn, we 
being headed for the fleet, about northeast. I went 
into the conning tower and directed the helmsman, 
told him what I wanted to do — to keep straight for 
the head of the fleet. 

They wavered a little, sometimes turned one way, 
and sometimes another. We shifted the helm once 
or twice, but a very little Indeed; and, finally, when 
we were getting up fairly close — between 2,000 yards 
and 1,500 yards, I should judge — It seemed to me 
clear that they wanted to pass between the Texas and 
the Brooklyn, 

The Texas was well on our starboard, and she was 
heading to the northward and eastward (how much 
I do not know) ; but all the ships were carrying out 
the Instructions of the commander-in-chief, which 
were to head for the entrance. 

The Spanish ships were well to the westward. We 
held to the northeast. When I saw that, I ported the 
helm, perhaps halfway over. The fleet was still com- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 205 


ing for this interval. I stepped out of the tower, and 
on to the port hand side, to get a good look at the 
Spanish fleet; to see just what they were going to do, 
and as to our relative positions. 

When I saw that they [the Spanish] had evidently 
put their helms aport, and were turning to the west- 
ward, — we were then turning rapidly to starboard 
with port helm, and had turned through, I think, 
almost to eastward ; had ported the helm from about 
northeast — as I saw the enemy turn westward, I gave 
the order “Hard-a-port” to the helmsman; ran 
through the opening between the shield and the con- 
ning tower, to the other [starboard] side, on purpose 
to see our own fleet, and the relative positions of our 
own fleet. The Texas was well on our starboard 
hand. 

Instantly, quicker than I can tell it, the commodore 
called to me: “Cook, hard-a-port,’’ or “Is your helm 
hard-aport?” My answer was, “It is hard-a-port; 
she is turning as rapidly as possible.’’ 

As I saw the Texas ^ I saw her port bow. I never 
saw her starboard side; and changing her bearing 
very rapidly, the Brooklyn turned very rapidly along 
the port side of the Texas ^ until there was a clear open- 
ing between the [bow of] the Brooklyn and the stern 
of the Texas, 

We made a complete turn, and a very rapid turn, 
with the helm haria-port, from previously “port,” 
until we came around, and paralleled the Spanish fleet 
on the other side; and then we had the Viscaya on 
our starboard bow; and abaft beam was the 
Oquendo, and then the Colon. At the time I thought 
it was the Teresa; but I soon discovered this vessel 
dropping out, and heading to the beach. Then we 
passed on. 

That [referring to the turn] was about the hottest 
time in the action. There was no time for indecision. 


2o6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


and I don’t think there was any. It was a critical 
point, at a critical time. 

I have always felt, in my own mind, from a study 
of the position, that the chances would have been of 
disaster, had we shifted the helm at such a time. 

However, we got around there, and we had those 
three vessels [Spanish] there; and I looked, and 
could see nothing but smoke astern. Our vessels 
seemed enveloped in this smoke. 

We certainly were alone then. They were all firing 
on the Brooklyn^ when, almost Immediately, — faster 
than I can tell it, — I saw a large “white bone” in the 
water, — that Is the bow wave, — and through the 
smoke I saw the bows of a vessel. I exclaimed, 
“What’s that?” and the navigator [Hodgson] who 
was near me said: “That’s the Massachusetts,^^ 
There was some question about the Massachusetts ; 
and I said, “That’s the Oregon!^ I was perfectly 
assured from that moment. She came up very 
rapidly. She was making more speed than we were 
at that time. 

She passed in between the Texas and the Iowa, shot 
Into that opening. She came to the northward of the 
Texas, and came out on our starboard quarter, and 
about eight hundred yards from us. I mean a perpen- 
dicular distance between our courses. There was 
never anything between the Brooklyn and the Spanish 
ships. . 

I gave that order, ^^Hard-a-port,^^ on my own order; 
there is no question about that. It was not after hav- 
ing heard the commodore. 

There was a perfect understanding between us, and 
never a question of any kind during the action. 


CHAPTER LIV 


CAPTAIN CLARK’s STORY OF THE BATTLE^ 

One would think that a judge advocate, whose duty 
it was to place before the Court of Inquiry the true 
facts of that eventful day, would, at the very outset, 
have called upon Captain Clark and his officers to tell 
what they knew about the battle of July 3, 1898. 

The eyes of the whole naval world had been fixed 
upon that gallant officer during his great voyage 
around from the Pacific, and his ship, the Oregon^ 
had been most conspicuously efficient In that fight. 

Captain Clark’s statements imported absolute 
verity, and no one could or would pretend to doubt 
them in any particular. He had been “in It” from 
start to finish, and knew all about it, and his absolute 
impartiality could not be doubted. 

And yet the truth seeking judge advocate left Clark 
and the other officers of the Oregon out of the telling, 
and left it to Admiral Schley to produce them as wit- 
nesses. 

Up to the time of the Inquiry, Clark had resisted 
all efforts to persuade him to tell the great story, ex- 
cept in the official reports; and one who consults his 
report of that battle will find It very meager and un- 
satisfactory, so far as details go. 

Before the Court of Inquiry he testified as follows 

(I- 1334) : . 

When we discovered the Spanish ships coming out, 
our fleet closed in at once to attack, each ship having 
been ordered to keep her head directly towards the 
harbor entrance. The Spaniards turned to the west- 
ward, breaking through our line, or crossing It, and 
our ships swung off to the westward in pursuit. Both 


^ Captain of the Oregon, 


2o8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


sides opened fire promptly, and a dense smoke soon 
obscured the vessels, making it difficult to distinguish 
them. The Oregon^ however, ran between the Iowa 
and Texas (the next ships to the westward in our 
line), and soon afterwards we sighted the four 
Spanish ships ahead, apparently uninjured at the time. 
They had gained so much that I believed they had 
been successful in their attempt to escape. It was 
very soon evident, though, that we were gaining a 
little, at least on one of them, which proved to be the 
Maria Teresa, the flagship; and I thought we should 
bring her to close action, might be exposed to the 
concentrated fire of all the ships. 

Just then the smoke lifted, or broke away to our left, 
and I discovered the Brooklyn. She was well forward 
of our port beam, and broadside to the enemy’s fleet. 
Her course was a little divergent from ours, because 
the Oregon was attempting to draw up on the Maria 
Teresa. But the Brooklyn and Oregon maintained 
this relative position, bow and quarter, to the end of 
the battle, the Brooklyn steaming straight ahead, as 
nearly as I could judge, and engaging all the Spanish 
ships; the Oregon endeavoring to come to close action 
with the sternmost one ; and when she was driven out 
of action, and pointed to the beach, pushing on for the 
next ahead; and so on, until the entire fleet was 
driven ashore, burning or sinking (I. 1336) . 

Wheft the smoke lifted and I saw the Brooklyn on 
her westerly course, she must have been engaged with 
all four of the enemy^s ships (I. 1338). I do not 
know that they were all firing at her, hut they could 
have fired at her, they were all within range; and' 
she was alongside of them — that is, broadside to 
them. 

I never saw the Brooklyn until I came out of the 
smoke and discovered her ahead. It made a deep im- 
pression on me to find her there. I felt that we should 
mutually support and sustain each other; and I felt 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 209 


that she needed a battle-ship ; and that we were to he 
there together at the battle. 

The Iowa, when I first saw her, during the earlier 
part of the engagement, was steaming in towards the 
entrance to the harbor. Her position was a little to 
the westward of the Oregon, and at first she seemed 
to be advancing faster than the Oregon. It seemed to 
me that she was gaining ground more towards the en- 
trance than we were, and I thought she would get in 
there considerably ahead of the Oregon. 

The smoke became very dense, and I lost sight of 
her, but I could see the Spanish ships as they came 
out, and turned to the westward. I knew that they 
were turning sharply that way, and that I would not 
get to the entrance in time to strike any of them, and 
that therefore I must immediately haul to the west- 
ward. I put my helm a-starboard, and sheered off; 
and then I saw the Iowa again. She had evidently 
changed her course to the westward very sharply at 
almost the same time [with me] ; and I was fearful 
that she would collide with us, — that she would swing 
too far. I therefore put my helm hard-a-starboard, 
to clear her, and we went by her; and I saw no more 
of her during the entire action. 

I saw the Texas just after I passed the Iowa (I. 
1338). Whether she was moving rapidly, or lying 
in the water without any movement, or how she was 
moving, I cannot recall, I was so concerned about 
striking her. I was just clearing the Iowa when the 
Texas was reported on the port bow, and I had no 
time except to give one glance at her; and then give 
the order ‘‘Hard-a-port.” Then I had to jump over to 
the other side to see if I was going to clear the Iowa. 
I was afraid my speed would not be sufficient to carry 
me by ; and yet / had to get past; and I really cannot 
tell whether I saw the bow or stern of the Texas. I 
just saw that large, great object loom up out of the 
14 


210 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


smoke, and I knew I had to give the order instantly, 
to clear her. I knew, or thought I would swing 
enough to clear her, but it might carry me into the 
lowdy which I had on my starboard beam, only about 
a ship’s length off.”^ 

Captain Clark further testified (I. 1339, 1340) : 
None of the Spanish vessels was run ashore or de- 
stroyed in the channel, as provided in the standing 
squadron orders to close in and destroy the enemy in 
the channel. The battle of July 3 was not completed 
in accordance with any squadron orders previously 
issued.^ 

I remember a signal, made by Commodore Schley 
from the Brooklyn^ “Follow flag,” because I ordered 
it repeated. We did close up. I thought it was “Fol- 
low flag.” It may have been “Close up.” My 
memory is distinct in this, — that it was made imme- 
diately after we came out of the smoke and discovered 
the Spanish fleet ahead of us. On our first discovery 
of the Brooklyn this signal was flying, or it was re- 
ported to me immediately after that time. 

Lieutenant Eberle’s (of the Oregon) picture of the 
end of the battle, will bear repetition here. He said : 

The bugle had sounded “Cease firing,” and the last 
shot of July 3 had been fired. That was a moment 
to die for. Suddenly the sound of heavy guns was re- 

^The lo^a^s navigator (Lieutenant Commander Scheutze) testified 
(I. 778) : “She [the Oregori] passed, I should say, about 150 to 200 
feet [from the /ooufl]” (I. 779). 

From this description of the situation it is evident that it was 
only by the most consummate seamanship and coolest judgment 
displayed by Captain Clark that a collision between those ships was 
avoided. The calm skill and judgment that Clark displayed in 
bringing the Oregon safely through the perils of her voyage from 
the Pacific to the Atlantic coast were most signally displayed in ex- 
tricating her from this new danger. 

*This statement of Captain Clark explodes the theory that Samp- 
son prescribed the plan of battle, and that he was therefore entitled 
to the credit of it, 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 21 1 


placed by the strains of ‘‘The Star Spangled Banner” 
from the band. On our forward deck 550 men, 
mostly bare to the waist, and begrimed with powder 
and coal dust, were embracing each other and cheer- 
ing with the fervor and joy which mark the out-pour- 
ing of the hearts of men who knew how to look into 
the face of death. 

There were rousing cheers for our beloved captain, 
and the tender words he spoke to the crew caused 
many a heart to soften. 

Amid ringing cheers the Brooklyn signaled: “Con- 
gratulations upon the glorious victory,” and her 
cheers were returned with enthusiasm. The Oregon^ s 
Fourth of July reception by the fleet off Santiago and 
Commodore Schley’s signal, “Welcome back, brave 
Oregony were something to be cherished. 


CHAPTER LV 


LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HODGSON’s STORY OF THE 

BATTLE 

Lieutenant Commander Albon C. Hodgson, the 
navigator of the Brooklyn^ was a star witness pro- 
duced by the judge advocate. He was smarting under 
a feeling into which he had worked himself, 
prompted, no doubt, by the officials of the Navy De- 
partment, that Commodore Schley had done him an 
injustice. He got dreadfully mixed up about that 
matter, (as will hereafter be shown), but he was an 
honorable officer, and loyal to the truth as he saw it. 

It will be well, for the better understanding of the 
non-professional reader, to explain in a general way 
the position and duties of the navigator in battle and 
on other occasions when any general function is going 
on. 

Up to a very late period the officer who is now 
styled “Navigator,” was called the “Master.” 
Among his other duties he is charged with the task 
of taking the observations and finding the ship’s posi- 
tion on the chart, and, under direction of the captain, 
to navigate her from port to port. 

When all hands are called, he proceeds — on board 
a modern ship of war, which is nowadays always a 
steamer — to the bridge and relieves the “Officer of 
the Deck,” who, up to that moment, has had charge. 

On the first Sunday of each month it is the custom 
to hold what is called “General Muster,” at which all 
the officers and crew are assembled on the quarterdeck. 
“The Articles for the Government of the Navy” are 
read, after which all the names of the men are called; 
and each passes in review before the captain and 
officers. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 213 


This general muster is commonly, and was on that 
3d of July, held at 9.30 A. M. ; and this explains why 
Mr. Hodgson happened to be on the bridge that 
morning when Cervera’s fleet was seen to be coming 
out of Santiago Bay at 9.35. 

From this station on the bridge he could see every 
move of all the ships, whether friends or foes, and his 
ringing battle cry: “Tell the commodore the Spanish 
ships are coming out,’’ transformed the solemn “mus- 
ter” instantly into a seeming chaos, with officers and 
men rushing to their respective stations. The seem- 
ing chaos soon resolved itself into the most perfect 
battle order and array, with every officer and man 
at his proper station, with a solemn silence reigning 
supreme, only to be broken by the captain’s order to 
fire the first gun at the foe, whose report turned that 
silence into pandemonium. 

When Mr. Hodgson was asked, on cross-examina- 
tion, to “give the work that the Brooklyn did in that 
battle from its commencement until the surrender of 
the Colon he testified (I. 617) : 

The Brooklyn did all that she could do. She got 
into action as soon as speed could carry her, and we 
began firing as soon as the first gun on port bow would 
bear; and we kept firing the port battery until we 
turned around with port helm. During the arc the 
guns of the after turret were fired until we brought 
all the starboard battery to bear. We got around as 
quickly as w^e could, with the port helm, and we 
almost paralleled the course of the leading Spanish 
vessel. 

When we got around the smoke was very dense, 
and nothing could be seen in the rear of us. 

The three Spanish vessels that were engaged [by 
the Brooklyn^ were the Viscaya, the Colon ^ and the 
Oquendo, The Viscaya was 2500 yards on our star- 
board bow, the Colon perhaps a little forward of our 


214 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


starboard beam, and the Oquendo was abaft the star- 
board beam. 

We continued in that direction, and I remarked to 
Captain Cook that it seemed rather lonely for us out 
there. He was inside the conning tower, and asked, 
‘Why?” And I replied, “We were alone after the 
three Spanish vessels, and it seemed that it would de- 
volve upon us to knock them out.” At that time, as 
I said, the smoke was so dense that I could see nothing 
to the rear, and I supposed that the Brooklyn was 
steaming ahead of the slower battle-ships. Captain 
Cook stepped out of the conning tower, and as he 
stepped out he exclaimed to me, “Why, what’s that off ' 
our starboard quarter?” I looked in that direction 
and saw the heavy bow wave formed by a ship, and 
next the bow looming up, and said immediately: 
“That must be the Massachusetts 

Captain Cook said, “It cannot be the Massachu- 
setts, for she has gone to Guantanamo for coal.” 
Then I said, “It must be the Oregon , and he said, 
“God bless the Oregon!^ And I said, “Yes, I’m very 
glad to see her.” The Oregon was at that time, I 
should say, about four hundred or five hundred yards 
off our starboard quarter, and we continued in that 
relative position until the Brooklyn's speed began to 
increase as we gradually got up more steam; and 
probably during the battle we drew further ahead. 
She never was that close to us again, that I remember. 

The Oquefido very shortly fell out and went ashore, 
and the Colon drew ahead and went inshore of the 
Vtscaya. I remember very well the time that the 
'Vxscaya blanketed her from our fire, and the chase 


^ It is proper to explain here that the Massachusetts had 
been next in line between the Texas and lo^iua, but had 
gone away to Guantanamo, at 4 o’clock that morning, for 
coal ; and Mr. Hodgson had not observed her absence from 
her usual place in the blockade. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 215 


was continued in that direction. Off Asseradores the 
Viscaya ported her helm and ran ashore. 

The Colon at that time had gained speed, and was 
inshore, I suppose, ahead about seven miles. 

After passing the Viscaya the men were allowed to 
come out of the turrets a few at a time, to get a breath 
of fresh air and something to eat, although the guns 
were kept manned, and everything ready. 

The gaining on the Colon was very slow; in fact, 
she gained on us, apparently, at first. We began 
gradually to gain. My recollection is that the com- 
modore told someone to signal over to the Oregon, to 
“try one of his railroad trains.” At any rate, shortly 
afterwards the Oregon fired one of her thirteen-inch 
shells, which fell short. Then we tried with an eight- 
inch shell, and that fell short. We were signaling to 
the Oregon, and she to us, the fall of the shots. Both 
continued occasionally feeling for the range, until I 
remember seeing one of the thirteen-inch shells from 
the Oregon fall ahead of her, from our view of the 
Colon, and one of our eight-inch shells apparently fell 
inshore of her. 

At that time the Colon put her helm hard-a-port. 
Previously, during the chase, she was porting her 
helm once or twice, apparently seeking for a soft spot; 
but at this time she made a rank sheer, with the port 
helm, fired her lee gun, and hauled down her flag. 

I pulled out my watch and looked at it, and it was 
exactly /./5. 

We then ceased firing, slowed down, and Captain 
Cook was ordered to go on board to make terms, or 
tell the terms to the commanding officer of the Colon. 

The Oregon of course came up, and other ships 
gradually drew up off the Rio Tarquino, about fifty 
miles to the westward of the entrance to Santiago de 
Cuba. 

The fight was then over. 


2i6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


The Colours captain had run her high and dry on 
the shore. She had not been injured by our shot or 
shell, and she was safe on the shore, where she should 
have been suffered to remain until it was found that 
she was uninjured. It will be remembered that the 
commander-in-chief, after sending Schley in the 
Brooklyn to fight the new foe that had been reported 
as coming from the eastward, had remained behind 
to secure the prize. 

Whose was the fault 'or bad judgment, cannot be 
known, under which the Colon was prematurely 
hauled off the shore into deep water, where it was soon 
discovered that she was sinking. An effort was made 
to push her back, but it was too late, and she turned 
over, sank in deep water, and was lost. All subse- 
quent efforts to raise her were vain. There she lies, 
where she met her doom. 


CHAPTER LVI 


schley’s and Sampson's announcements of the 

VICTORY 


After parting from the Austrian ship of war while 
on his way to the entrance of the harbor Commodore 
Schley prepared and, as soon as possible, sent to the 
cable office at SIboney, by his flag lieutenant, James 
H. Sears, a despatch to the Secretary of the Navy, 
announcing the victory. 

When Sears reached Siboney he found there Samp- 
son’s flag lieutenant, Sidney A. Staunton, sending, in 
Sampson’s name, an announcement of the victory. 

For convenience of reference and contrast, these 
two despatches are here printed in parallel columns : 


SCHLEY’S announce- 
ment. 

Santiago, July 3, 1898. 

Spanish squadron came out of 
Santiago harbor this morning, 
and were all destroyed in a run- 
ning fight to the westward of 
about three and one-half hours. 
Very few casualties in our fleet. 
Ellis, chief yeoman, killed, and 
one man wounded on the Brook- 
lyn. Reports from other ships 
not in yet. The commander-in- 
chief superintending transfer of 
prisoners from Cristobal Colon, 
which surrendered to Brooklyn 
and Oregon at 1.15. Victory 
complete. Details later. 

Schley. 


SAMPSON’S announce- 
ment. 

Santiago, July 3, 1898. 

The fleet under my command 
offers the nation, as a Fourth of 
July present, the whole of Cer- 
vera’s fleet. 

It attempted to escape at 9.30 
this morning. At 2 last ship, 
the Cristobal Colon, had run 
ashore seventy-five miles west 
of Santiago, and hauled down 
her colors. The Infanta Maria 
Teresa, Oquendo, and Viscaya 
were forced ashore, burned and 
blown up, within twenty miles 
of Santiago. The Furor and 
Plutdn were destroyed within 
four miles of the port. 

Sampson. 


The contrast between these two despatches Is re- 
markable. 

One reading that of Schley will be struck with the 


2i8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


entire absence of any self-exaltation, or even reference 
to himself. Neither of the personal pronouns “I,” 
or ‘‘My” is to be found in it, and he would fail, in 
reading it, to learn more than the fact that the 
Spaniards had come out of Santiago that morning and 
had all been destroyed in the running fight that 
ensued. 

One would certainly suppose, from reading Samp- 
son’s despatch, that he had been leading in the battle, 
and had actually commanded in the fight; and be left 
in entire ignorance of the fact that he had not been in 
the battle at all; or of the other fact that Schley had, 
as the “senior officer on the spot,” been actually in 
command. 

The late Secretary of the Navy (John D. Long), 
in his book lately published, entitled, “The New 
American Navy” (Vol. ii. p. 42), says: “Sampson 
has been criticised for this despatch. He did not 
write it. It was written by the officer he sent to tele- 
graph the news; but he assumed it, for he shirked no 
responsibility. The personal pronoun “I” is not in it. 

This last statement is true. The personal pronoun 
“I” is not in it, but the equally, and in this case more, 
personal pronoun “My,” is in it; and, whether so in- 
tended or not, the despatch conveys the false impres- 
sion that Sampson had been in actual command in the 
battle. 

That assistant chief of staff (Staunton) who wrote 
it (as alleged by Mr. Long) no doubt had in his mind 
and memory Caesar’s famous triplet, ^^Veni, Vediy 
Viciy^^ and Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry’s an- 
nouncement of his victory on Lake Erie: “We have 

met the enemy, and they are ours,” and thought, no 
doubt, that he was framing a despatch that would ring 
down the ages with equal brilliancy. But he only 
succeeded in placing his chief in a false position, from 
which there has been no escape. Secretary Long 
further says: “It [the despatch] is exceedingly like 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 219 


General Sherman’s telegram on the capture of 
Savannah.” 

It is exceedingly unlikely that Lieutenant Staunton 
had ever read Sherman’s despatch, for, if he had, it is 
not probable that he would have repeated it in this 
instance. As well might he have repeated Perry’s 
famous couplet. He might have tried to frame some- 
thing that was quite as original, for it cannot be 
doubted that Staunton thought himself quite as com- 
petent as the heroes named, to startle the world with 
a brilliant announcement of the great victory that had 
been that day achieved, — but in which his chief and 
he had borne no part ! 

The despatches of Caesar, Perry, and Sherman 
expressed the exact truth; and if Sampson’s despatch 
had been similarly based, while there might have been 
differences of opinion as to the good taste of the lan- 
guage employed, it would have created no false im- 
pression. 

All that it was necessary to do was to announce the 
plain truth about the matter, and there could have 
been no adverse criticism. 

Sampson’s despatch is never mentioned by, or in the 
presence of, his friends without explanations or apolo- 
gies; but there can be nothing of the sort necessary 
for that of Schley. 

Staunton, being Sears’ senior, would not allow the 
latter to send Schley’s announcement. The Navy De- 
partment has never published it, and when it was 
offered to the Court of Inquiry the majority would 
not permit it to go upon the record of the court’s pro- 
ceedings. 

As a part of the res gestae, it was clearly admissible 
and proper. 


\ 


CHAPTER LVII 

SCHLEY^S PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE BATTLE 

During the night of July 3 Schley wrote, and on the 
morning of the 4th sent to the commander-in-chief a 
report of the events of the day as follows : 

“Flagship Brooklyn, off Santiago 

DE Cuba, July 3d, 1898. 

“Sir: — I have the honor to make the following 
preliminary report of the engagement this morning. 

“i. At 9.30 o’clock Admiral Cervera, with the 
Infanta Maria Teresa^ Viscaya, Almirante Oquendo ^ 
and Cristobal Colon^ with two torpedo-boat destroy- 
ers, attempted to escape from Santiago harbor. 

“Signal was at once made for ‘close action,’ which 
was promptly responded to by the Brooklyn, Indiana, 
Oregon, Iowa, Gloucester, and Vixen, 

“The squadron, after leaving the harbor, stood to 
the westward, but engaged at close range (from 1100 
to 3000 yards) ; and in about twenty minutes the 
Oquendo, and Viscaya^ were set on fire by the shells 
of our squadron, and were forced to run ashore, 
where they burned and blew up later in the night. 

“Of the destroyers, one was sunk, and the other 
was set on fire by our shells, and burned on the beach. 

“2. The flagship Infanta Maria Teresa, with Ad- 
miral Cervera, and the Colon were engaged in a run- 
ning fight with the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and 
Iowa for some twenty-five minutes, when the Spanish 
flagship was set on fire, the Spanish being obliged to 
beach her.^ 

“The Brooklyn and Oregon continued the chase 

^This last should be the Infanta Maria Teresa. — J. P. 

^ This paragraph is all wrong; it was the Viscaya, not the flagship. 


I 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 221 


and fight, gradually drawing away from the other 
ships, until 1.15 p. M., when the Colon was beached, 
and struck her colors to the Brooklyn and Oregon. 

‘‘3. The Brooklyn was exposed for some twenty 
minutes to the fire of the four Spanish ships, until the 
other vessels of our squadron could get into good 
range. 

cannot speak with too much praise of the con- 
duct of the officers and crews of the vessels engaged; 
their spirit and enthusiasm were such as I have rarely 
before seen in action. 

“4. I would especially mention Captain Philip, 
Captain Evans, Captain Taylor, Captain Cook, and 
Captain Clark, for exceedingly meritorious conduct 
on the occasion. Their ships were handled superbly, 
and their officers and men responded nobly. 

‘‘Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, command- 
ing the Gloucester^ and Lieutenant Sharp command- 
ing the Vixen^ acted with conspicuous gallantry, and 
although not able to engage the heavier ships, they 
were close in on the battle line. 

“5. Admiral Cervera and his officers, with about 
1200 men, were captured, and he informed me that 
his loss in killed was about 450. 

“Our casualties were one killed and one wounded, 
(both) on board the Brooklyn. No one else was hurt 
in the squadron, although this ship was struck twenty 
times. 

“6. In order to make a complete and detailed re- 
port, I would suggest that you direct that the com- 
manding officers of vessels of the First Squadron send 
copies of their reports on the engagement to me. 

“Very respectfully, 

“W. S. Schley, 

^^Commodore U. S. Navy, 
^^Commander Second Squadron. 

“The Commander-in-Chief, 

“U. S. Naval Forces, 

“North Atlantic Station.” 


222 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


It is noteworthy that the pronoun “I” only appears 
thrice in the foregoing report, and then in connection 
with others than himself. The pronoun “My” does 
not appear at all. 

Schley testified (I. 1529) : “I carried that report 
to the commander-in-chief, and went back on board 
of my ship. He signaled for me to come on board 
again, which I did. He then handed the report back 
to me. There was nobody in the cabin but him and 
myself at the time. 

“He handed it back to me, with the statement that 
he was the commander-in-chief, and that I had 
omitted a very important detail, which was that the 
New York was present.” 

Schley on July 6 made a second report (A. 517), 
concerning which he further testified: “I felt at that 
time that the victoiw, as I said, was big enough for 
all. I made this last ‘out of generosity’ ; and because 
I knew that if the New York had been present they 
would have done as good work as everybody else, I 
referred all throughout this to ‘your command,’ and 
his appearance, and so on, in complimentary terms.” 

There can be no doubt that Commodore Schlev 
made a mistake when he consented to receive back 
that preliminary report. It stated exactly the truth, 
gave full credit to every ship, officer, and man that 
had been in the battle, and assumed no credit to him- 
self. The facts spoke for him with a forceful elo- 
quence that any claim he could have made would 
have only weakened. 

Receiving it back and writing the other in the terms 
he employed was a most amiable display of generosity, 
which, when occasion required, was sure to be — and 
was — quoted against him. 

Sampson did all he could for himself and his flag- 
ship New York when he said in his official report of 
the battle (A. 507) : “She [the New York~] was not 
at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 223 


ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the 
undivided fire from the fort In passing the harbor en- 
trance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, 
thought at the moment to be attempting to escape 
from the Gloucester/^ 

That preliminary report of Commodore Schley has 
never been printed by the Navy Department, and the 
majority of the Court of Inquiry refused to permit It 
to be made part of Its record. In the judgment of 
lawyers. It was clearly admissible as part of the res 
gestae (attending circumstances) . 

. Lieutenant Sears also, in the judgment of the 
writer, made a mistake in not sending Schley’s an- 
nouncement of the victory, notwithstanding Stanton’s 
objections. Sears was but obeying Schley’s orders, 
and with Sampson “forty miles away” Schley was un- 
doubtedly, as “senior officer on the spot,” In command 
off Santiago. Stanton had no right to countermand 
Schley’s order at any time. 

Commodore Watson sent a similar announcement 
(A. 505), and no fault was found with him. How 
could there be? 


CHAPTER LVIII 


THE NOTES OF THE BATTLE TAKEN ON BOARD THE 

‘‘vixen” 

In addition to the accounts of the battle of Santiago 
given In the official reports made by the commanding 
officers of the ships engaged, and In the already 
quoted testimony of Admiral Schley, Captains Cook 
and Clark, and Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, 
there was one account written during the progress of 
the fight that has never been given to the public by the 
Navy Department, to which attention will now be 
called. 

The Vixen^ commanded by Lieutenant Alexander 
Sharp, Jr., occupied, when that morning the Spanish 
fleet was discovered to be coming out, the extreme 
westerly end of the semicircle of the blockade. She 
was about two miles from the shore and about three 
miles from the entrance. The VixeUy like the 
Gloucester^ which occupied the extreme easterly end 
of the semicircle, was a frail craft — a converted 
yacht — and when the Spaniards came out that morn- 
ing and turned to the westward Lieutenant Sharp saw 
that she had no place among those thunderers, just as 
Walnwright did In the Gloucester, So knowing that 
it was his plain duty, as Wainwright said, to “look 
after the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers,” that at 
that time it was thought would be found running 
along the starboard side of the fighting ships, ready 
to dash out against our vessels when opportunity 
offered — Sharp very properly put the helm of his 
little craft “hard-a-port,” and ran down to the south- 
ward, out of the line of battle, but still under fire ; and 
then, turning to the westward, steered a parallel 
course to that of the combatants, ready for any duty 
he might be called upon to perform, 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 225 


There can be no doubt in the minds of those who 
know Sharp that, if those Spanish torpedo-boat de- 
stroyers had ever got that far to the westward, the 
Vixen^s commander would have shown that he and 
she well deserved their names — Sharp and Vixen, 

Having no fighting to do. Sharp thought that the 
next best service he could perform would be to have 
notes taken of what the fighting vessels did as the 
battle progressed, and accordingly such notes “were 
written by Paymaster Doherty, and the times and in- 
cidents given by Lieutenant Harlow, the executive 
officer.” 

Lieutenant Harlow, before the court, described the 
method pursued : 

“Mr. Doherty sat with pad before him and the 
watch in his hand. I, with glasses, carefully watched 
the fighting ships. Whenever I saw anything worth 
noting I called to Doherty, ‘Mark time,’ which he 
would do; and then wrote what I told him to write.” 

It may be doubted if there ever was a more truth- 
ful and impartial account of a battle written than 
that. There was no dream of controversy about any 
of the incidents related, and no possible inducement 
to relate anything but “the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth.” 

Within a few hours after the battle ended Sharp 
caused manifold typewritten copies of the notes to be 
made, and the “ribbon copy” was attached to the log- 
book of the Vixen, where it still remains. The notes 
thus became an official statement of the facts to which 
they relate. 

On July 5, at Guantanamo, Sharp took one of these 
manifold copies on board the Brooklyn to Commo- 
dore Schley, who was so pleased with the notes that 
he sent them to the ship’s printer and caused numer- 
ous copies to be printed and distributed to his officers 
and men as a faithful and accurate pen-picture of the 
battle. 


15 


226 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Those notes are the only Impartial account written 
by officers at the exact instant of the events; they are 
a record made by unbiased eye-witnesses who were 
under no temptation or influence to color or conceal 
facts, either in their own interest or for their self- 
exaltation, or that of any other officer or vessel. 

Every vessel engaged, as long as she was in sight 
from the Vixen^ has full mention of the parts taken by 
such vessel; and what these officers thus set down 
would be accepted by any tribunal as the nearest pos- 
sible approach to the exact truth. 

On July 6 Lieutenant Sharp wrote his official re- 
port, addressed to Admiral Sampson, of the part 
taken in the battle by the Vixen. His report is type- 
written, and in it he says: “I enclose a copy of notes 

taken during the chase, by my orders, at the sugges- 
tion of Lieutenant Harlow. The times taken after 
10.30 are accurate; those taken before that time were 
estimated, and may be in error a few minutes.” 

Now, when Sharp wrote that report to Admiral 
Sampson he had still in his possession several of the 
manifold typewritten copies that had been made; and 
one would think he would have enclosed one of those, 
but the purported copy that appears to have been en- 
closed is in long hand, written on the stiff official 
paper used in the navy. It was written by a man 
named Wainwright, who was the yeoman of the 
Vixen, and it differs in very many and important par- 
ticulars from the copy attached to the log-book. 

When the Court of Inquiry was about to begin its 
sessions Wainwright was serving on board the sur- 
veying steamer Ranger, which was at Panama. Ad- 
miral Schley’s counsel made request, in the usual 
form, that Wainwright should be subpoenaed before 
the court, which request was made in ample time to 
secure his attendance. But whether by accident 
(which the writer very much doubts) or design 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 227 


(which the writer may be pardoned for believing) 
Wainwright was not brought before the court. He 
was the only person who could have fully explained 
how the notes came to be so changed. 

When the character of these changes is consid- 
ered — that every one of them which relates to the 
Brooklyn's doings is made less favorable to her, and 
not one more favorable; the unsailor-like expressions 
that are absent in the original, but contained in the 
purported copy; the suppression of all that occurred 
between 1.15 p. M. (the time of the Colours surren- 
der) and 2.23 (the time the New York arrived near 
her, off Rio Tarquino), made evidently in the interest 
of the flagship New York, and which corresponds to 
a similar suppression in the notes taken on board the 
latter vessel, and attached to her log-book ; the altera- 
tion in the log-book of the New York, made at the 
request of Lieutenant Marble nearly two years after 
the battle (to be hereinafter more particularly re- 
ferred to), which last alteration was made apparently 
at the instance and request of Sampson’s chief of staff. 
Captain French E. Chadwick, and certainly with his 
approval — the paternity and purpose of all is evi- 
dently the same, and is sufficiently well indicated. 

In all these changes and suppressions one palpable 
purpose is to place the New York nearer to that battle 
than she really was. The other was to belittle the 
part taken by the Brooklyn. 

For convenience of comparison, those notes and the 
purported copy that was sent to Admiral Sampson In 
Sharp’s official report are printed in parallel columns; 
and some comments will be made In passing. It may 
be noted that both Sharp and Harlow testified before 
the court that the notes attached to the Vixen^ s log- 
book are exactly correct. 


228 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


NOTES TAKEN ON ABOARD THE U. S. S. VIXEN, 

JULY 3, 1898. 


(From copy attached to the 
'■^Vixen's^^ log-book.) 

What follows is a copy of 
notes taken during the engage- 
ment with Admiral Cervera’s 
fleet, and is an accurate state- 
ment of such incidents as ap- 
peared important, as viewed 
from the Vixen. Bearings and 
distances are approximate, and 
are generally relative to the po- 
sitions of the Vixen. The coast 
pilot, Eduardo Nunez, was fre- 
quently consulted ; and where 
there was an uncertainty as to 
the correctness of his estimates, 
the opinion of several officers 
was taken, and as nearly as pos- 
sible a fair estimate was arrived 
at. 

At 9.45 — Quartermaster re- 
ported a tug coming out of the 
harbor. Upon examination it 
was discovered to be a Spanish 
cruiser, flying a large Spanish 
flag, with a smaller flag at the 
masthead, which was taken to 
be an admiraPs flag, as it was 
on the leading ship. 

(The Vixen at this time was 
lying about two miles off shore, 
and four miles to westward of 
Morro Castle ; and from this 
time to the end was never out 
of sight of the chase, and was a 
close witness to the destruction 
of the three armored cruisers.)^ 

Word was immediately sent 
to the commanding officer; all 
hands were called to quarters; 
full speed ahead was ordered ; 
and the helm put to port, to 
stand further off shore and leave 
the line of fire of the Brooklyn 
unobstructed.^ 


(As sent by Lieutenant Sharp to 
Admiral Sampson.) 

These notes were written 
about II A. M., and were drawn 
from the recollection of events 
transpiring prior to 10.30. 


At 9.45 A. M. — Reported tug 
coming out of harbor. Mr. 
Harlow examined it through 
glass, and discovered it to be a 
Spanish cruiser, flying what 
was probably an admiraPs flag. 


Notified commanding officer ; 
called all hands to quarters; 
and stood to southward. 


^ The omission from the other notes of the part here put in paren- 
thesis is very significant. , 1 i« ' x 

^ Why leave out of the other account this about leaving the line ot 

‘ffire of the Brooklyn unobstructed”? 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 229 


The Brooklyn had hoisted a 
signal that the enemy were at- 
tempting to escape; and the 
Vixen, noticing that the leading 
ship was turning to the west- 
ward, hoisted signal that the 
enemy was attempting to escape 
to the westward. 

(The fleet, which at that time 
had resumed their day block- 
ading stations, began rapidly to 
close in towards the Morro, con- 
centrating a terrific fire upon the 
escaping fleet, though at long 
range. There was no doubt at 
all to the fact that the enemy 
was coming out; but there 
were several anxious moments 
as to his intentions. Whether 
he would disperse and attempt 
to break through the lines, or 
keep his vessels together.)^ 

The leading vessel had about 
changed course to the west, 
when the second vessel ap- 
peared, followed shortly by the 
Cristobal Colon. 

It was easy to identify this 
ship from the fact that her 
mast is placed between the two 
smoke-stacks. The first two 
were not so easy to identify, as 
the Viscaya, Oquendo and Maria 
Teresa are practically identical 
in appearance. The fleet, mean- 
while, were closing in towards 
the Morro, and when the fourth 
vessel appeared and turned to 
the westward, it became ap- 
parent that Admiral Cervera 
had carefully reconnoitered the 
field, and selected the west as 
the weakest part of the block- 
ade, as the strong easterly cur- 
rent had drifted the heaviest 
ships considerably to the east- 
ward of their customary posi- 
tions.* 


Brooklyn hoisted signal 250. 


The leading vessel had about 
changed course to west, when 
the second vessel appeared, fol- 
lowed shortly afterwards by the 
Colon. 


The first two vessels were evi- 
dently the Viscaya and Oquendo, 
or Maria Teresa. Fleet closing 
in, and opening fire. 


*Why omit this in parentheses? 

*What is here said about Cervera having reconnoitered is im- 
portant and probable. It is not surprising that the revisers left 
that out. 


230 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


The western arm of the 
blockading circle chanced to 
be defended by the Vixen and 
Brooklyn. The Brooklyn headed 
to the northward, apparently in- 
tending to intercept the head of 
the enemy’s column. Simulta- 
neously with the appearance of 
the leading ship of the enemy’s 
column, the western battery 
opened fire, apparently direct- 
ing it upon the eastern and cen- 
tral ships of the blockading 
squadron. 

At lo A. M. — ^The Brooklyn 
was the nearest vessel to, and 
was engaging, the two leading 
ships. 


These two ships were quite 
close together, with an interval 
of perhaps three-quarters of a 
mile between the second ship 
and the Colon. 

At 10.05 — The Brooklyn be- 
gan to turn up with the port 
helm, and made a complete turn 
to the eastward, continuing 
around so that, when again 
heading the west, the two lead- 
ing enemy’s ships bore well on 
her starboard bow, and the 
Colon on her starboard quarter, 
with the fourth vessel coming up 
rapidly astern. 

The Vixen at this time was 
well to the westward of the 
leading ship, and was steering a 
parallel course. 

For the next fifteen minutes 
the Brooklyn received and re- 
turned the fire of the two lead- 
ing enemy’s ships, with an oc- 
casional shot from the Colon. 

The first two shots from the 
enemy’s leading ship were evi- 


About 10 A. M. leading 
enemy’s vessel had headed to 
west, full speed, followed by the 
others. Brooklyn at 10 was 
nearest vessel, and standing to 
north, engaged two leading 
ships. 

At this time two leading ships 
were quite close together, with 
an interval of perhaps three- 
fourths of a mile between second 
ship and Colon. 

About 10.05 Brooklyn be- 
gan to turn with port helm, 
and made a complete turn to 
eastward, coming around so that 
when again heading west the 
two leading enemy’s ships bore 
well on her starboard bow, and 
the Colon on her starboard 
quarter.® 


For the next fifteen minutes, 
the Brooklyn sustained and re- 
turned the fire of the two lead- 
ing ships with an occasional 
shot from the Colon. 

The Vixen steered courses of 
various time intervals of south, 


®The substitution of the word “coming” for “continuing” is sig- 
nificant. It was subsequently charged that the Brooklyn^ had stood 
to the southward two thousand yards or more before turning west. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


231 


dently aimed at the Vixen, as 
they passed directly over her, 
striking the water a hundred 
yards or so beyond. 


At 10.30 the chase was well 
formed, with the positions as fol- 
lows: Enemy’s ships were in 

column between Cabanas and 
Guayacabon, with the Brooklyn 
steering a parallel course about 
a mile distant from them; and 
the Oregon southeast of them 
about two miles distant. The 
other vessels of the squadron 
were obscured by smoke.® 


southwest-by-south, and about 
10.15 was going, full speed, W. 
V2 S. (steering compass). The 
shells that went over the 
Brooklyn struck close ahead, 
astern, and on starboard bean:^ 
of Vixen; and several passed 
directly over, a piece of burst- 
ing shell going through the 
flag at the mainmast-head. 

10.30 — Entirely omitted.^ 


NOTES TAKEN BY LIEUTENANT HARLOW DURING THE 
ENGAGEMENT WITH ADMIRAL CERVERA’S FLEET ON 
JULY 3, 1898.® 


At 10.32 the Colon and lead- 
ing enemy’s ships were close to- 
gether, just clear of the Brook- 
lyn's bow, as viewed from the 
Vixen; the Colon evidently 
gaining in speed, and closing up. 

At this time it was apparent 
that the vessel that had been 
leading was disabled and on fire. 


10.32 — Colon and first boat 
close together, just clear of 
Brooklyn's bow. Colon evi- 
dently passing ahead. 

The first ship that came out of 
harbor stopped off Juan Gon- 
zales, undoubtedly on fire. 


®Up to this time the Brooklyn, Oregon and Vixen were the only 
ships of our squadron mentioned. 

’^The omission of the whole paragraph lo.yo was made for ob- 
vious reasons: 

It is the only statement given of the positions of the whole fleet 
at that instant. It contains the statement that (after the loop was 
complete) the Brooklyn was “steering a parallel course, about a 
mile distant from” the Spaniards. And it shows that only the 
Brooklyn and Oregon were visible; the other of our vessels were 
obscured by smoke. 

® These notes are accurate, as viewed from the Vixen. The 
watch used was at practically the same reading as the deck clock 
of the Brooklyn. 

Accuracy of position is not claimed for any vessel. Position and 
bearings are relative only. 

Incidents recounted are accurate. 


232 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


as she dropped rapidly astern. 
She apparently was headed for 
the shore oif Juan Gonzales. 
The Oregon was forging rapidly 
ahead, engaging the fourth 
ship as she passed. 

Two smaller vessels, probably 
the torpedo-boat destroyers — the 
Furor and Pluton — were to the 
westward of Cabanas, engaged 
by the Iowa and Texas, and ap- 
parently on fire; but the lead- 
ing vessels had gone too far to 
the westward to be able to dis- 
tinguish either of them accur- 
ately. 

The Indiana was in sight a 
little to the westward of Morro. 

At 10.34 — The Colon was still 
gaining and reserving her fire. 

At this moment the only 
United States vessels in sight 
from the Vixen were the Brook- 
lyn and Oregon; the Texas 
in the rear of the Oregon, fol- 
lowed closely by the Iowa, about 
five or six miles distant. The 
Indiana was apparently about 
four miles astern of the Iowa. 


At 10.37 — The Colon and 
other enemy’s vessels opened fire 
again. 

The second vessel was just 
clear of the Brooklyn, and about 
five miles distant from the 
Vixen. The Oregon was gain- 
ing rapidly. The Colon was 
apparently using nothing but 
smokeless powder. 

The firing of the enemy was 
very high, many of their shots 
falling close ahead, astern, and 
around the Vixen, one piece of 
shell going through the flag at 
the mainmast. 

At 10.46 — The Brooklyn forged 
ahead, and the Oregon fired her 
13-inch forward gun at the 
leading vessels of the chase. 

At 10.47 — ^The Texas was in 


Oregon forging ahead, and 
firing ahead. 


Enemy’s destroyers to west- 
ward of Cabanas, evidently en- 
gaged by Iowa and Texas, and 
apparently on fire. 

Indiana a little to the west- 
ward of Morro. 

At 10.34 — Colon still gain- 
ing. Ship which led before, 
rapidly falling behind ; and 
two on fire near Juan Gonzales. 
Colon reserving fire. 

Colon commenced firing again 
at 10.37. No other United 
States vessels in sight. Texas 
and Iowa in rear of Oregon, five 
or six miles. Distance between 
Iowa and Indiana about four. 
Colon slacking up. 


At 10.40 — Second vessel just 
clear of stern of Brooklyn. 
Vixen distant about five miles. 
Oregon gaining rapidly. Colon 
using only smokeless powder. 


At 10.46 — Brooklyn forged 
ahead from our point of view, 
Oregon fired 13-inch from for- 
ward gun. 

10.47 Texas considerably 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 233 


lead of the lonjoa and gaining 
rapidly. 

The firing of the Brooklyn at 
this time was both steady and 
deadly, shells from her guns ap- 
parently striking or bursting 
alongside or striking the enemy. 

At 10.49 — The Texas passed 
Juan Gonzales, and what was 
apparently the Indiana was off 
Cabanas at the same time. 

At 10.50 — The Vixen veered in 
close, heading about N. N. W. 

The Texas was gaining rap- 
idly. The Iowa appeared off 
Juan Gonzales. 

A small vessel, evidently a 
yacht, appeared off Guayacabon, 
hotly engaging some of the 
enemy’s ships. 

At 10.54 — It was apparent 
that another of the enemy’s ves- 
sels was on fire, and headed for 
the beach, with a heavy list to 
port. This vessel proved to be 
the Viscaya; and she was evi- 
dently making for the reef at 
Asserederos. 


At 1 1. 01 — She ported, evidently 
heading east, as if seeking for 
the entrance to Asserederos. 

The Texas and Vixen directed 
their fire on this vessel until 
11.07, when, as her colors were 
evidently down, the order was 
given to cease firing. 


ahead of Iowa and gaining rap- 
idly." 

10.48 — Shell from Brooklyn 
burst apparently alongside of 
second vessel. 

Texas passed Juan Gonzales 
at 10.49 ; Indiana off Cabanas 
at 10.49. 

Vixen at 10.50 veered in- 
shore, heading about north- 
northwest. 

At 10.53 — Texas gaining. 
Yacht and Indiana off Guaya- 
cabon. 


At 10.54 Viscaya (?) evi- 
dently on fire and heading for 
the beach, with a heavy list to 
port quarter (sic).^^ 


At 10.56 — Viscaya heading 
for Asserederos. T exas com- 
ing up five miles distant. Vis- 
cay a at ii, with colors flying, 
nearly ashore at Asserederos. 

At ii.oi — Viscaya ported 
helm, and headed about east. 
Texas firing forward gun. 
Iowa and New York close off 
shore, and torpedo boat astern 
of New York, about one mile.^^ 


® Leaving out the statement about the firing of the Brooklyn is 
very significant. 

No sailor wrote that sentence. “Heavy list to port quarter” is 
absurd. The proper expression, “heavy list to port,” is as used in the 
original. 

In this revised ii.oi, first mention is made of the New York. 
But she “fades away suddenly, like the grass,” and appears no more 
in either of the notes, until n.42, in the revised, and 11.45 in the 
original, in which last mention is first made of her. 


234 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


At 11.09 — There was a sud- 
den burst of smoke from her 
after end, and she apparently 
was sinking, and all ships re- 
served their fire on passing the 
doomed vessel, now hard and 
fast ashore on Asserederos reef. 

At 1 1. 1 6 — The vessels in sight 
from the Vixen were the Brook- 
lyn, Oregon, Texas, Iowa and 
Indiana. The Indiana at least 
ten (10) miles from the Colon. 

The impression on board the 
Vixen was that the vessel ashore 
at Asserederos was the admiral’s 
flagship. 

At 11.25 — The Iowa evidently 
had stopped. The after end of 
the vessel ashore at Asserederos 
was a sheet, of flame. 

From 11.20 to 11.42 there was 
a series of explosions on board of 
her, which were apparently from 
the ignition of loose charges 
about the guns. They resembled 
huge chrysanthemums with rib- 
bons of smoke, as the burning 
powder grains fell from the end 
of the petals. 

At 11.45 — The chase had re- 
solved itself into the Colon, close 
inshore, distant about seven miles 
from the Vixen; the Oregon, 
about one point on the starboard 
bow, distant about one mile and 
a half; the Brooklyn, one point 
on the port bow, distant about 
three miles; and the Texas, on 
the starboard quarter, distant 


At 11.04 — Viscaya star- 
boarded, and stood close in- 
shore. 

At 11.05 — Vixen opened fire 
on Viscaya, and at 11.07 her col- 
ors came down, and orders 
were given on board Vixen to 
cease firing. 

At 1 1.09 — Sudden burst of fire 
from her, and probably sinking. 


At 1 1. 1 5 — Texas and other 
ships reserved their fire. 

Iowa gaining on Massa- 
chusetts.^^ 

Vessels in sight at 11.16, Iowa 
and Indiana. Indiana at least 
ten miles from Colon. Vessel 
ashore at Asserederos probably 
flagship. 

At 11.20 — Iowa evidently had 
stopped. 

At 11.24 — Flames were seen 
bursting from the Viscaya. 

At 11.26 — The Viscaya ex- 
ploded, followed by another ex- 
plosion, probably magazine, 
with large sheet of flame. 


Other explosions at 11.33.30; 
iI‘36.i 5; and n.41. 

At 11.42 — The position of the 
ships as seen from the Vixen 
was as follows: The Colon 

close inshore, distant about 

seven miles from the Vixen; the 
Oregon, about one point on 

starboard bow, distant about 
1% miles; the Brooklyn, one 
point on starboard bow, distant 
about 3 miles; the Texas, on 

starboard quarter, distant about 
I mile; Iowa, two points on 

starboard quarter, distant about 


The Massachusetts had gone to Guantanamo that morning, and 
was not in the battle. She was ‘‘forty miles away.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 235 


about one mile; the lo^a was 
two points on the starboard 
quarter, distant about eight 
miles; and the Ne^ York, one 
point on starboard quarter, dis- 
tant about ten miles. These last 
two vessels were apparently off 
Boca del Rio, but they were too 
far off to identify either of them 
with certainty, in thin haze of 
smoke that was left behind the 
leading ships. 

No other vessels were in sight. 
The smoke from the ships de- 
stroyed at Juan Gonzales and to 
the eastward could be seen, but 
their hulls could not. 

At 12 M. — Their positions were 
practically the same, except that 
each had changed positions rela- 
tive to the Vixen. When the 
Vixen was abreast of Cevilla, 
thirty miles west of Santiago, the 
Texas bore three points on the 
starboard quarter, a little less 
than a mile distant. The Oregon 
and Brooklyn, one point on the 
starboard and port bows, respec- 
tively, distant about four and five 
miles, respectively; while the 
Colon bore two points to star- 
board box, distant fully ten 
miles. 

According to the official pilot 
on board the Vixen, the latter 
vessel was off a point called 
Bayamita. It might be said here 
that all localities and estimates of 
distances were referred to him in 
connection with the opinions of 
four or five officers of the 
Vixen. 

At 12.05 — The Nenv York was 
in line with the burning ship 


8 miles. New York, one point 
on starboard quarter, distant 
about 10 miles ; the two latter 
apparently off Boca del Rio. No 
other vessels in sight. 

Smoke of vessels destroyed off 
Juan Gonzales in sight; but 
hulls invisible.^^ 


At 11.52 — Another explosion 
occurred on board the Viscaya}^ 
Position at noon practically 
the same, except Texas gaining 
rapidly. Vixen abreast of Cc- 
villa, 30 miles west of Santiago. 
Texas bearing three points on 
starboard quarter, distant i mile. 
Oregon and Brooklyn one point 
on starboard and port bows re- 
spectively, distant 4 and 5 
miles. Colon, two points on 
starboard bow, distant about 10 
miles, close under fourth hill 
(see sketch), Bayamita. 


Vixen shifted Nos. 2 and i 
pounder guns upon their mounts 
at 12.03, No. 3 I pounder being 
disabled. 

[No mention of consulting 
pilot and officers.]^® 

At 12.05 — New York was in 
line with the burning ship at 


In the original the New York and Iowa were “too far off to be 
identified with certainty.” The revision leaves out the uncer- 
tainty. 

^*This helps out the certainty. 

Why leave out this about consulting the pilot and officers 
as to distances and localities? 


236 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


(Vis cay a) at Assercderos, distant 
about ten miles. 

At 12.25 — The Texas was on 
the starboard quarter; Ne^ 
York two points on the starboard 
quarter and evidently gaining. 
The Oregon was a half point on 
starboard bow ; the Brooklyn one 
point on the port bow ; the 
Colon one point on the star- 
board bow, still distant about 
ten miles. 

The Oregon fired a shot at 
12.20, which fell short. The 
Colon at this time was about hull 
down from the Vixen. 

During the next half hour 
there were occasional shots fired 
from the Oregon and Brooklyn, 
many of which apparently struck 
near the chase. 


At 12.50 — ^The Texas was one 
point forward of the starboard 
beam, and gaining steadily. 

At 1. 15 — The Oregon and 
Brooklyn headed in shore about 
four points.” 


Asserederos, about 9 miles dis- 
tant. 

At 12.15 — Texas was on star- 
board quarter; Vixen heading 
west by south, (p. c) ; Nenv 
York two points on starboard 
quarter, and evidently gaining. 
Oregon one-half point on star- 
board bow; {Brooklyn, one point 
on port bow, distant 9 miles ; 
Colon, one point on starboard 
bow distant 10 miles,)” half 
way between third and fourth 
hills. Oregon started firing at 
12.20, her shot falling short. 
Fired only one shell from 13-inch 
gun. 


At 12.23 — Oregon fired again ; 
shot struck a little ahead of 
Colon, and appeared ,to pass 
over her. Colon is almost hull 
down from the Vixen. Brooklyn 
started firing at 12.26 ; struck 
very short; about two-thirds the 
distance to Colon. Second shot 
at 12.26.30, about three-fourths 
distance to Colon; third shot at 
12.27.15, about four-fifths dis- 
tance to Colon; fourth shot 
about five-sixths of distance.^^ 

At 12.29.30 — Oregon fired 
again; shot went over. There 
were thirteen seconds between 
the flash of the Brooklyn's shot 
and the time the shell struck 
the water. 

At 12.50 — The Texas bore 
one point forward of the star- 
board beam. 

At 1. 15 — ^The Brooklyn and 
Oregon headed in about four 
points. 


” These distances are absurd. The Brooklyn never was within one 
mile of the Colon. 

The precision of the above 12.30 is remarkable. 

” This was the time that at which the Colon hauled down her flag 
and, like her consorts, “put for the shore.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON ^AND CERVERA 237 


At 1.23 — The Texas hoisted 
the signal “Enemy has surren- 
dered.” 

This signal was repeated to the 
Ne^w York, but not acknowledged. 
The Colon was distinguished by 
the aid of glasses, lying close in 
shore, and, according to the pilot, 
lying off a point called Rio Tar- 
quino. Opinion was divided on 
the Vixen as to whether a white 
flag was displayed on the 
Colon or whether it was steam 
escaping from the steam pipe 
forward. This subsequently 
proved to be steam. 

At 2 — A boat from the Brook- 
lyn, or the Oregon, was seen to 
go alongside the Colon. 

At 2.25 — The Vixen stopped off 
Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of 
the Brooklyn and Oregon, The 
Nenu York arrived from three to 
five minutes later, and intercepted 
the boat returning from the 
Colon. 

In all these observations the 
time was accurately noted, but 
the watch used was five minutes 
slow of the deck clock, which 
agreed very nearly with the times 
indicated by the bells on other 
vessels. 


At 1.23 — The Texas hoisted 
signal, “Enemy has surren- 
dered.”^* 

The Colon lying at Rio Tar- 
quino. 


Boat from Brooklyn went 
alongside Colon^s starboard side 
at 2 o’clock.^® 


As a matter of fact, allowing for difference of time, 
the New York arrived at 2.23, or an hour and eight 
minutes after the surrender. Inasmuch as Admiral 
Sampson In his report insists (A. 507) that the New 

^®The Nenx) York was evidently too far away to read the signal. 
Therefore, why, thought the reviser, make any mention of the re- 
peating of the signal ? It might be embarrassing later on. 

The revised notes end here. It will be observed that no men- 
tion of events occurring after 1.15 is made in the revised notes. That 
clause showing that “the Vixen stopped off Rio Torquino, in the 
vicinity of the Brooklyn and Oregon, and that the Ne^ York ar- 
rived from three to five minutes later,” at 2.25, was a most embarass- 
ing one. If allowed to remain it settled the fact, beyond dispute or 
cavil, that the Ne^ York did not arrive near the Colon for an hour 
and twelve minutes after the latter surrendered. 


238 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


York “toward the end of the chase was making i6j4 
knots,” and Captain Chadwick wrote a second report 
(A. 522) to show that she was going “not less than 
17 knots,” by giving her the latter speed she must 
have been 19.26 knots (or 22.2 miles) away at the 
time the Colon surrendered. As the facts were incon- 
trovertible, suppressio veri was the only escape from 
them. 


CHAPTER LIX 


REAR ADMIRAL SAMPSON’s REPORT OF THE BATTLE 

The report of the commander-in-chief (A. 505) 
dated July 15, 1898, is a remarkable document, and 
the most significant of its features is the evident pur- 
pose of whoever wrote it to belittle the part played in 
the combat by the Bt‘ooklyn. 

The commander-in-chief says (A. 507) : ‘‘The 

initial speed of the Spanish vessels carried them rap- 
idly past the blockading vessels, and the battle devel- 
oped into a chase, in which the Brooklyn and the 
Texas had, at the start, the advantage of position. 
The Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon, 
steaming with amazing speed from the beginning of 
the action, took first place.’’ Again (A. 510) : “The 
fine speed of the Oregon enabled her to take a front 
position in the chase.” 

It was so easy for the commander-in-chief to state 
the facts exactly as they were, because he knew from 
the report of Captain Clark that the latter had said 
(A. 526) : “We soon passed all our ships, except the 
Brooklyn, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore 
Schley.” 

Captain Clark’s report is so significant that I ven- 
ture to make a larger quotation from it. He says (A. 
526) : “As soon as it was evident that the enemy’s 

ships were trying to break through and escape to the 
westward, we went ahead at full speed, with the de- 
termination of carrying out to the utmost your order ; 
‘If the enemy tries to escape, the* ships must close and 
engage as soon as possible; and endeavor to sink his 
vessels, or force them to run ashore.’ 

“We soon passed all of our ships except the 
Brooklyn, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore 


240 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Schley. At first we used only our main battery, but 
when it was discovered that the enemy’s torpedo boats 
were following their ships we used our rapid fire guns, 
as well as the 6-inch, upon them with telling effect. 
As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships, 
she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We 
raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, 
using our starboard guns as they were brought to 
bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she too was 
making for the beach. The two remaining vessels 
were now some distance ahead, but our speed had in- 
creased to sixteen knots, and our fire, added to that of 
the Brooklyn, soon sent another, the Viscaya, to the 
shore in flames. 

‘‘The Brooklyn signaled, ‘Oregon, well done/ 
Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it 
seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened 
with our forward turret guns, and the Brooklyn fol- 
lowed, she began to edge in towards the coast, and her 
capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the 
beach her flag came down, and the Brooklyn signalled, 
‘Cease firing,’ following it with: ^Congratulations 

for the grand victory ; thanks for your splendid assist- 
ance/ 

A large part of the report of the commander-in- 
chief is devoted to laudation of the method of block- 
ade that had been pursued during the month before 
the battle, and he claims that “this complete and most 
important victory was the successful finish of several 
weeks of arduous and close blockade.” 

This is ^‘non sequitur/^ It is difficult to see what 
the effort to keep an enemy in port has to do with 
beating him to absolute destruction after he has come 
out. If Cervera’s fleet had escaped when they came 
out that Sunday morning, could either Schley or 
Sampson have pleaded that closeness of the blockade 
in justification? Manifestly not. 

It may well be doubted whether It was good judg- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 241 


ment on the part of the commander-in-chlef, after 
having sent the Massachusetts away to Guantanamo 
for coal that morning, to withdraw the fast cruiser 
New York and two other vessels (the Hist and Erics- 
son, the latter being his only torpedo-boat destroyer) 
to enable him to go ^^en grande tenue^^ to Altares, 
where he was to land with his staff, and go up to Gen- 
eral Shafter’s headquarters. This especially In view 
of the fact that the movements of columns of smoke 
In the harbor on July 2 (the previous day) had been so 
marked as to excite Schley’s attention to such a degree 
as made him think It proper to send word (as he did) 
to the commander-in-chief, calling his attention to the 
matter (Schley, I. 1385; Sears, I. 972; Harlow, I. 
1362). 

It was a mere accident that the battle-ship Indiana 
was not left without her captain (Taylor) In that 
day’s battle. 

It has already been stated that, before starting for 
SIboney, Captain Chadwick, the chief of staff, sig- 
naled Captain Taylor, saying that the admiral wished 
to know if he (Taylor) would not go with him to 
General Shafter’s headquarters, and that Taylor de- 
clined, because of something that was going on on 
board the Indiana that required his presence. 

Suppose that Taylor had gone, and that the Span- 
iards had deferred their exit for two short hours. In 
that event Sampson and his party would have been on 
shore, astride of horses or mules, part way up to 
Shafter’s headquarters, and when Cervera came out 
the New York and Indiana would each have been left 
in command of their respective executive officers. 

The roar of the battle would have put upon Lieu- 
tenant Commander Potter, the executive officer of the 
New York, the decision of the question whether to 
remain at Altares until he could get his admiral and 
captain back on board, or, leaving them behind, go at 
once to the assistance of his brethren In the fight. 

16 


242 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 

\ 

There can be no doubt that Potter would have 
promptly chosen the latter course, as would have been 
his plain duty, and have done his best to speed the 
New Y ork into the fight. 

In that case, could she have reached the scene, both 
the New York and Indiana would have been fought 
under command of their respective executive officers, 
instead of their absent captains. 

And then of course it would have been in order for 
Captains Taylor and Chadwick to claim the credit for 
fighting them, and to criticise and find fault with 
everything that those executive officers had done — 
without any criticism — during the past month or 
more before the battle; and even to make insinuations 
as to their courage, in order to deprive them of the 
credit of fighting their ships successfully. 

If this would not have been proper in Taylor and 
Chadwick, with respect to their respective seconds in 
command, why not? 

Anyone can see the absurdity of the question, and 
the proper answer to be given. 

In the famous battle between the Confederate iron- 
clad Virginia (as the Confederates called her) or 
Merrimac^ (as we called her) and our wooden ships, 
the Cumberland and Congress^ the captains of both 
the latter ships were ten miles away, sitting as mem- 
bers of a court of inquiry at the time the fight began. 

Their absence left their respective executive of- 
ficers — Lieutenant George U. Morris in the Cumber- 
land and Lieutenant Joseph Smith in the Congress — 
in command of those ships respectively. 

Every naval officer knows the names and deeds of 
Morris and Smith on that day, and the whole world 
rang in praise of their gallantry; and history records 
it. But who knows who their captains were? The 
latter were very gallant and capable officers, and as 
soon as the Merrimac was seen to be about to make 
the attack they took horse, galloping at full speed to 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 243 


Newport News, off which their ships were lying. If 
they could have gotten there in time we know that 
they would have done their full duty in command, but 
as it was, through no fault of theirs, they were not 
able to be in it. They therefore claimed no part of 
the credit due to “Joe Smith” (as his brethren have 
always affectionately remembered him), of the Con- 
gressj and George U. Morris, of the Cumberland. 

Captain (afterwards Rear Admiral) William Rad- 
ford commanded the Cumberland^ and in his report 
said: “I was on board the Roanoke^ by order of the 

Secretary of the Navy, as member of a court of in- 
quiry when the Merrunac came out. I immediately 
procured a horse and proceeded with all despatch to 
Newport News, where I arrived only in time to see 
the Cumberland sunk.^ 

“Though I could not reach the Cumberland before 
the action was over, I have the satisfaction of report- 
ing that she was fought as long as her guns were 
above water. Everyone on board must have done his 
duty nobly. 

“/ send, with this, the report of Lieutenant George 
U. Morris of the action, he being, in my absence, the 
commanding officer/^ 

When old Commodore Smith, the father of Lieu- 
tenant ‘ ‘Joe” Smith, heard that the Congress had been 
surrendered, he exclaimed: “Then Joe’s dead.” 

And so he was. 


^This was exactly Sampson’s experience and course. 


CHAPTER LX 


THE LOOP (so-called) MADE BY THE ‘^BROOKLYN” 

That incident of the battle has been the subject of 
much inquiry and unfavorable criticism and comment 
on the part of Schley’s detractors. Even a President 
of the United States joined in this, and, in his 
memorandum on Schley’s appeal to him, says of the 
‘‘loop”; “It seriously marred the Brooklyn's other- 
wise excellent record; being, in fact, the one grave 
mistake made by any American ship that day.” 

The author is not going to make any apologies or 
excuses for the “loop,” but on the contrary will ex- 
plain and show clearly that, in the situation that con- 
fronted the Brooklyn at that moment when Captain 
Cook — without direction from Schley — ordered the 
helm of the ship “hard-a-port,” to make the turn, it 
was not only the right thing to do, but the only proper 
thing; and that to have turned the other way, under 
starboard helm, would have been “the one grave mis- 
take” ; not only an act of folly, but might, and prob- 
ably would, have exerted a disastrous effect upon the 
fortune of the day; and would probably have re- 
sulted, not only in the destruction of the Brooklyn, but 
in the escape of the Colon and Viscaya. 

It was merely a tactical move, and must be rightly 
judged solely by its results. 

When in a battle between two prize-fighters one 
“knocks the other out,” it makes no difference whether 
the victor struck the decisive blow with his right fist 
or his left; or whether at a critical moment he turned 
to the right (starboard) or left (port), or towards 
or from his adversary, the better to deliver the knock- 
out blow. 

The on-lookers who were not in the fight may have 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 245 


and may express their opinions about it — that’s easy 
enough ; but the man who knocked the other out gets, 
because he deserves, the credit of the victory. In this 
case Cook and Schley get no credit for the result, but 
only criticism of the method by which that result was 
accomplished. 

The Brooklyn and the Spanish ships were ap- 
proaching each other on practically opposite courses, 
each steaming at the rate of twelve knotes an hour; 
which, for both, was twenty-four knots, or a knot in 
two and one-half minutes, and the Teresa (Cervera’s 
flagship), was only eleven hundred yards away, or, in 
time, one minute, forty seconds. 

The other Spanish ships were following her at dis- 
tance (about four hundred yards) from each other, 
except the Colon, which was pursuing a course much 
inside the others, in the hope to escape — that being 
the plan agreed upon. 

That the Brooklyn must promptly turn about and 
pursue an opposite course admits of no doubt, because 
in another two minutes the two leading Spanish ships 
would pass her, and she would be between them and 
our other ships, thus, as it is termed, “blanketing their 
fire.” 

Turn, therefore, she must, and the only question 
was whether the turn should be under port helm, to 
starboard (right), or under starboard helm, to port 
(left). 

The credit (or blame) of beginning the turn under 
port helm undoubtedly belongs to Captain Cook. He 
first gave the order to his helmsman (Anderson) 
“Port.” The commodore. Captain Cook, and the 
navigator (Hodgson )all agree about that. Captain 
Cook testified before the Court of Inquiry: “I gave 
the order; it was not after having heard the commo- 
dore.” 

That it met with the approval of Commodore 
Schley is also a fact that nobody denies, or wishes to 


246 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


deny. He could have given the order ‘‘starboard’’ 
instead of “port,” if he had thought proper; but he 
approved and confirmed Cook’s order, and assumed 
responsibility for it, and any results that might have 
followed. 

No one has as yet even suggested that Captain 
Cook committed any impropriety, either of action or 
motive, in so doing, or insinuated that he was afraid 
of getting into too close proximity “to the enemy” in 
giving the order “Port.” It was done in the exercise 
of his best judgment. All who were there approved 
of it then, and approve of it now. 

To ask from either Cook or Schley reasons influ- 
encing his mind at the instant it was done would be 
futile. “A situation, and not a theory” confronted 
them, and there was no time for theorizing, reasoning, 
or calculation of chances. They were both profes- 
sional men of the highest ability, skill, and judgment 
and long experience in dealing with the emergencies 
of the sea-life and in the handling of ships, and par- 
ticularly of the Brooklyn, They both seemed to reach 
the same conclusion as to the proper way in which to 
turn almost at the same instant, because, as Captain 
Cook testified: “I gave the order ‘Hard-a-port,’ to 

the helmsman instantly, quicker than 1 can tell it. 
The commodore called to me, ‘Cook, hard-a-port,’ 
or ‘Is your helm hard-a-port?’ My answer was, ‘It is 
hard-a-port; she is turning as rapidly as possible.’ ” 
The nautical instinct of self-preservation (by which 
is meant preservation of their ship) asserted itself 
in the mind of both at the same moment. 

It was quite certain that one or the other of the 
Spanish ships would ram the Brooklyn, if possible to 
do so, and their movements had only a few moments 
previously caused Schley to say to Cook: “Look out; 
they’re going to ram.” 

Another thing was probably in the mind of both. 
Each knew that the enemy’s ships were provided with 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 247 


self-acting torpedoes that were effective within a 
radius of about six hundred yards, and that In about 
another minute and a half the Brooklyn would be 
within that radius. 

In the judgment of both the turn under port helm 
meant Immunity from torpedo attack, or danger of 
being rammed, for, as Cook testified (I. 898) : “If 

she had turned with starboard. Instead of port helm, 
and the Spaniards had continued on their course south- 
west, straight for us [the Brooklyn~]^ It would have 
made ramming possible; yes, certainly.” (At the 
point F In last diagram.) 

Cervera’s chief of staff (Captain Concas y Palau), 
In Chapter IX. p. 68, of his book, reprinted by the 
Navy Department says: “The admiral [Cervera] 

proceeded to give us Instructions for the battle. When 
we came out, the Teresa was to engage her [the 
Brooklyn^ In battle, endeavoring to ram her while 
the rest of the ships, headed by the Fiscaya, without 
delaying to succor the Teresa, were to pass In column, 
between her and the coast and endeavor to escape.” 

It would have been fatuous, and of the highest de- 
gree of foolhardiness, to have run the risk of either 
under the circumstances. 

The following diagram Illustrates the turn as It was 
actually made, the positions after It was completed, 
and the Brooklyn and the four Spanish ships running 
on parallel courses to the westward. It also shows the 
movements of the Spanish ships before they ran 
ashore. 

The testimony about this turn or “loop” Is as 
follows : 

Captain Cook (I. 895) : “When I saw the enemy 
turn westward I gave the order, ‘Hard-a-port.’ 
Quicker than I can tell It, the commodore called to 
me: ‘Cook, hard-a-port,’ or ‘Is your helm hard-a- 

port?’ My answer was, ‘It Is hard-a-port; she Is 
turning as rapidly as possible.’ ” 


248 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


“We made a complete turn, and a very quick turn, 
until we came around and paralleled the Spanish fleet 
on the other side ; and then we had the Viscaya on our 
starboard bow, and about a-beam was the Oquendo; 
and then the ColonJ^ 

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson testified (I. 
571) : “The Teresa falling off, she got abaft our 

port beam, and the helm of the Brooklyn was ported 
immediately after that; and we were swinging with 
a port helm [to right] ; I heard the commodore sing 
out, ‘Hard-a-port,’ or words to that effect, and Cap- 
tain Cook sang out to him, ‘The helm is a-port.’ ” 
Lieutenant Harlow, in the notes taken by him on 
board the Vixen ^ said: “The Brooklyn at 10 A. M. 

was the nearest to, and engaging, the two leading 
ships. The two ships were quite close together, with 
an interval of perhaps three-fourths of a mile be- 
tween the second ship and the Colon, 

“At 10.05 the Brooklyn began to turn with the 
port helm, and made a complete turn to the eastward, 
continuing around so that when again heading west the 
enemy’s two leading ships bore well on her starboard 
bow and the Colon on her starboard quarter, with the 
fourth vessel coming up rapidly astern. For the next 
fifteen minutes the Brooklyn received and returned the 
fire of the enemy’s two leading ships, with an occa- 
sional shot from the ColonJ^ 

Intimations have been made that the Brooklyn was 
run off on a southerly course two thousand yards (a 
nautical mile) before she was brought on a course 
parallel to that of the Spaniards. 

Captain Taylor (of the Indiana) and his marine 
officer (Captain Dawson) were the only two officers 
who made that statement before the Court of Inquiry. 
Inasmuch as their ship was not less than six miles 
away from the Brooklyn at the time the turn was 
made, and Taylor’s attention was probably engrossed 
(certainly ought to have been) by the movements of 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 249 


the Spanish ships, his testimony as to what the Brook- 
lyn was doing would not be very reliable. 

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson testified (I. 
620) : “Any witness who made the statement that the 
Brooklyn ran two thousand yards to the south from 
the Spanish line of battle, though he might have been 
stating what he thought was true, was absolutely mis- 
taken.” 

Captain Cook, in reply to a question by the court, 
testified (I. 904), in answer to the question, was the 
helm of the Brooklyn steadied or eased, at any time 
during the turn: “No, no, no, not until she was 

around and parallel with the Spanish ships; it was 
not even eased.” 

And the helmsman Anderson, who was produced 
by the judge advocate, in reply to the question by the 
court. Was the Brooklyn's helm eased or righted from 
the time it was first put a-port until she was put on her 
westerly course? replied: “No, sir.” And Anderson 
also testified (I. 1604) : “I understand it has been 

stated that she went to the southward and stood on a 
southerly course, which is incorrect.” 

And the finding of the court (I. 1829) put a 
quietus on that untruth, which finding was: “The 
Brooklyn turned to starboard, with her helm hard-a- 
port, and contiued to turn until she headed to the 
westward, parallel to the course of the Spanish ships.” 

In the face of such testimony and that finding of 
the court, Mr. John D. Long, formerly Secretary of 
the Navy (at p. 36, Vol. ii. of his book lately pub- 
lished) has had the hardihood to say: “The Brook- 

lyn began to turn away from the battle line until her 
stern was presented to the hostile cruisers. Having 
gone to the southward a distance not fully established, 
but ranging between eight hundred and two thousand 
yards, the Brooklyn turned and ran parallel with the 
Spanish ships.” And again (at p. 41) he says: “Far 
out to sea, the Brooklyn, which had been doing mag- 


250 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


nificent work with her battery, after the loop was 
made . . 

For making just such untruthful insinuations in his 
(so-called) ‘‘Naval History,’’ one Edgar Stanton 
Maclay was dismissed in disgrace, by order of Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, from the service of the United States. 
His book was condemned by the Congress of the 
United States, and its use in the naval or military 
academies was prohibited. 

Mr. Maclay did not have the above testimony and 
finding to show him his error, and he was undoubtedly 
deceived by just such statements as that of Captain 
Taylor. Long reviewed all this testimony, and ap- 
proved the finding of the court. 

If Maclay was justly treated, what treatment does 
Long deserve ? 


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Diagram V. — “ The plan of the battle, as given by Captain 

Mahan, is here reproduced.” 


FACING 2SI 


CHAPTER LXI 


THE LOOP (continued) ITS PROPRIETY ILLUS- 

TRATED IN THE BATTLE BETWEEN UNITED STATES 
FRIGATE “united STATES” AND THE BRITISH 
FRIGATE “MACEDONIAN” 

It was clearly the duty of Commodore Schley and 
Captain Cook not to take unnecessary risks In per- 
forming the duty of that moment. 

If a ship has guns that will enable her captain to 
keep out of the range of the enemy’s guns and tor- 
pedoes, and knock that enemy to pieces without “get- 
ting her Into dangerous proximity” to that enemy, it 
would be the worst sort of foolhardiness if, for mere 
purposes of individual display, he should go within 
range of the guns and torpedoes of that enemy. He 
would simply be a vainglorious fool to do so. 

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, United States Navy 
(who is one of the best authorities on such subjects), 
in the May, 1904, number of Scribner^ s Magazine, in 
an article, “The War of 1812,” well Illustrates the 
truth of the last statements in a critical description of 
the battle between the United States Frigate United 
States, commanded by Captain Stephen Decatur {who 
was, as Cleaves says^ ^Uhe most brilliant sailor officer 
the navy of the United States has ever p^oduced^^) . 
and the British frigate Macedonian, commanded by 
Captain Carden, resulting in the capture of the latter 
ship with very little loss to the former. 

The plan of the battle, as given by Captain Mahan, 
is here reproduced. Diagram V. 

At 8.30 A. M. the two ships were approaching each 
other exactly as the Brooklyn and the Spanish ships 
were just before the “loop” — that is to say, each had 
the other on the port bow. 


252 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Mahan says (p. 604) : “The United States was 
fully fifty per cent, stronger than the Macedonian In 
artillery power.” 

The United States at that time put her helm “hard- 
a-port” (just as the Brooklyn did) , thus turning away 
from Instead of towards her enemy (just as the Brook- 
lyn did). Or to use the elegantly expressed insinua- 
tion of Ex-Secretary Long regarding the Brooklyn's 
actions at the Battle of Santiago ( Vol. ii, p. 36 of his 
book), “Thus began to turn away from the battle 
line, until her stern was presented to the hostile 
cruiser.” After a little time she a second time turned 
“away from her foe,” again “presenting her stern to 
the hostile cruiser” ; and she, a third time, ran further 
away from her foe. 

Mahan of this maneuvering, says (p. 608) that 
“the action of the United States puzzled the British 
extremely. Her first wearing [turning away from the 
Macedonian^ was interpreted as running away.”^ 

Three cheers were given [by the British] , as though 
victorious in repelling an attack.^ 

“The handling of the United States was thoroughly 
skillful. Though he probably knew himself superior 
in force. Captain Decatur’s object necessarily should 
be to take his opponent at the least possible injury to 
his own ship. 

“In general principle the great French Admiral 
Courville correctly said : ‘The best victories are those 
which cost least in blood, timber, and iron.’ 

“Captain Carden, of the Macedonian^ had no hesi- 
tation as to the need of getting near [the United 
States~\, To avoid this was therefore not only fitting, 
but the bounden duty of the American captain. 

“His business was not merely to make a brilliant 
display of courage and efficiency, but to do the utmost 

^That is what Schley’s critics have insinuated and professed to 
believe. 

^ We have no report of any cheers by the Spanish on July 3. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 253 


injury to the opponent at the least harm to his own 
ship and men.” 

This battle is also described by Mr. Theodore 

Roosevelt, in his book entitled and he 

therein gives a diagram which shows these turnings 
from the English ship, but not to so marked a degree. 
And thus these two great naval authorities agree in 
commending the course pursued by Decatur. 

Tested by these sound and sensible principles, thus 
stated by our most able critic, Mahan, and Roosevelt, 
Cook and Schley, in making that turn as they did, did 
exactly what v/as right to be done — what Captain 
Decatur twice did in one battle, and what Mahan says 
‘‘was thoroughly skillful.” 

Decatur brought the captured Macedonian into 
New York, where he was received by his fellow-coun- 
trymen (just as Schley has been) with universal and 
hearty praise. 

What a pity it was that there was not some Maclay 
or Long to make insinuations against him for turning 
three times away from his foe ! 

The criticism of the “loop” has been indulged in by 
a President of the United States, who said: “Had 

the Brooklyn turned to the westward, that is, in the 
same direction that the Spanish ships were going, in- 
stead of the contrary direction, she would undoubtedly 
have been in a more dangerous proximity to them. 
But it would have been more dangerous to them as 
well as for her. This kind of danger must not be too 
nicely weighed by those whose duty it is to do and 
dare for the honor of the flag. Moreover, the danger 
certainly was not as great as that which, in that self- 
same moment, menaced Wainwright’s fragile craft as 
he drove forward against the foe.” 

The innuendo of the last statements and the com- 
parison with Wainwright were not necessary to a judi- 
cial determination. 


254 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Comparisons are always odious, and one who 
makes them should be sure of his parallelism. 

The President says that he had examined all the 
official reports of every kind In reference to the San- 
tiago campaign. He could not have examined with 
any great care or comprehension the reports made by 
Captain Walnwright and his executive officer, Lieu- 
tenant Huse (A. 540-1), wherein Walnwright said: 
“It was the plain duty of the Gloucester to look after 
the destroyers, and she was held back, gaining steam, 
until they appeared In the entrance. The Indiana 
poured In a hot fire upon the destroyers from all her 
secondary batteries, but Captain Taylor’s signal, 
‘Gunboats close In,’ gave security that we would not 
be fired upon by our own ships.” 

Lieutenant Huse says (A. 541) : “In the belief 

that the two torpedo destroyers known to be In the 
harbor would come out, you directed me to slow down 
and wait for them, keeping up a deliberate fire on the 
cruisers from the port battery. 

“Presently signal was made from the Indiana, 
‘Gunboats will advance.’ After this signal It ap- 
peared that the fight between this ship and the ap- 
parently uninjured destroyers was a thing apart from 
the battle In which the larger ships were engaged.” 
In this he was mistaken. 

Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, says (A. 530, 
531) : “Our secondary battery guns were directed 

principally on the destroyers, as were the sIx-Inch 
guns. The destroyers were sunk through the agency 
of , our guns and those of the Gloucester, which vessel 
came up and engaged them close aboard. At about 
10.15 we devoted our especial attention to prevent the 
escape of the destroyers, which appeared to be more 
than a match for the Gloucester, she being the only 
small vessel near, to engage them. They were soon 
seen to blow up, apparently struck by our sIx-Inch and 
six-ponders.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 255 


Captain Evans, of the Iowa, in his report of the 
battle (A. 537) says: About ten o’clock the 

enemy’s torpedo boat destroyers Furor and Pluton 
were observed to leave the harbor and to be following 
the Spanish squadron. At the time they were discov- 
ered (and, in fact, most of the time they were under 
fire) they were at a distance varying from 4500 to 
4000 yards. As soon as they were discovered the 
secondary battery of this ship was turned upon them. 
About 10.25 the fire of this vessel, together with that 
of the Gloucester and another small vessel, proved so 
disastrous that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers 
{Pluton) was so damaged that she was run upon the 
rocks.” After his characteristc fashion, Evans 
ignores the fire of the other battle-ships. 

The log-book of the Texas contains the following: 
‘‘Four ships came out; besides these there were two 
torpedo-boat destroyers. These two were compelled 
to run ashore by this ship and the Gloucester^ 

From the log-book of the Oregon the following is 
taken: “Shortly after the beginning of the engage- 

ment one torpedo destroyer was seen to steam in 
towards the beach, and the other was blown up by a 
shot from the after six-inch gun of this ship.” 

In his report (A. 526) Captain Clark says: 
“When it was discovered that the enemy’s torpedo- 
boats were following their ships, we used our rapid- 
fire guns, as well as the six-inch, upon them with tell- 
ing effect.” 

In the notes taken on board the Vixen appears the 
following: “10.32, — Two small vessels, probably 

the torpedo-boat destroyers, the Pluton and Furor, 
were to the westward of Cabanas, engaged by the 
Iowa and Texas and “10.50. — A small vessel, evi- 
dently a yacht, appeared off Guyacabon, hotly engag- 
ing some of the enemy’s ships.” 

Now, the author does not wish or purpose to de- 
tract in the slightest degree from the gallantry, ability, 


256 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


and skill displayed by Captain Wainwright of the 
Gloucester y and his officers and crew, on that occasion. 
But Wainwright was not the foolhardy man that the 
President seems to think Cook and Schley ought to 
have been. Wainwright knew that he might have a 
highly important duty to perform, — which was to 
protect the battle-ships against the attacks of those 
torpedo boats, — and he therefore, as in their official 
reports he and Huse say he did, ‘‘held his ship back, 
gaining steam,” and waiting for the proper time when 
the signal from the Indiana and the support of the 
powerful batteries of the Indianay loway Texas y and 
Oregon warranted his advance. Then, and not till 
then, he went in with a dashing gallantry never ex- 
celled in any naval battle except perhaps that of Nel- 
son in the Captain in the Battle of St. Vincent. There 
is, however, this difference between the two cases: 
Wainwright’s gallantry was displayed in obedience to 
signal; Nelson’s was without — in fact contrary to, — 
orders. 

Any comparison between the situation of the 
Gloucester y supported, as she was, by four battle-ships 
and another small vessel, and directed to go in by the 
signal of his superior officer, and the situation of the 
Brooklyn at the time of making that turn, fighting, as 
Captain Clark says, those four Spanish ships alone, 
is far-fetched and absurd, no matter who makes the 
comparison. 

If Wainwright had been foolhardy enough to 
attack the Spanish cruisers, and the Gloucester had 
been sunk, as she certainly would have been, it would 
have been no appreciable consequence to the result; 
but the loss of the Brooklyn at that time would have 
been a most serious and probably fatal calamity, so 
far as the capture or destruction of the Viscaya and 
Colon was concerned. 

One more quotation and we will have done with 
this subject. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 257 


Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, the navigator of 
the Brooklyn, wrote to Admiral Schley concerning 
that turn (I. 592) : ‘‘It proved to be a strategical 

move of the greatest importance, and the result of the 
battle proved its wisdom. And the successful issue of 
the turn, the gallant closing in of the Brooklyn upon 
the fleeing enemy, the bulldog tenacity with which she 
held on, her magnificent fighting and glorious scars, 
will always attest your leadership and bravery.” 
Captain Cook was promoted five numbers for his 
conduct in the battle of Santiago (as were all the 
other captains of ships engaged). 

Cook began the “loop.” Schley merely approved 
of it. If there was anything wrong about it, why 
should Cook be promoted, and Schley not only not 
promoted, but condemned? 

In this connection let me add my approval of the 
praise so gallantly and justly earned by Lieutenant 
Commander Richard Wainwright, commander of the 
Gloucester in that battle. He comes of fighting naval 
stock, and he proved himself worthy his lineage. 

And I deem it but just to quote what he said of his 
executive officer. Lieutenant Harry McL. P. Huse, 
in his report (A. 40), which is as follows: “The 

escape of the Gloucester was due mainly to the accu- 
racy and rapidity of her fire. The efficiency of this 
fire, as well as that of the ships generally, was largely 
due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the 
executive officer, lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The re- 
sult is more to his credit, when It is considered that a 
large proporltlon of the officers and men were un- 
trained when the Gloucester was commissioned. 
Throughout the action he was on the bridge and car- 
ried out my orders with great coolness.” 

Such praise is worthy all the publicity that can be 
given to it. 

The majority of the Court of Inquiry expressed the 
17 


258 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


opinion that ‘‘by commencing the engagement on July 
3 with the port battery, and turning the Brooklyn 
around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her 
to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, 
especially with the Viscaya and Colon/^ 

Let us see about that. This is the situation after 
the turn, as told by an absolutely impartial witness : 

Lieutenant Harlow, of the Vixen ^ testified (I. 
1330) ' was not until after the Viscaya had gone 
on shore at Asserederos that it was apparent to any- 
body on board the Vixen that there had been any 
fighting by any ship except the Brooklyn, a little by 
the Oregon, and a little by the Texas, except that fire 
which was concentrated on the Morro as the ships 
came out. From my positive knowledge, I saw the 
Brooklyn receiving and returning the fire, almost the 
entire fire, of the two leading ships, with an occasional 
shot from the Colon, I was in a position to see the 
flash, and immediately afterwards, or shortly after- 
wards, the fall of the projectiles; and the proportion 
between the flash and the fall showed that a large 
proportion fell about the Brooklyn, I made a note at 
the time, and remember distincly that it was evident 
that the Colon was using smokeless powder; so I was 
not able to detect the fall of as many shells from the 
Colon as I was from the two leading ships. I have 
very good reason for believing that the projectiles 
which set on fire the Viscaya, and compelled her to 
turn inshore, came entirely from the Brooklyn; and 
that there was at that time no other ship within range 
of the Viscaya, 

“As I have said before, I repeat now, from my 
point of view (calmly, and carefully watching), the 
Brooklyn was receiving the bulk of the fire from the 
two leading ships, with occasional shots from the 
third.’’ 

Captain Clark, of the Oregon, testified (I. 1336) : 
“I never saw the Brooklyn until I came out of the 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 259 


smoke and saw her ahead. She must have been en- 
gaged with all four of the enemy’s ships.” 

‘‘Lose distance and position with the Spanish 
vessels !” 

Those poor Spaniards, with her shells bursting all 
about them, burning, sinking, and fleeing to the shore, 
didn’t think the Brooklyn had lost any distance or 
position, and it was preposterous for the majority of 
the court to make that finding. 


CHAPTER LXII 


THE ALLEGED DANGER OF COLLISION BETWEEN THE 

“BROOKLYN” AND “tEXAS” 

Let us now consider the matter of the alleged danger 
of collision between the Brooklyn and the Texas. 
There was no reference in any of the official or news- 
paper reports of the battle as to the possibility or 
danger of such a collision. 

Strong effort has, however, been made by Schley’s 
detractors to make it appear that In turning about 
(“making the loop”) the Brooklyn ran into great 
danger of such collision with the Texas. 

The sole foundation for this story was an article 
printed in the Century Magazine for May, 1899, by 
Captain John W. Philip, who commanded the Texas 
in the battle. 

He described this Incident of the battle thus : “The 
smoke from our guns began to hang so heavily and 
densely over the ships that, for a few minutes, we 
could see nothing. We might as well have had a 
blanket over our heads. Suddenly, a whiff of breeze 
and a lull In the firing lifted the pall, and there, bear- 
ing towards us and across our bows, turning on her 
port helm, with big waves curling over her bows and 
great clouds of black smoke pouring from her funnels, 
was the Brooklyn. She looked as big as half a dozen 
Great Easter?ts, and seemed so near that it took my 
breath away. ‘Back both engines hard!’ went down 
the tube to the astonished engineers, and In a twin- 
kling the old ship was racing against herself. The col- 
lision which seemed Imminent, even if it was not, was 
averted, and, as the big cruiser glided past, all of us 
on the bridge gave a sigh of relief.” 

Philip had died before the Court of Inquiry was 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 261 


held, and when that magazine article was mentioned 
by Schley’s counsel before the court, the judge advo- 
cate promptly objected to all reference to it, and it 
was ruled out by the court. 

But the President and Ex-Secretary Long (in his 
book) having both cited it to support a conclusion ad- 
verse to Schley, in having endangered the Texas, it is 
thought proper to insert the foregoing citation from 
the article. 

It will be observed that Philip does not say that 
there was danger of a collision, but merely that “it 
seemed imminent, even if it was not.” The statement 
regarding the menace to the Texas^ safety was never 
made until this magazine article appeared, and Cap- 
tain Cook testified (I. 896) : “I didn’t hear anything 
about it until long afterwards.” That is, long after 
the battle. The testimony to support the statement 
that the Texas had been endangered, was as follows: 

Thomas M. Dieuwaide, a newspaper correspond- 
ent, — produced as a witness by the judge advo- 
cate, — was on the bridge of the Texas, at the time, 
and testified (I. 398) : 

“I saw the Brooklyn ten or fifteen minutes after the 
battle began. When I first saw her she was off the 
port bow of the Tex^s. I would not like to make any 
estimate of the distance, — how far away; she seemed 
very close to me. She was going seaward, and it was 
her stern that I saw.” 

From Dieuwaide’s statement there was absolutely 
no possibility of collision, unless the Brooklyn should 
stop, reverse, get a sternway on, and back into the 
Texas, 

Dieuwaide continued: “I have an entry in my 

notes, ‘Stop both engines; helm hard-a-starboard,’ 
and another, ‘It was the Brooklyn; close shave.’ ” 

It seems incredible that Philip, who was a fine sea- 
man and had had a large experience in the manage- 
ment of the large steamships of the Pacific Mail 


262 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Steamship Company for several years, should have 
done anything so unseamanlike as to put the helm of 
the Texas hard-a-starboard to avoid a collision with 
the Brooklyn, if the latter was crossing the bows of 
the Texas from starboard to port. If he did so, he 
must have been “rattled,’’ and that I cannot believe. 

Dieuwalde must have got that order “starboard” 
wrong as to the time when it was given. It would 
have been necessary, shortly before that, for Captain 
Philip to give that order “starboard”; but not with 
reference to the Brooklyn, 

It is worthy of note that Dieuwaide, as soon as pos- 
sible that afternoon of July 3y cabled to his news 
agency an account of the battle (which was printed in 
the New York Siin) ^ in which he said not a word 
about the turn of the Brooklyn or of danger of col- 
lision with the Texas, 

Commander Heilner (navigator of the Texas dur- 
ing the battle) testified (I. 127) : “When the second 
of the enemy’s ships followed the first to the west- 
ward, he [Captain Philip] put our helm a-starboard. 
I had made several reports to him about the Brook- 
lyn , — that is, about her signals, — of which he said: 
‘Never mind’ ; and also the way I thought the Brook- 
lyn was standing up to the fight, as I said, very nicely. 
The captain said : ‘Oh, cracky ! never mind the Brook- 
lyn, You look out for this ship.’ The Brooklyn was 
then about on our port beam, I said: ‘All right. 

Captain; I will lobk at the Brooklyn no more’; and 
I turned my back and looked over on the starboard 
beam at those ships coming out. After we slewed 
[turned] around and got to the westward, I suggested 
to give her a little port helm, to get closer In ; and he 

did.” 

This conflicts with Dieuwaide, and the next sen- 
tence more so. 

^^Right after he gave her this port helm, he sang 
out through sight holes, to the men at the engine room 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 263 


indicators, to ‘slow’; then ‘stop.’ I said, ‘Captain, 
they will all get away from us.’ He did not answer 
me, but immediately said, ‘Back.’ I then said: ‘My 

Lord, Captain, we are out of the fight.’ He then 
said: ‘Look at the Bi'ooklyn,^ 

“I turned around, and right ahead of us this big 
gray ship loomed out of the smoke. For a second, I 
think, my heart was in my mouth ; but I saw at once 
that she had a heavy sheer, — or, rather, that she was 
steaming with a heavy helm, and she sheered by us. 
When I saw her she was practically ahead of us, — 
that is, the first I saw of her. As soon as the Brook- 
lyn cleared us we rang to go ahead. Just before this 
turn of the Brooklyn, the Iowa and the Oregon were 
both close to us on our starboard beam.” 

The testimony given by others than those on board 
the Texas, was, on the other hand, as follows: 

Captain Francis A. Cook (of the Brooklyn^) said 
(I. 895) : “We ported our helm from about north- 

east. The Texas was well on our starboard [right] 
hand. As I saw her, I saw her port bow. I never 
saw the starboard bow of the Texas. And, changing 
her bearing very rapidly, the Brooklyn turned [her 
bow] along the port side of the Texas until there was 
a clear space between the Brooklyn’s bow and the 
stern of the Texas. 

At this point of the testimony Admiral Dewey in- 
terposed with the following question : 

Q. May I Interrupt you there? How near did you 
pass to the Texas? 

A. In my estimate, at the time, the thought of col- 
lision never entered my head. I never for a moment 
had any idea of solicitude in that respect. We passed, 
I should judge, about four hundred yards. I had 
handled that ship under all circumstances, and had 
gotten so that I could judge distances pretty correctly; 
and my impression was, at the time, that we were 
about our distance that we sailed in squadron; but 


264 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


collision never entered my head, and I didn’t hear 
anything about it until long afterwards. She turned 
perfectly clear of the Texas 

If Cook had seen the starboard side of the Texas he 
could not but have known that there was danger of 
collision, and would immediately have whistled to the 
Texas his purpose to cross her bow. 

The ‘‘Rules of the Road” enacted by Congress, as 
adopted by all maritime nations for the prevention of 
collisions at sea, provide : 

Art. 16. If two ships under steam are crossing so 
as to involve risk of collision, the ship that has the 
other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the 
way of the other. And 

Art. 20. Where, by the above rules, one of two 
ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep 
her course. 

The Texas, in the situation, would have had 
the Brooklyn on her {Texas) starboard side; 
ond thus the Brooklyn (apart from the fact that 
she was the flagship, and could go where she 
pleased) would have clearly had the right of way, 
and it was the duty of the Texas to keep out of the 
way. 

Lieutenant Sears (I. 1007) when asked by the 
court: “At the time the Brooklyn turned to star- 

board, was her distance more or less than what is 
known as ‘distance,’ when ships are in column?” re- 
plied: “It was not far from that distance.” And on 
page 974 he said: “When the order was given, 

‘Hard-a-port,’ I looked to the next vessel in our fleet, 
the Texas; and in my judgment we were completely 
clear of her. As we turned, we passed well clear of 
her.” 

And on page 1008 he was questioned and answered 
as follows: 

Q. Do you know whether the Brooklyn crossed 
the bows of the Texas? 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 265 


A. She did not. 

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who called the 
attention of both the commodore and Captain Cook, 
to the Texas ^ testified (I. 572) : ‘‘The Brooklyn 

swung well clear of the Texas ^ and came around with 
helm ‘hard-a-port.’ 

Q. (By the judge advocate) : I want to ask you 

how near was the Texas to the Brooklyn when she 
crossed the bow of the Texas ^ and you spoke to Com- 
modore Schley about it? How near were the two 
vessels? 

A. Well, I suppose, sir, about 250 to 300 yards. 

The witness then read from notes: “We quickly 

put our helm a-port, and wore round to starboard, 
passing well inside the Texas and added: “This 

was the account written by me the day after the 
battle.” 

Lieutenant Harlow, who was on the bridge of the 
Vixen taking notes, in reply to the court’s question 
(I. 1333) : “If you saw the Texas while the Brook- 
lyn was turning to starboard on July 3, how near were 
those two ships?” answered: “At no time were they 
sufficiently near to give me any idea of collision.” 
And (I. 1331) : “I saw the Texas at the time of the 
‘loop.’ She was to the eastward. The Brooklyn 
made the ‘loop’ and started to the westward, and I 
don’t think the other vessels had started in to the 
westward.” 

Lieutenant Commander Nicholson (who as navi- 
gator of the Oregon had been on her magnificent voy- 
age ’round from the Pacific) was asked: Q. When 
you passed under the stern of the Texas can you esti- 
mate the distance between the Brooklyn and Texas 
about that time? and replied (I. iiii) : “Well, I 

thought she was a mile, or mile and a half, away, I 
never saw her [the Texas'] when she was any closer 
than then to the Brooklyn. I never saw the Brooklyn 


266 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


anywhere near the Texas And (I. 1115) : did 

not see them come anywheres near each other.” 

Admiral Schley testified (I. 1338) : ‘‘I never saw 

the starboard side of the Texas at all. We were never 
across her bow. I saw only her port side, and she 
never approached any position that was within six 
hundred yards of the Brooklyn, She was so distant 
that it never entered my head at all as a menace or 
danger.” 

It would seem quite clear from all this testimony 
that the turn (or “loop”) of the Brooklyn did not in 
any way, or to any degree, menace the Texas with 
collision ; and that the two vessels were never nearer 
each other than four hundred yards, — if so near. 

That the captain of the Texas, for an instant only, 
thought a collision possible, there is no doubt. 
Whence his apprehension? 

In his book “James Lawrence,” Lieutenant Com- 
mander Cleaves says : 

“The affair with the Leopard had effectually con- 
demned the Chesapeake and sealed her untoward 
reputation, for, as is well known, to seamen a ship 
becomes endowed with human virtues or human 
thoughts. To them she ceases to be a mere inanimate 
thing of wood or iron, for in their eyes she is a living 
organism, and as such acquires a reputation for good 
or evil; and in a short time establishes a permanent 
reputation. 

“The Chesapeake was considered the most unlucky 
ship in the navy, and from the time she was launched 
until Barron’s bullet, at Bladensburg twenty years 
later, slew the most brilliant sailor officer the navy of 
the United States has ever produced, she seemed to 
exercise a baleful influence upon everyone connected 
with her. 

“Like Oedipus in the fable, she was pursued by a 
malignant fate from which it seemed impossible to 
escape.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 267 


Captain Philip was personally as brave a man as 
ever trod a deck, but affected possibly by the feeling 
Cleaves has so well stated, he might have regarded 
the Texas as “a hoodooed’’ ship. She had been un- 
fortunate from the start. She was built from plans 
brought from England, had some trouble at her 
launching, and had mysteriously sunk while lying at 
the wharf at the Navy Yard, Brooklyn. 

Philip, in that Century article, tells of an interview 
he had had with a woman in the Navy Yard, just be- 
fore he sailed. She, in bidding him good-by, said 
that she was the last person who had shaken hands 
with the captain of the ill-fated Hiiron^ which was 
wrecked on the coast of North Carolino a few hours 
after leaving port. 

Speaking (in the magazine) of the turning of the 
Brooklyn, he says : ‘‘It was the one time in the battle 

when I thought for a second that I should have to give 
in to that woman in Brooklyn who shook hands with 
me just before the Texas sailed.” And he adds: “I 

always did want to fool that woman.” 

Philip, a short time before his death, said to the 
author, when asked if there really was danger of col- 
lision, “No; not at all. But when I saw that great 
ship coming out through that pall of smoke with her 
batteries a sheet of flame, belching fire from her three 
great smokestacks and all her guns, she looked as big 
as a mountain; and for an instant my heart was in 
my mouth, and I gave the order to back immediately; 
but countermanded it.” 

Captain Cook has told the author that Philip made 
the same statement, in substance, to him. 


CHAPTER LXIII 


THE PERSONAL CONDUCT OF COMMODORE SCHLEY 

DURING THE BATTLE 

In taking up the matter of the personal conduct of 
Commodore Schley at the Battle of Santiago, it seems 
almost an insult to the gallant commodore even to 
allude to that subject; but there have been so many 
insinuations and suggestions made, even by those in 
high places, that it will be well to give the testimony 
of those who saw him during the progress of the 
battle; and who, consequently, know whereof they 
speak. 

Lieutenant Templin M. Potts (suggestive name), 
who was the officer who for some reason was 
unable to get the ranges right on the day of 
the reconnaissance ( May 31) while navigator of 
the Massachusetts (as hereinbefore stated), having 
intimated that during that reconnaissance the com- 
modore had betrayed some nervousness or excite- 
ment, Potts’ captain (now Rear Admiral) Higginson 
was requested to ‘‘describe definitely the bearing of 
Commodore Schley at the time.” 

He replied: “His bearing was that of a com- 

mander-in-chief. I don’t know what you mean.” 

Of the commodore’s conduct during the battle with 
Cervcra’s fleet, July 3, the subjoined testimony calls 
for little or no comment. 

Captain Cook (I. 899) testified: 

Q. (By judge advocate) : What was the conduct 
and bearing of Commodore Schley while under fire 
on such occasions as you have had opportunity of ob- 
serving? 

A. I have always regarded him as an enthusiasti- 
cally brave and patriotic officer; never in any other 
light. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 269 


Q. (By the Court) : Please state what was the 

conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley during the 
battle of July 3d. The answer to the question pre- 
viously given by you does not refer specifically to this 
date. 

A. I cannot imagine any conduct in battle more 
admirable. He was cool, brave, and enthusiastic, 
from the beginning to the end of the battle.” 

Q. (I. 992) : Was Commodore Schley’s position 
upon the Brooklyn on the day of the battle one of 
danger ? 

A. Yes. As much so as that of anyone’s on board 
the Brooklyn, He was in the open all the time. 

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who was labor- 
ing under a feeling that Commodore Schley had not 
been just to him, and was close to the commodore all 
through the action, testified (I. 619) : ‘‘The bearing 
and manner of Commodore Schley during the engage- 
ment of July 3 were the bearing and manner that you 
would expect an officer of his rank and station in the 
service to have. That is all I should say. It was the 
natural manner of a commander-in-chief of the naval 
forces on that occasion. His position was a point of 
danger. He was always in full view of the enemy’s 
ships.” 

Lieutenant Edward Simpson (I. 1255) testified: 
“I very often heard the commodore’s voice, cheering 
us on to fire rapidly. ‘Give it to them, boys,’ and ex- 
pressions of that sort. As the Viscaya! s fire slackened, 
I heard the commodore’s voice giving the order, ‘Fire 
deliberately, boys.’ As the Viscaya turned and 
headed inshore, the Oregon fired one of her big bow 
guns. I heard the commodore say : ‘He has raked 

her, and she is on fire. Signal to the Oregon to cease 
firing.’ I saw Ensign McCauley climbing up on top 
of my turret with a wig-wag flag, and I could hear the 
flapping of the flag. 

“I saw the commodore (L 1256) several times dur- 


270 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


ing the action. The principal time I recall seeing him 
was just when the Viscaya was about two points for- 
ward of our starboard beam. I then saw the commo- 
dore standing leaning against the turret, In the most 
natural position, with his glasses on his arm and his 
hand up to his chin. I was about ten feet from him. 
His bearing was that of a brave man, self-possessed, 
alert to his duties, and encouraging his officers and 
men in their duties/* 

Major Paul St. Clair Murphy, of the Marines (I. 
1301) : “I saw Commodore Schley on three or four 

occasions during the battle. His manner and conduct 
impressed me, as they seemed to Impress everyone on 
board the Brooklyn — It was that of a brave and reso- 
lute officer. It inspired the utmost enthusiasm 
thoughout the ship.** 

Captain T. S. Borden, of the Marines (I. 1541) : 
“I saw the commodore during the battle; once imme- 
diately after the doop’ was made; twenty minutes 
been destroyed, except the Viscaya and the Colon. 
His bearing was everything that the crew expected, 
and the officers; and everything that could be ex- 
pected.” 

Lieutenant Edward McCauley (I. 1037) : ‘‘The 

conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley on the day 
of the battle were perfectly cool and steady. He 
made encouraging remarks to the officers and crew. 
‘Give them hell, bullies.’ Said that several times.” 
Lieutenant J. P. J. Ryan (I. 1 139) : “I saw Com- 
modore Schley all the time. His manner and bearing 
were admirable, I think. He was on the fighting side 
of the ship all the time; was exposed all the time.” 
Carpenter George H. Warford (I. 1134): “I 

saw Commodore Schley several times during the bat- 
tle. His bearing was that of a brave and fearless 
officer. I heard him encourage the men. Heard him 
say: ‘Give them hell, bullies.* ‘Well done, bullies.* ” 
Passed Assistant Surgeon C. M. De Valin (L 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 271 


1 1 17) : “I saw Commodore Schley during the whole 
time of the battle, and his manner and bearing were 
all that could be desired or expected. He seemed to 
know what he was about, and doing what he wished 
to do, in complete command of the situation.” 

Gunner F. T. Applegate (I. 1391) : “Saw Com- 

modore Schley several times during the battle, and 
spoke to him. He seemed to be cool, calm, and col- 
lected, and wanted to inspire confidence.” 

Orderly Lennis J. Cronin (I. 1237) : “His man- 

ner was such that it inspired the men under him with 
confidence.” 

Chief-Boatswain William L. Hill (I. 1276): 
“The Viscaya was putting up the best fight of any of 
them Spanish ships there. She fought well; and 
them big shells were going over us, and a great many 
people ducked. The shells sounded like half a dozen 
railroad trains under way; made the same kind of a 
‘Chuck, chuck, chuck,’ and down would go a head; 
but Commodore Schley’s head never bent.” [Loud 
applause broke out from the spectators in the court- 
room.] “He was as calm and collected as he is at 
this moment. He called me to him constantly, as the 
different events occurred, and said, ‘Do the bullies 
below know this ?’ Do they know this or that ship has 
gone ashore? and his whole idea seemed to be that he 
wanted the people below to know as much about it as 
those of us who were on deck.” 

In the face of such testimony as was given by these 
officers and men before the Court of Inquiry, its find- 
ing on this subject was tame and cold. That finding 
was as follows, viz. : 

“His [Commodore Schley’s] conduct during the 
battle of July 3 was self-possessed; and he encour- 
aged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and 
men to fight courageously.” 

The majority of that court was not going to display 
any enthusiasm in praising the commodore. 


272 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


That finding, however, disposes of and refutes all 
the base insinuations, by whomsoever made, that any 
of Schley’s actions or orders during that battle. In- 
cluding the turn or “loop,” were prompted by any 
feeling, influence, or motive other than a purpose to 
do the best possible thing in the performance of the 
duties of the hour. 

With that finding, and the unanimous testimony of 
all who knew (from Captain Cook down to a plain 
marine orderly), given before the Court of Inquiry, 
It was criminally ridiculous for any of the officials to 
pretend or believe otherwise. No one has had the 
manliness to make any charge directly or in the open. 
It has only been base insinuation — from the highest 
to the lowest of those In official station who have dealt 
with the matter. 


CHAPTER LXIV 


UNDER WHOSE COMMAND WAS THE BATTLE OF 

SANTIAGO FOUGHT AND WON? 

Inasmuch as much time and effort have been made 
to place the honor of command at the battle of July 3 
where It does not belong — obviously denying It to Its 
proper officer — a summary of evidence touching upon 
this point will determine the matter. 

As has been already stated, on the morning of July 
3, 1908, the log-book of the New York, Admiral 
Sampson’s Flagship, records (I. Ex. A. 107) : 

‘‘At 8.50 started at full speed under three boilers, 
for Altares (SIboney), accompanied by the Hist and 
Ericsson, after making signaP to the rest of the fleet, 
to disregard movements of the commander-in-chief.” 
Mr. John D. Long, then Secretary of the Navy, in 
his letter of February 6, 1899, to the Senate, in re- 
sponse to the resolution of the Senate of January 23d, 

before cited (p. ), failed to make any reference 

to, or mention of, that signal as having been made 
by Admiral Sampson that morning. 

This failure may have been through ignorance on 
the part of the secretary. But Captains Evans and 
Taylor were not ignorant that that signal had been 
made, and it was clearly their duty, as members of the 
board of compilers of the despatches and reports re- 
ferring to the events of that day, to make mention of 
that signal. Evans and Taylor were clearly, and 
should have so felt themselves, bound In honor to in- 

^This was the same signal that the commander-in-chief had made 
“to the rest of the fleet” on April 22, 1898, as told by Rear Admiral 
Robley D. Evans in his book, “A Sailor’s Log,” p. 412; and referred 
to hereinbefore. 

18 


274 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


form the secretary, and, through him, the Senate 
about it. 

The secretary’s letter mentions several other unim- 
portant signals, and it requires considerable credulity 
to believe that he was innocently kept in ignorance 
of that particularly important one, and innocently 
failed to make mention of it. 

It is also a most significant fact that neither Ad- 
miral Sampson nor his chief of staff (Captain French 
E. Chadwick) and captain of his flagship New York^ 
made any mention in their respective reports of the 
making of that signal. 

It is difficult to see how any fair report can be made 
of the events of that day if the making of that signal 
is omitted therefrom. 

But Admiral Schley, in his letter to the Senate of 
February i8 (Ex. Doc. D. 171), having mentioned 
it, of course it had to be explained away, if possible. 
Therefore Mr. Secretary Long, in his letter to the 
Senate of March 8, undertook to do so thus (Ex. Doc. 
D. 174) : “Admiral Schley’s mention of the signal 
made by Admiral Sampson, at 8.45 A. M., July 3, 
‘Disregard movement of the commander-in-chief’ and 
his mention of the movement of the commander-in- 
chief towards Siboney, is followed by an incorrect in- 
ference, to wit, ‘This left me senior officer present, 
and necessarily clothed me with the responsibilities of 
command.’ ” 

It is proper to give the secretary’s reasoning, which 
is as follows: “The signal mentioned is one which 
is frequently made in squadron” (which is true), 
“and is never held in any sense a relinquishment of 
command” (which may or may not be true, according 
to circumstances) . 

“It is made where, for any reason, the flagship 
leaves its assigned position in formation, as was the 
case when the New York left her habitual blockading 
station that morning of July 3. At such times it is 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 275 


made to avoid confusion, which would result if other 
vessels, fixing their positions by reference to the flag- 
ship, were to move with her. Without further sig- 
nal the responsibility of command would not be 
shifted until the senior officer had gone out of signal 
distance.” 

This last statement is correct, for It is undoubtedly 
true that the senior officer cannot relieve himself of 
the responsibility of the command that rests upon 
him and impose that responsibility upon his junior 
merely by making that signal. But if he goes beyond 
signal distance, the senior left behind becomes, with 
or without the signal, ipso facto clothed with that 
responsibility. 

To the secretary, reply may be made that the flag- 
ship might have on that morning moved all about 
the blockade without disturbing the formation of the 
blockading fleet, since every vessel had her assigned 
position, fixed not at all by any reference to the posi- 
tion of the flagship, but with reference to the Morro 
at the entrance to the harbor. And Sampson’s order 
of blockade provides that, if any vessel Is ‘‘with- 
drawn for other duty, the blockading vessels on either 
side will cover the angle thus left vacant.” 

The source of the secretary’s Inspiration will be 
apparent to anyone who reads the comments on that 
signal submitted by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, 
to the President (I. 1931) In the President’s memo- 
randum on Schley’s appeal to him. But Evans In 
practice differed from Evans in theory. On the 
afternoon of April 22, 1898, Admiral Sampson, as 
Evans states (“A Sailor’s Log,” p. 412) “left his 
place In column, flying the signal, ‘Disregard move- 
ments of the commander-In-chief.’ I, as next in rank 
to Sampson^ hoisted the guard flag; and, as senior 
officer present^ held the fleet to its course direct for 
the Morro Castle at the entrance of the harbor of 
Havana^ 


276 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


But all theories and opinions are vain in the face 
of the Naval Regulations on the subject. These are 
as follows and are quoted from ‘‘Regulations for the 
Government of the Navy” (in force July 3, 1898). 

“Art. 53. By the force of naval law and regula- 
tions made in conformity therewith, the following 
principles are established, and exist as essentials of all 
military service, without which there can be neither 
command, discipline, nor responsibility. 

“i. Officers entrusted with the command of war 
or naval vessels, or with the command or direction 
of any military duty, whatever their rank, while 
properly in such command or direction have full 
command authority and precedence over all persons 
of whatever rank serving in such vessel, station or 
expedition; or in the execution of such duty. This 
authority and precedence will descend to the officer 
or person on whom such command or direction may 
devolve by reason of the death, disability or absentee 
of the person otherwise in command or direction. 

“2. In case of the death, disability or absence of 
an officer in military command or direction, this com- 
mand and direction^ with all its authority and pre- 
cedencCy devolves and rests upon the line officer next 
in rank who may be present and on duty with such 
command!^ 

Art. 18, par. 4, prescribes that “at all times and 
places not specifically provided for in these regula- 
tions, where the exercise of military authority for the 
purpose of co-operation or otherwise is a necessity, 
of which the responsible officer must be the judge, 
the senior line officer on the spot shall assume com- 
mand, and direct the movements and ef[orts of all' 
persons in the navy presentJ^ 

Art. 325. — The senior officer present shall dis- 
charge the duties of the flag officer in chief command^ 
as laid down in paragraphs [enumerating them, of 
which Arts. 268, 270, and 271 refer to battle], and 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 277 

authority for that purpose is hereby conferred upon 
him. 

It is a question how far the flagship New York 
went to the eastward that morning. As to this the 
only positive and Impartial evidence must be the log 
entries made at the time, before any controversy had 
arisen. 

It is a significant fact that neither Sampson nor 
Chadwick claims that the New York was within 
signal distance of the ships actually engaged In 
the battle. Sampson does say (A. 507) : “The 

New York turned about and steamed for the 
escaping fleet, flying the signal ‘Close in towards 
harbor entrance, attach vessels.’ ‘However, none of 
the reports or entries made that day in any of the 
log-books mentions having seen that signal, or of 
any action taken with circumstances. The expres- 
sion means ‘distance within which signals can be read 
at the time they are made.’ ” 

Captain Taylor’s idea of the extreme distance with- 
in which signals can be read Is shown by his sworn 
testimony given In the prize case of the Panama, 
The captain was endeavoring to show that his vessel 
(the Indiana) was within “signal distance,” in order 
that she might share In the prize. Self-Interest, then, 
would prompt him not in understate the distance 
within which signals can be read. 

The captain was asked the question, “What would 
you call the distance at which, under most favorable 
circumstances, signals could be read?” His answer 
was: “Under most favorable conditions of light, 

clearness of atmosphere, and everything possible, up 
to eight miles — under favorable circumstances.” 

Admiral Sampson, in his report, written July 15, 
(A. 506), said: “The New York was about four 
miles east of her blockading station, and seven miles 
from the harbor entrance.” If that statement were 


278 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


correct, then her ‘‘full speed under three boilers” that 
morning was only a trifle over five knots an hour. 

But the log-book tells a different tale. 

From that log-book it appears that, instead of 
going four miles only, the New York actually went 
9.5 miles east from her blockading station, or more 
than twice as far as the admiral states, and, adopting 
the rest of the admiral’s statement, the New York 
was (nautical, or nearly 14.5 statute) miles 

from the mouth of the harbor when Cervera came 
out, or twice as far as the admiral estimated. 

That log-book of the New York for the forenoon 
of July 3 was most carefully written. There were 
no alterations or interlineations in it. It was duly 
signed by Lieutenant Frank Marble, the officer of the 
watch, and the regulations (Art. 568) required that 
it should be examined and signed by the navigator, 
and submitted to the captain before i P. M. daily. 
Whether that was done with the log-book of July 
3 does not appear, although that of the previous day 
bears the endorsement: “Examined and found cor- 
rect — John E. Roller, Lieutenant and Navigator.” 
Naturally, and probably, in writing the log for 
that day they made the best case they truthfully could 
for their ship. 

That log shows that “at 8.50 the New York started 
at full speed, under three boilers, for Altares 
(Siboney), after making signal to the rest of the 
fleet ‘to disregard movements of the commander-in- 
chief’; that she steamed [“at full speed”] 9.5 knots 
[not 4] ; that the admiral, captain, and assistant 
chief of staff prepared to land at Altares, to visit the 
headquarters of the army; that, about 9.45, just be- 
fore reaching Altares, heard heavy firing off San- 
tiago, and observed smoke in the entrance. Imme- 
diately turned and stood back, at full speed.” 

That log-book remained (for two years less seven 
days) as it was then written, or until June 20 , igoo. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 279 


On the last mentioned day Lieutenant Marble 
found himself on board U. S. S. Baltimore (then on 
her way to the United States, bearing the flag of Rear 
Admiral John C. Watson, who was returning at the 
end of his two years’ command of the Asiatic Fleet), 
which vessel had arrived at Port Suez. On that day 
Lieutenant Marble wrote to the Navy Department a 
letter, of which a copy is as follows (I. Ap. A. 108) : 

“U. S. S. ‘Baltimore, 
“Suez, June 20, 1900. 

“Sir: — I have the honor to request that the follow- 
ing correction be made in the log of the U. S. S. 
New York, for the forenoon watch of the 3d of July, 
1898, which was signed by me, viz: The time at 

which the New York turned to the westward in pur- 
suit of the Spanish fleet, then emerging from the har- 
bor of Santiago de Cuba, ought to be 9.37 A. M. in- 
stead of 9.45 A. M., as written in the log. 

“My attention has only now been called to this 
error, which I believe was wholly due to an oversight 
in the first place. The time 9.37, as I now state it, 
accords with my remembrance of the event, and with 
the time at which we went to quarters for Sunday in- 
spection — 9.30 A. M., and the time — 9.35 A. M. — 
at which, by general consensus of reports, the Spanish 
fleet began to make their exit; and with the fact that 
the New York turned immediately upon sighting the 
first Spanish ship, which she did the instant the latter 
was clear of the entrance. No one on board the New 
York, so far as I have heard, noticed,* in the excite- 
ment of the moment, the precise time by the clock 
when her helm was first put over; and in writing the 
log three or four hours later, I had to be guided by 
the time of going to quarters, etc., as here stated. 

“The difference of eight minutes may seem small, 
but it is, of course, of considerable importance when 
events are moving rapidly. 


28o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


“I make this correction now, after nearly two years, 
but merely because my attention has been called to 
what I regard as an obvious ( sic) error. 

“I think it right to forward this letter through 
Captain Chadwick, who commanded the New York 
at that time, rather than through my present Imme- 
diate superiors. 

“Very respectfully, 

“Frank Marble, 
*^Lieutenant U, 5 . Navy, 

“The Secretary of the Navy, 

“Washington, D. C.’’ 

(Endorsed) “Respectfully forwarded, requesting 
that the change mentioned may be made. F. E. 
Chadwick, Captain U. S, NavyJ^ 

The department, on receipt of this letter, caused 
the change to be made by a Mr. Taylor, by endors- 
ing on a copy of ' this letter the following: “Memo- 
randum, for Mr. Taylor. ‘Make the correction 
herein requested; and paste this sheet in the log-book 
to indicate authority.’ ” 

Mr. Taylor then made the alteration by striking 
a red line across the 45 in the figures 9.45, and In- 
serting, In red, the figures 37, alongside. 

It Is not surprising that the young officer who wrote 
the foregoing letter should have adopted the apoli- 
getlc tone displayed therein. He must have felt him- 
self to be standing on very doubtful ground indeed, 
when he undertook to Impeach the accuracy of his 
own solemn statement, made over his own signature, 
two years before, and, as he says, made only “three 
or four hours after the events occurred.” 

How he could venture to call the alleged error 
an obvious error” rather puzzles one. 

The lieutenant does not say who had called his 
attention to this “obvious error,” but the fact that 
he sent the letter “through Captain Chadwick, rather 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 281 


than through my immediate superiors” (which naval 
regulations required), unmistakably points to the 
source of the lieutenant’s inspiration. 

Lieutenant Marble, in the letter, says: ‘‘No one 
on the New York, so far as I ever heard, noticed the 
precise time by the clock, when her helm was put 
over.” 

Nevertheless, attached to the log-book of that day 
is a typewritten paper purporting to be a copy of 
“Official Notes, taken on the Bridge of the U. S. 
Flagship New York, on July 3, 1898, by Chief Yeo- 
man Fred J. Buenzle, U. S. Navy [admiral’s writer]. 
Time by clockJ^ 

In the judgment of the writer these purported 
“Notes” in several particulars bear internal evidence 
that they probably do not correspond with the 
originals. 

A copy of the notes is as follows: 

“9.50 A. M. — Reported to the admiral on the 
bridge by the chief quartermaster, that the Cristobal 
Colon was coming around Morro Point. Without 
glasses could not distinguish what sort of a vessel 
she was, being enshrouded in her own smoke, and 
that of the guns of the west battery. The New York 
had turned, and was speeding in the direction of the 
Morro.” 

None of that sounds sailor-like. The words used 
are too big. A sailor would say “Make out,” and 
not “distinguish,” and “surrounded” instead of “en- 
shrouded.” Mention is made of the Cristobal Colon, 
and nothing is said about the other three vessels that 
had come out before her. If those notes had been 
properly taken, they should have stated the time when 
the order to turn was given, just as the log-book 
entry does, or, rather, did before it was changed. 

These notes purport to make mention of events as 
they occurred, and the last entry is as follows : 

“At 1. 1 5 P. M. — The Oregon fired a 13-in. shell 


282 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


which fell very close to the Colon; and it was thought 
that the latter had been struck, as thick black smoke 
arose. This was a few moments before it was re- 
ported that she was heading for the beach.” 

With this last statement Buenzle’s notes end. He 
was interviewed by the author hereof, and he stated 
that in his notes he had made mention of the time 
when the New York arrived, and stopped near the 
Colon, which, as he remembered, was 2.15 P. M. 

Here, then, is a second instance of the siippressio 
veru 

Connect with this the same suppression in the notes 
taken on board the Vixen and the alteration in the 
log-book of the New York by Lieutenant Marble. 
All these omissions, alterations, and proposed cor- 
rections may have been accidental, but as they all 
have apparently a common purpose, the suspicion will 
arise that some one person must have inspired them 
all; and that some one must have been acting with 
intent to bring the New York, if possible, “within 
signal distance” of the fighting ships. That is plainly 
apparent. 

Having shown (as think) that Lieutenant Mar- 
ble’s alteration was suggested by Captain Chadwick, 
the fatherhood of all these alterations and omissions 
seems sufficiently well indicated. 

Exactly where the New* York was located at the 
time that battle began is settled by the following 
affidavit. It may be premised that, inasmuch as the 
statements, under oath, of a newspaper correspondent 
(Mr. Thomas M. Dieuwaide) were, by the judge 
advocate of the Court of Inquiry and apparently by 
the majority of the court, considered sufficient to fix 
the fact that the Brooklyn^ s turn endangered the 
Texas, the statements made in this affidavit by an- 
other, and, so far as appears, equally reliable news- 
paper correspondent, ought to have equal effect. The 
affidavit is as follows: 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 283 


State of Illinois, 

County of Cook, 

I, James O’Shaughnessy, being duly sworn, do 
depose and say, that I am a citizen of the United 
States, and of Chicago, in the County and State afore- 
said; and that, in the year of 1898, I was employed 
as a reporter and correspondent of the Chicago 
Chronicle, In that capacity I went to Cuba with the 
military expedition that left Tampa, Florida, June 
14, 1898. I landed at Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 
1898, and remained in Cuba, watching the operations 
of the army about Santiago until after the capitula- 
tion of that city, July 17, 1898. On July 2d I was 
informed that Admiral Sampson was to come on shore 
to confer with General Shafter. 

On the following day, July 3d, I was at the beach 
at SIboney, Cuba. While waiting there that morn- 
ing, I saw the U. S. Cruiser New York approach 
from the direction of Morro Castle. It came directly 
into the bight of Siboney, and approached nearer to 
the shore that I had ever before observed approach 
a large war ship in that bight. A launch was let 
down into the water from the New York when it 
stopped; and three officers from, the New York en- 
tered the launch. While the launch was still along- 
side the Nezv York, I heard the report of a heavy 
gun coming from the direction of Morro Castle. Im- 
mediately there seemed to be a commotion among 
those on the decks of the New- York, The ladder 
was quickly drawn up on the side of the New' York. 
The officers in the launch were gesticulating to some- 
body on the cruiser. The firing towards the mouth 
of Santiago Harbor increased; and I could hear the 
heavy guns booming at close intervals. The distance 
was too great to hear any but the heavier guns. I 
was aftenvards informed it was the reports of the 
twelve-inch and thirteen-inch guns only which were 



284 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


audible at Siboney. After the ladder was drawn 
up the New York began to move. It began to swing 
round, moving slowly, as It had to turn around in the 
bight, in which were a number of army transport 
ships. On the western horizon the smoke of the 
ships, which was plain enough at first, was becoming 
less distinct, and the sound of the guns was fast be- 
coming fainter. A torpedo boat which had accom- 
panied the New York got around first, and was steam- 
ing away to the west. The New York was slower In 
its movements as it brought its bow around to the 
west, but when it was headed towards Morro Castle 
it went away at a fast pace. The launch with the 
three officers in it came to the temporary dock at 
Siboney. I waited at the dock for their coming, and 
talked with them for some time. Those officers who 
were left in the launch seemed greatly chagrined 
when they came on shore, and appeared as if they 
were at a loss to know what to do. I questioned 
them about the meaning of the fire, and the precipi- 
tate departure of the New York; but they were reti- 
cent, although at that time those thereabouts were 
evidently in no doubt that a considerable sea fight 
was going on then somewhere below the western 
sky-line; and later in the day I learned of the de- 
struction of the ships of the Spanish fleet by those of 
the United States Navy. That was, then, the ex- 
planation of the failure of Admiral Sampson to visit 
General Shafter after having come to Siboney. 

My reason for noticing this much was that It was 
my Intention and desire to talk with Admiral Samp- 
son when he carne ashore, to obtain some statement 
from him for the benefit of the paper I represented. 

James O’Shaughnessy. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th July, 

1899, Francis J. Houlihan, 

[Seal] Notary Public. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 285 


The above affidavit carries conviction on its face. 
The occurrences stated are just what probably took 
place. No more intelligent statement of the exact 
facts could be made, and the New York must have 
been pretty close to shore to enable him to see what 
he says he saw going on alongside of her. And the 
ship must have been stopped, or very nearly so, be- 
fore that boat would be lowered except as a matter 
of great haste or emergency, of which there was none 
at that time. The booming of those guns creating 
commotion, furnished the occasion for haste. 

The facts set forth in this chapter in conjunction 
with the citations from the “Regulations for the Gov- 
ernment of the Navy’’ show plainly the correctness of 
the opinion given to the President, by Admiral Clark, 
of the Oregon (I. 1929) : “I considered Commodore 
Schley in responsible command during this running 
fight and chase, so far as I was concerned.” 

And also of the finding of Admiral Dewey, who, 
as President of the Court of Inquiry, said (I. 1830) : 
“Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our 
squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron at- 
tempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. 
He was in absolute command, and is entitled to the 
credit due to such commanding officer, for the 
glorious victory which resulted in the total destruc- 
tion of the Spanish fleet.” 

In which all impartial and unprejudiced people 
will concur. 


I 


CHAPTER LXV 


THE PART IN THE BATTLE TAKEN BY THE FLAGSHIP 

''new YORK^^ 

For the purpose of determining what part the New 
York took in the Battle of Santiago, the subjoined 
extracts from reports and other sources are subjoined. 

Admiral Sampson, in his report (A. 507) says: 
‘‘She [the New York~\ was not at any time within 
the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only 
part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire 
from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and 
to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, though at 
the moment to be attempting to escape from the 
Gloucester/^ 

‘‘The mills of the gods grind slowly, yet they grind 
exceeding small.” 

Of course, as soon as the admiral descovered by 
the firing off Santiago that the Spaniards were at- 
tempting to escape, he, and every officer and man of 
the New York, did everything possible to get into 
the battle. He well described the feelings of him- 
self, his officers and crew, when, in his Century ar- 
ticle, he said: “The first thought was. Oh, that we 
had wings, not those of the dove, but of the eagle, 
swooping down upon its prey.” 

One can imagine the galling bitterness of the 
thoughts that must have possessed him, as (like Mil- 
ler of the Merrimac) he saw himself deprived of the 
opportunity for which he had so long waited and 
watched; and that opportunity given to another. 

When the New York started back from Siboney 
she hoisted the signal, “Close in towards harbor en- 
trance and attack vessels,” but none of the squadron 
seem to have seen it, because they were too far away 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 287 


to the westward and surrounded with the smoke and 
roar of battle, engaged in obeying the same signal, 
and another, ‘‘Follow the flag,” that had been hoisted 
by Schley when the Spaniards turned to the westward. 
In fact, all signals were superfluous that morning. 
The cats had been watching the rat-hole too long not 
to know exactly what to do without any signal. 

Admiral Sampson says, as quoted above, that the 
New York “was not at any time within the range of 
the heavy Spanish ships.” It is capable of mathemat- 
ical demonstration that she was never within 19.26 
nautical miles of any one of them until they were 
driven successively to the beach. 

That part of the notes taken on board the Vixen 
which was suppressed states that “the Vixen at 2.25 
stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the neighborhood of the 
Brooklyn and Oregon. The New' York arrived from 
three to five minutes later,” or at 2.28 to 2.30. 

As a matter of fact it was 2.23. And thus it is 
shown, by entirely impartial testimony, that the New 
York did not arrive for an hour and eight minutes 
after the Colon surrendered. The suppression from 
Buenzle’s notes — taken on board the New York — 
of all mention of events after 1.15 (the time of the 
Colon^s surrender) tends to corroborate the Vixen 
notes. 

Admiral Sampson in his report (A. 507) says: 
“The New York gradually increased her speed, until 
towards the end of the chase she was making 16^ 
knots.” 

Captain Chadwick in his official report (A. 521) 
says: “The speed had rapidly increased, so that we 

were going 16 knots at the end.” But on July 29, 
after nearly a month’s consideration, he wrote (A. 
522) : “As supplementary to my report dated July 
4, of the action of the 3d, I beg to say that, at the 
close of the chase of the Colon, our speed had in- 


288 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


creased to not less than 17 knots, instead of 16, as 
mentioned in my ninth paragraph.” 

So that, accepting Captain Chadwick’s statement 
of her speed, she must have been 1.13x17 k.=9.2i 
knots=22.i statute miles away from the Colon when 
she hauled down her flag. 

And that is as near as she got to any of the “heavy 
ships” during the battle. 


CHAPTER LXVI 


WAS THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO A CAPTAIN's FIGHT? 

In considering another phase of the great contro- 
versy arising from the events of that memorable July 
3, it will be recalled that the President of the United 
States himself has said that neither Sampson nor 
Schley was in actual command on that day (against 
which assertion we place the opinion of Commodore 
Dewey and Rear Admiral Clark) and that it was 
‘‘a captains’ fight.” 

The claim that the credit of a great victory is not 
to be given to the admiral commanding, or other 
‘‘senior officer on the spot,” but may be taken from 
him and divided among two or more of the captains 
commanding single ships, is no new thing in naval 
history. 

It is commonly supposed that Nelson was what is 
ordinarily styled “the hero of the battles of the Nile 
and Trafalgar” ; but J. Fennimore Cooper, the novel- 
ist and naval historian, in the preface to “The Tale 
of Two Admirals,” writing by the authority of the 
late Commodore Charles Morris of the United States 
Navy, says: 

“It is now known that all the early accounts of the 
maneuvering at the Nile, and of Nelson’s reasoning 
on the subject of anchoring inside and doubling on 
his enemies, is pure fiction. 

“Since that time naval officers of rank have written 
on the subject, and stripped the Nile, Trafalgar, etc., 
of their poetry, and given the world plain, nautical, 
and probable accounts of both those great achieve- 
ments. The truth was just as little like the previously 
published accounts as well could be.” 


19 


290 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


It was doubling on the French line that gave Nel- 
son so high a reputation as a tactitian. 

The merit of the maneuver belonged exclusively to 
one of his captains. As the fleet went without any 
order, keeping as much to windward as the shoals 
would permit, Nelson ordered the Vanguard hove to, 
to take a pilot out of a fisherman. 

‘‘This enabled Foley, Hood, and one or two more 
to pass that fast ship. It was at this critical moment 
that the thought occurred to Foley (we think this 
was the officer) to pass the head of the French line, 
keep dead away, and anchor inside. Others followed, 
completely placing their enemies between two fires.” 
Nelson’s tactics are discussed by Fitchett (an emi- 
nent English writer) in his book, “Nelson and his 
Captains.” What he says is as follows: 

“Nelson’s tactics were merely perfect common 
sense applied to the business of war. The official 
‘Fighting Instructions’ of the Admiralty directed an 
admiral, when engaging an enemy’s fleet, to arrange 
his line exactly parallel to the enemy’s line, and to 
pit ship against ship; so that a sea battle resolved 
itself into so many sea duels. The essential idea was 
to distribute the attacking force along the whole of 
the enemy’s line, not to combine it in overwhelming 
preponderance against a portion of that line. 

“Nelson inverted that process. The essential prin- 
ciple of all his battles was to double on part of the 
enemy’s line and crush it, leaving the surviving frag- 
ments to be destroyed in detail. 

“All the traditions of the navy were against these 
tactics, and, it may be added, the natural pride of the 
British seaman was against it. ‘One Englishman was 
equal to two Frenchmen. Why invert these odds 
and expend two Englishmen on one Frenchman?’ 
This was, in substance, the criticism of Saumarez, on 
Nelson’s tactics at the Nile. 

“The terrible quality of Nelson’s fighting was 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 291 


found in the deadly skill with which he threw his 
whole force on part only of his enemy’s force, and 
thus satisfied the first condition of victory — that of 
being overwhelmingly superior in strength at the 
point of attack. Nelson applied this new principle 
to naval warfare on a scale and with a certainty and 
swiftness that made his battles like thunderbolts, and 
as destructive as thunderbolts.” 

All the critics of Nelson’s tactics in those battles 
have long been forgotten, but Nelson is still the 
‘‘Hero of the Nile,” and he and that “noble fellow, 
Collingwood” (as Nelson called him, as he carried 
his ship into action at Trafalgar), are still the heroes 
of that battle, and will always continue to be. 

Nelson and his deeds are, however, now a part 
of history, so let us pass back to the matter under dis- 
cussion. 

The Court of Inquiry refused to allow any testi- 
mony to be given as to the position of the New York 
at the time the battle began. 

The President of the United States therefore vio- 
lated all the rules of proper procedure in respect to 
appeals when, upon Admiral Schley’s appeal to him 
from the findings of the court, and of their approval 
by the Secretary of the Navy, he called in all the cap- 
tains in that fight except Cook (who was the only 
one who knew whether the New' York was within 
signal distance of the Brooklyn) and took their state- 
ments and opinions upon that matter. 

These officers were all Schley’s subordinates; they 
had all been witnesses before the court, and not one 
of them was allowed to give any testimony as to the 
position of the New York, If the court had per- 
mitted any such testimony the admiral’s counsel were 
prepared to show exactly where the New' York was 
when she started back towards the battle that morn- 
ing. 

The affidavit of Mr. James O’Shaughnessy (here- 


292 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Inbefore given) and other testimony of a like char- 
acter were ready. , 

The President also quoted from Philip’s article 
in the Century Magazine^ giving statements from it 
which were expressly excluded by the court, and he 
also referred to a letter written by Philip to the 
Secretary of the Navy, dated February 27, 1899, 
which has never been published — a letter which 
Schley has never seen, and which no tribunal having 
regard for the plain practice and principles of legal 
proceedings on appeal would have permitted to be 
used. 

It was grossly unfair to receive statements, opin- 
ions and documents outside the record, without giv- 
ing Schley opportunity to introduce evidence in reply. 

Rear Admirals Evans and Taylor, in their state- 
ments quoted by the President, take the extraordinary 
position that if Commodore Schley had made any 
signals to them, they would not have heeded them, 
inasmuch as they considered Admiral Sampson “to 
be present and in command.” And yet Captain Tay- 
lor (as he then was), with his admiral present (as he 
says), did not hesitate to make signal to the Glou- 
cester, “Gunboats advance,” a signal which Captain 
Wainwright promptly obeyed, because made by the 
“senior officer present.” But if Admiral Sampson 
was present, within signal distance. Captain Taylor 
had no right whatever to make any signal to Wain- 
wright, and according to his statement above, Wain- 
wright should not have heeded it. 

Notwithstanding these ex post facto assertions, 
there can be no doubt that if Schley had made a signal 
to any ship that day to do some particular thing, that 
signal would have been promptly obeyed. 

There was none of this ill feeling going at that 
time, and Taylor was not the kind of officer to defy 
or neglect a command from his superior officer during 
the progress of a battle, on any such flimsy theory 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 293 


as he advanced to the President. And the writer Is 
of the opinion that ‘‘Fighting Bob” would not have 
done so either. 


CHAPTER LXVII 


PAUL JONES AND THE BATTLE OF THE LIMAN 

Efforts to deprive the commanding officer who was 
actually in the battle of the credit due the victor and 
give it to another who was “not in it” have occurred 
before. 

Buell, in his book “Paul Jones, the Founder of the 
American Navy,” gives the following instructive in- 
stance, in his account of the “Battle of the Liman,” 
between the Russians and the Turks, June 17, 1788. 

Paul Jones, who had been apointed by the Empress 
Catharine a rear admiral in the Russian Navy, was in 
actual command of the Russian fleet on that occasion. 
Field Marshal Potempkin (a military officer and one 
of Catharine’s personal favorites) was Jones’ superior 
officer, and as such was in titular command, though 
not actually present. A great victory was secured by 
Jones, for which Potemkin at first endeavored to 
claim the credit. He suppressed Jones’ report, and 
endeavored to take the credit to himself. 

Buell (Vol. i. p. 196) in a note says: “Kolnitz, a 
harsh critic, but in the main well sustained by his au- 
thorities, says of this incident: 

“Potemkin was at first thought captivated by the 
idea Paul Jones had offered him, that of figuring as 
the vicarious hero of a great naval battle and victory. 
But on a second thought the Prince Marshal recon- 
sidered this ambition. It occurred to him that the 
hero of a naval battle must be on board a ship actually 
engaged in it, 

“On land battles could be won by a pseudo-com- 
mander, who might choose the distance of his person 
from the enemy. There is no limit to the rear of an 
army in battle, but there is no rear whatever on board 
a ship in battle/^ 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 295 


Mr. Ex-Secretary Long, in his book already re- 
ferred to, undertakes to settle this question of com- 
mand in Santiago affair, by saying: “Sampson was as 
much in command as Grant was at Chattanooga, 
although Grant’s generals were doing the actual fight- 
ing at Lookout Mountain, and Missionary [5/r] 
Ridge, where he could not possibly be.” 

Let us see about that. The perpetrator of such a 
parallel should be sure of the facts; and an examina- 
tion — which Mr. Long evidently did not make — 
of the facts of that battle will show that there is no 
parallel whatever between the two cases. General 
Grant had not gone off, out of controlling and com- 
municating distance of those generals, leaving them 
in their ordinary encampments and positions, after di- 
recting them to “disregard [his] movements,” as 
Sampson had. 

General Grant planned out the battle in all its main 
details, assigning all the parts to be played by each 
corps commander, and he then assumed a central posi- 
tion where he was in constant communication with the 
center and both flanks of his army. 

In Chapters XLili. and XLiv. of his “Memoirs,” 
the whole story of that battle is told by General Grant 
himself; and one who reads that story will not fail 
to see that, from the beginnig to the end of that three 
days’ contest, he had, and personally exercised, com- 
plete control of all the forces engaged. He tells how 
he prearranged the battle, and began it. Sherman, 
Thomas, Gordon Granger, Thomas J. Woods, 
Hooker, Howard, and a host of other generals were 
all assigned to their respective parts, and performed 
them under Grant’s eye; and he tells how he was 
there through the whole of it, directing modifications 
of his orders as emergencies arose. 

Of his own positions during the battle he says ( Vol. 
ii. p. 72) : “Thomas and I were on the top of 

Orchard Knob. Hooker’s advance now made our 


296 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


line [of battle] a continuous one. It was in full view, 
extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman 
had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of 
Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the 
Ridge, to the Chattanooga Valley; then along, paral- 
lel to the Ridge, a mile or more across the Valley, to 
the mouth of Chattanooga Creek; thence up the slope 
of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the palisade.” 

Again (p. 77) : “From the position I occupied I 

could see column after column of Bragg’s forces mov- 
ing against Sherman. Seeing the advance, repulse, 
and second advance of J. E. Smith, from the position 
I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to 
reinforce him.” Again (p. 80), speaking of Thomas 
J. Wood’s charge, he said: “I watched their pro- 

gress with Intense Interest.” And (p. 81). “While 
the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward. 
General Thomas, with staff. General Gordon 
Granger, commanding the corps making the assault, 
and myself and staf occupied Orchard Knob, from 
which the entire field could be observed. The moment 
the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel 
defenses I ordered General Granger to his command, 
and, mounting my horse, I rode to the front. General 
Thomas left about the same time.” And, at the close. 
General Grant says: *^The battle was fought as 

ordered.^^ 

The above extracts show that if ever a general was 
“in It,” Grant, on that occasion, was the man. But If 
he had gone off for any purpose out of possible com- 
munication with his army, without any expectation of 
a battle, and Bragg had made an attack; or — as 
Cervera did — had attempted a retreat from his posi- 
tions, the senior general left behind on the spot (It 
was Sherman) would have been In command, and 
entitled to the credit of whatever success had been 
secured; and held responsible for defeat or failure. 


CHAPTER LXVIII 


SCHLEY’s generosity towards SAMPSON 

Schley’s preliminary report, which Sampson re- 
turned to him, has already been given in full (ante 

pp. ) . 

A few days later Schley sent to Sampson a second 
report (A. 517), m which, in several places, expres- 
sions are used such as: “The great victory of the 

squadron under your command.” 

Among other things, Schley in that report said : “I 
congratulate you sincerely upon this great victory to 
the squadron under your command [this is a very 
equivocal sentence] ; and I am glad that I had an op- 
portunity to contribute in the least to a victory that 
seems big enough for all of us.” 

Concerning this report. Admiral Schley testified (I. 
1529) : “I felt that the victory, at that time, as I 
have said, was big enough for all; and I made this 
[report] out of generosity, and because I knew that if 
the New York had been present they would have 
done as good work as anybody else. I referred 
throughout this, to ‘your command’ and his appear- 
ance, and so on, in complimentary terms. That was 
the reason.” 

The writer may be pardoned in saying that, in his 
opinion, the commodore made a mistake in couching 
his second report in the equivocal language employed, 
which may be so read as to convey the impression that 
Admiral Schley therein states, that Admiral Sampson 
was in command. Sampson in his report says that 
he was “not in range of any of the heavier fighting 
ships,” — that is, he was not in the fight. Assertions 
that are contrary to the facts, however complimentary 
they may have been intended to be, carry no weight. 


298 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


A few days after the battle the newspapers from 
the United States containing the accounts of It 
reached the fleet. Many of these accounts, written by 
correspondents who had been ‘in it,” and had seen the 
whole of It, almost without exception printed Schley’s 
name In large head-lines, as the “Hero of the Battle.” 

Further influenced by his generous feelings, without 
suggestion or any other motive, Schley cabled (with- 
out Sampson’s knowledge) to the Navy Department 
the following: 

“Off Santiago de Cuba, 

July lo, 1898. 

Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. : 

“I feel some mortification that the newspaper 
accounts of July 6 have attributed the victory on July 
3 almost entirely to me. The victory was secured by 
the force under the command of the commander-in- 
chlef of naval force on N. A. Station, and to him the 
honor is due. The end of the line held by the Brook- 
lyn and Vixen was heavily assailed, and had the 
honor, with the Oregon^ being in the battle from the 
beginning to the end; and I do not for a moment 
doubt that proper credit will be given all persons and 
all ships in the official report of the combat. 

“Schley.” 

The commodore then wrote the following letter to 
Sampson : 

“U. S. Flagship Brooklyn,- 
Off Santiago, July 10, 1898. 

“My dear Admiral : 

“I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a cipher 
telegram which I sent to-day to the Secretary of the 
Navy, with a view to correcting the accounts in the 
newspapers of July 6, which attribute the victory of 
July 3 to me. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 299 


‘‘2. My official report indicates very clearly what 
my views are upon the subject, and I beg to say that, 
so long as I am serving under your orders, I shall do 
my duty loyally, fully, and without reserve. 

‘‘Very respectfully, 

“W. S. Schley, 
^^Commodore U. S. N. 


“Commander-in-Chief, 
“North Atlantic Fleet.” 


Concerning these two papers. Admiral Schley testi- 
fied (I. 1533) : ‘‘I took that letter, and that de- 

spatch, on board the New' York to Admiral Sampson. 
The admiral accepted it, and stated to me that he 
thought it was very generous on my part.” 

“Very generous,” it certainly was; and anyone 
familiar with the parts played by the two officers in 
that battle will agree with Admiral Sampson’s state- 
ment. It may well be doubted if there ever was such 
self-abnegation displayed, for the benefit of another, 
by any navy or military officer before that time. All 
Sampson’s supporters, from Secretary Long down, 
should have united in so accepting Schley’s action. 
But instead, the despatch was divorced from the letter 
(which was what the majority of the Court of In- 
quiry professed to think “unfair,” in the Hodgson 
matter), and was sent, by the Secretary of the Navy, 
to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. p. 135), to be considered 
“as a pertinent fact.” by that body, in secret session. 


CHAPTER LXIX 


SAMPSON’S CONDUCT TOWARDS SCHLEY 

On that same tenth day of July Admiral Sampson 
received from the Secretary of the Navy a despatch 
asking “if he had any recommendations regarding 
promotions of officers to make.” 

To this Sampson replied by cable (Ex. Doc. C. p. 
13. No. 36), making many such recommendations. 

Concerning Commodore Schley, he said: “I pre- 

fer leaving any question of reward for Commodore 
Schley to the department. Think his conduct during 
the time when Schley commanded the east [5/r] side 
of Cuba, which I assume is well known to the depart- 
ment, should be considered.” 

This last clause, beginning “Think his conduct.” 
etc., is geographically absurd, in so far as it speaks of 
Schley’s having commanded the “east side of Cuba.” 
If there is any east side of Cuba, it has not yet been 
discovered or placed on any map or chart. There is 
a little sneering insinuation in that last clause, that one 
would think Sampson, with his thanks given to Schley 
so shortly before, for the despatch and letter set forth 
in the last chapter, would not have made. He had 
never before criticised Schley’s conduct, either to 
him or to the Navy Department. 

On that same tenth of July Sampson signed and 
sent to the Secretary of the Navy a letter which was 
evidently intended (though not so worded) to be re- 
garded as confidential, (Ex. Doc. C. p. 135. No. 35) : 
It begins, “My dear Mr. Secretary.” 

In this letter, after recommending promotion for 
many other officers, he says (p. 136) : “With regard 
to Commodore Schley, I much prefer that the depart- 
ment should decide his case. I am unwilling to fully 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 301 


express my own opinion. His conduct when he first 
assumed command on the south coast [he gets his 
geography correct] of Cuba, I assume to be as well 
known to the department as to myself. If he had left 
his station off Santiago de Cuba at that time, he 
would probably have been court-martialed, so plain 
was his duty. 

‘‘Were I alone in this opinion, I would certainly 
doubt my judgment; but, so far as I know, this opin- 
ion is confirmed by that of other commanding officers 
here, acquainted with the circumstances. 

“This represensible conduct I cannot separate from 
his other conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do 
him ample justice on this occasion.” 

The picture here presented, of the commander-in- 
chief listening to the opinions expressed by Commo- 
dore Schley’s subordinates in order to fortify, or per- 
haps form, his own, is most extraordinary, and is con- 
trary to all naval ideas of propriety and custom. 

It was a well-established rule of the service that a 
junior is never allowed to express opinions upon the 
conduct of his senior in the service. Thus, opinions 
that no naval court would have permitted appear to 
have been solicited (or at least permitted) by the 
commander-in-chief, and made use of by him to preju- 
dice the question of Schley’s promotion. 

On that same tenth of July a prominent officer of 
that squadron (whose statement imports absolute 
verity among his brother officers) went on board the 
flagship New York, and was ushered into the cabin of 
the admiral without formality. He found there 
Admiral Sampson and Captain Chadwick, the chief 
of staff ; and he heard Admiral Sampson say to Chad- 
wick: “There’s no use talking, Chadwick, I can’t, 

and I won’t, send any such letter as that about Com- 
modore Schley to the department. I would never be 
able to justify myself before my brother officers if I 
did.” Or words to that effect. 


302 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


What letter they were discussing the officer did not 
know, but the letter of which the above quotations 
form a part was the only letter relating to Commo- 
dore Schley that was sent that day; and the letter, 
whatever it was, must have been one prepared by the 
staff, without previous direction by the admiral, be- 
cause, if he had ordered it he would not have objected 
to it. 

In the judgment of the writer hereof, the letter 
bears internal evidence that Sampson never wrote the 
body of It. He was a very clear-headed writer, knew 
exactly what he meant, and how to express himself 
clearly. 


CHAPTER LXX 


THE navigators’ CHART OF THE BATTLE 

Two months after the battle, on September 2, 1898, 
Admiral Sampson convened a board of officers, com- 
posed of the navigators of the different ships that had 
participated, “to plot the positions of the ships of 
Admiral Cervera’s squadron and those of the United 
States’ fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago 
de Cuba.” 

The board took more than two months to perform 
the duty imposed upon it, and on October 8 made a 
report, which report, and accompanying chart, will be 
found in A. 593. 

The report says: “The board submits this report, 
with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as 
nearly correct as is possible so long after the engage- 
ment.” 

Before the Court of Inquiry this chart came early 
under review in the cross-examination of one of its 
makers. Commander Heilner. He testified (I. 
141): “I never signed that chart as correct.” 

Thereupon the assistant judge advocate said: “If the 
purpose of these inquiries is to show the incorrectness 
of that chart, we will save time by conceding it at 
once. We never supposed it to be correct.” 

Lieutenant Commander Wainwright (who was the 
senior member of board of navigators) testified (I. 
672-3) : “So far as I know, none of the members of 
the board was satisfied with all the positions. We 
did not consider them accurate positions. We were 
not satisfied with the positions as they were; but, in 
order to get all the navigators to sign, we took those 
as the probable positions. It was not the best we 
could do to satisfy any of us, it was the best we could 


304 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


do, under the circumstances, to get all the navigators 
to sign the report. I think none of the seven was sat- 
isfied, except the navigator of the Brooklyn, and I 
don’t know that he was. None of the navigators was 
satisfied ; nevertheless, all of them signed that 
report.” 

He was asked the question : 

Q. Then all signed a report putting the Brooklyn 
at a certain position, and the Texas at a certain posi- 
tion on that chart; and yet there was not a man of 
them who was satisfied with the position they plotted? 

A. That is correct as far as I know. I doubt very 
much If Mr. Schuetze, the navigator of the Iowa, 
was satisfied with any of the positions of the Iowa (I. 
676). 

Lieutenant Scheutze testified (I. 778) : pro- 

tested against signing the report, as being inaccurate; 
but I was finally persuaded, principally by Lieutenant- 
Commander Walnwright, the senior member of the 
board, that that was the best we could do, even if we 
stayed there until doomsday, and that I had better 
sign It; and I signed It under protest. Measured with 
reference to the time stated In the report, she [^lowa^ 
Is making there 16 or 18 knots. In my opinion she 
made about 9^ to 10 knots. 

Every officer signing that report, whose evidence 
could be had, stigmatized that chart as Incorrect and 
unsatisfactory to all the signers. It well merited what 
Mr. Rayner said of It, In his argument: 

“Now, this navigators’ chart is a most wonderful 
thing. It Is a thing of joy forever. It Is like the 
obliterated epitaph on an antiquated tombstone. Here 
are half a dozen navigators, who meet together for 
the purpose of giving to the country a chart of the 
Battle of Santiago; and, after two months of unceas- 
ing toil and unremitting labor, they compose a chart 
which might as well be a chart of the Battle of Salamis 


^ Her captain, Evans, stated her speed as 9^ knots. (I. 384.) 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 305 


or the Battle of Thermopylae, or of the field of 
Waterloo. It appears that every navigator was try- 
ing to put his ship in a different position from where 
his ship really was. 

“They were all trying to compose a chart that did 
not represent the situation at all ; and, as a disgrace- 
ful failure, this chart is undoubtedly a magnificent 
success.” 

The Navy Department has never withdrawn that 
chart, — which it knows to be a chart that has been 
pronounced by its makers to be totally inaccurate and 
wrong, — and the ex-Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John 
D. Long, knowing its false character, and that it had 
been repudiated by the officers who made it as false^ 
has since reprinted it in his book; and, so far as he 
thereby can, has sent it down to the future as correct 
and true. 

Mr. Long may think it to be in the interest of truth 
and fair history to send down to posterity a false chart 
of that great battle, but honorable minds will not so 
regard it. If anyone were to put before a club as true, 
a plan or statement that he knew to be false, there can 
be no doubt that the club would promptly and prop- 
erly expel him, as having been guilty of a dishonor- 
able act. 


20 


CHAPTER LXXI 


THE ALLEGED CONTROVERSY WITH LIEUTENANT 

HODGSON DURING THE BATTLE 

In its effort to find something which might throw dis- 
credit upon Admiral Schley, the judge advocate, 
under instructions of the Navy Department, formu- 
lated the Tenth Article of the Precept, as follows: 
“loth. — The circumstances leading to, and the in- 
cidents and results of, a controversy with Lieutenant 
Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. Navy, who, on July 3d, 
1898, during the Battle of Santiago, was Navigator 
of the Brooklyn; also the colloquy at that time be- 
tween Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson; 
and the ensuing correspondence between them on the 
subject; and the propriety of the conduct of Com- 
modore Schley in the premises.” 

In this article, as in all others, the Precept assumes 
that there had been a controversy and a colloquy; and 
does not leave it to the court to find as to the fact. 

The basis of that Article 10 was the following: 
The New York Sun having printed an offensive edi- 
torial relative to a colloquy alleged (on the authority 
of Lieutenant Hodgson, as it asserted) to have oc- 
curred between the two officers during the height of 
the battle, about or immediately before the turn of 
the Brooklyn was made. Admiral Schley wrote to 
Lieutenant Hodgson as follows (I. 589) : 

“Washington, June 6, 1899. 

“Dear Hodgson: 

“I enclose you an editorial of the New York Sun^ 
and would ask you to write me your denial of this 
oft-repeated calumny. 

“I know full well that you never made any such 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 307 


authorization of this grotesque lie, but I desire to 
place you in a proper position before the country, as 
well as myself. This vicious and malignant vitupera- 
tion ought to cease, and, in justice to you and myself, 

I think something authoritative ought to be said. 

“Very sincerely yours, 

“W. S. Schley.” 

It is not worth while copying the Siin^ s editorial. 
After reading it. Lieutenant Hodgson replied to Com- 
modore Schley, on June 8, 1899, by a long letter full 
of vituperation of persons not named, concerning cer- 
tain statements relative to the turn of the Brooklyn, 
in the battle of July 3, 1898, alleged to have been 
made or Insinuated. As to the statement, Hodgson 
said: “You can Imagine that no one would acknowl- 

edge the paternity of such a bastard.” 

He further said: “Mr. Dieuwaide [the Sun^s re- 

porter] came to visit me some days ago, about the 
conversation quoted as having taken place, and he 
wished to know from me if it was correct. I told him 
that to the best of my recollection it was substantially 
correct, though garbled and incomplete ; but that the 
inference the Sun wished to have drawn from It, and 
the stand his paper had taken, was damnably and In- 
famously false. 

“I do not believe that anyone whose opinion is at 
all worth considering, will be at all Influenced by the 
scurrilous and Infamous lies that appear from time to 
time in the Sun; but I am willing to do anything in 
my power, that may be agreeable to you, that will 
cause the editor of this paper to be shown up as an 
unprincipled blackguard.” 

This was pretty strong language, and the admiral 
thought that letter hardly the thing to publish ; and 
so, on June 10, wrote again to Hodgson, saying, 
among other things (I. 594) : “The Sun^s effort has 
been to promote the notion that you and I had a con- 


3o8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


troversy at a critical moment; and this is unjust to 
you, and to me. What I desire is simply your denial 
to me that any such colloquy occurred. 

“There is much in your letter that I should not like 
to use, as it would provoke an assault upon you, 
which I am unwilling should happen; and what I 
want to show is simply that this dialogue did not 
occur; and that shown, the whole flimsy canard falls 
to the ground. Make your letter as short as 
possible.” 

To this Hodgson replied (I. 595) : 

“June ii, 1899. 

“Dear Admiral Schley: 

“The colloquy published in the Sun, and alleged 
to have taken place between you and me on the day of 
the battle of Santiago de Cuba, never occurred. I re- 
turn, herewith, the newspaper clipping containing the 
colloquy referred to. 

“Very respectfully, 

“A. C. Hodgson, 

^^Lieut, CommdWJ^ 

The reported colloquy, alleged to have taken place 
between the commodore and his navigator in the heat 
of the battle, set forth in the clipping returned, as 
stated by Hodgson, was as follows (I. 594) : 

Schley. Hard-a-port. 

Hodgson. You mean starboard. 

Schley. No, I don’t. We are near enough to 
them [the Spaniards] already. 

Hodgson. But we will cut down the Texas, 

Schley. Damn the Texas! Let her look out for 
herself. 

Hodgson enclosed that letter and clipping in the 
same envelope with another, of which follows a copy 

(I- 5.95) : 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 309 


“June ii, 1899. 

“Dear Admiral Schley: 

“I send you, herewith, a categorical denial of the 
colloquy published in the New York Sun, for such use 
as you may desire. 

“From my last letter you will gather my recollec- 
tion of what occurred the day of the battle regarding 
the turn. I wish you to have a clear idea of what I 
told the Sun reporter the day he came to see me ; and 
what grounds the Sun had for publishing the editorial 
of June 1st. The reporter asked me if there was any 
foundation for the article as published in the Sun, I 
told him that I could not recollect exactly what was 
said, but that he had published a very garbled and 
misleading account of whatever might have happened ; 
for, of course, I had never answered you in any such 
manner as had appeared in print; nor had there been 
any argument or difference between us, the very idea 
of which was absurd. 

“I told him that, when the turn was to be made, I 
had suggested the proximity of the Texas; and the 
probable danger of getting mixed up with her, if we 
turned to starboard; and you said the Texas would 
have to look out for herself. This is all the grounds 
the Sun has for saying that I am authority for that 
printed colloquy as being absolutely correct. I write 
you this, so that you may know just what I have said 
to anyone connected with a paper. As I wrote in my 
last letter, I have frequently explained on other 
grounds than interfering with the fire of our fleet; but 
not since I knew that you had given that reason. I 
trust this will be satisfactory, but still hold myself in 
readiness to do anything in my power that you may 
desire. • 

“Very respectfully and sincerely, 

“A. C. Hodgson.” 

To this Admiral Schley replied: 


I 


310 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


“June 12, 1899. 

“Dear Hodgson: 

“Thank you for your prompt answer, relating to 
the colloquy. Your statement that it never occurred 
is absolutely true, for you are too good an officer and 
too gallant a man to have committed the impropriety 
charged in the New York Sun/^ 

Schley then published the categorical denial, as was 
evidently intended, and permitted by that clause of 
the last letter from Hodgson, which says: “I send 

you a categorical denial, for such use as you may de- 
sire.” Publication of the denial was what it was 
asked for and given, and it is plain that Hodgson did 
not expect, or intend, and certainly did not ask, that 
both letters should be published. That was clearly 
an afterthought. 

On the very day on which Admiral Schley’s ac- 
knowledgment of the categorical denial was sent to 
Hodgson (July 12), the Navy Department ordered 
Hodgson to appear before Captain French E. Chad- 
wick, at Boston (I. 627), in relation to this matter. 
He so appeared, and made a statement, which he and 
Chadwick signed, as follows : 

“U. S. S. ‘New York/ 

“Boston, June 17, 1899. 

“Sir: I have to report the following as the state- 

ment of Lieutenant Commander Hodgson of the 
conversation between Rear Admiral Schley and him- 
self during the action of July 3, 1898. 

“He states as follows: ‘As we were approaching 

the Spanish ships I heard Admiral Schley say “Port,” 
or “Starboard,” several times to Captain Cook in the 
conning tower. I had been on the bridge above, and 
was just coming down to report the positions of the 
ships, when I heard the admiral say, “Hard-a-port.” 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 31 1 


The Maria Teresa was then hauling abaft our port 
beam. The Brooklyn was heading about northeast. 

“ ‘I told the admiral, or at least suggested to him, 
that the Texas was very close on our starboard hand, 
and that turning to starboard would bring us too close 
to her. I don’t know that I used the word “collision.” 
I did not say: “You mean starboard.” I intended 

him to understand there was danger of running into 
the Texas. He said: “All right; the Texas must 

look out for that,” or words to that effect; I cannot 
repeat verbatim. 

“ ‘When I knew he was going to turn to starboard, 
I suggested backing the starboard engine, in order to 
make a smaller circle, and give the Texas a wider 
berth; but he decided against that as decreasing the 
speed of the turn. 

“ ‘He did not say, that I know of, “We are near 
enough to them [the Spaniards] already.” The only 
thing I gathered from what he said was that, if he 
turned to port, we should get so close that we would 
expose ourselves to torpedo attack. I supposed he 
meant torpedo boats, and replied to him that I had 
not seen them.’ 

“Lieutenant Commander Hodgson states that he 
did not intend to convey, in his note of denial sent at 
request of Admiral Schley, and published in the 
Washington Post^ the idea that no such colloquy took 
place. 

“He states, regarding this, as follows: ‘Admiral 

Schley wrote me, enclosing an article from the New 
York Siin (of June i) asking me to write a denial of 
what he phrased as “an oft-repeated calumny.” He 
said he had no recollection of any such conversation. 
I wrote a lengthy letter of explanation, giving my 
recollection of the conversation as nearly as possible. 

“ ‘Admiral Schley wrote me saying, “There is 
much in your letter that I should not like to use, as it 
would provoke assault upon you, which I would not 


312 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


like to happen. What I want to show is that the dia- 
logue did not occur.” 

“ ‘I then wrote a denial of the colloquy, certainly 
not intending to say [but that is exactly what he did 
say] that no such colloquy occurred; but that it did 
not occur as printed. I at the same time sent with this 
an explanatory letter, explaining to Admiral Schley 
that the letter of denial was a denial of the dialogue 
as it appeared in the Sun; and that I had told the 
Sun correspondent that the substance of the conver- 
sation was correct. In writing the letter I wished to 
refute the fact of any controversy existing at a critical 
stage of the battle. It (the letter) was a denial of the 
words as they stood in the published article; a denial 
of their literal correctness, and not a denial of the sub- 
stantial correctness of the statement.’ 

‘‘Lieutenant Commander Hodgson appends his sig- 
nature as a voucher for the accuracy with which the 
foregoing is given. 

“Very respectfully, 

“F. E. Chadwick, 

^^Captain U. S. Navy, 
“A. C. Hodgson, 

^^Lieut, Comdr., U, S. N. 
“To THE Secretary of the Navy.” 


The alleged Colloquy, and what Hodgson has said 
about it at different times, will now be stated in par- 
allel columns. 


THE ALLEGED COLLOQUY 
I. Schley. Hard-a-port. 


2. Hodgson. You mean star- 
board. 


3. Schley. No, I don’t. We 
are too near them already. 


HODGSON’S statement 

1. Before the court: “He either 

said ‘Hard-a-port,’ or ‘Is 
your helm hard-a-port?’ ” 

2. Before Chadwick (I. 625) : 

“I did not say ‘You mean 
starboard.’ ” 

2. Before the court (I. 625) : “I 

did not say, ‘You mean 
starboard.’ ” 

3. Before Chadwick (I. 626) : 

“He did not say, that I 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 313 


4. Hodgson. But we will cut 
down the Texas. 


5. Schley. Damn the Texas! 
let her look out for herself. 


1 


know of: ‘We are near 

enough to them already.’ ” 

Before the court (I. 624) : “I 
never said that he said: 
‘We are near enough to 
them already.’ I did not 
tell the Sun man that Ad- 
miral Schley had ever said: 
‘We are too close to the 
Spaniards.’ I never told 
him that. That’s not true 
either. We never had such 
a colloquy as that.” 

4. Before the court (I. 624) : “I 

never said, ‘We will cut 
down the Texas/ I never 
said that.” 

Before Chadwick (I. 627) : 
“I don’t know that I used 
the word ‘collision.’ ” 

5. Before Chadwick (I. 627) : 

“I intended him to under- 
stand that there was danger 
of running into the Texas. 
He said: ‘All right; the 

Texas must lookout for 
herself,’ or words to that 
effect. I cannot repeat 
verbatim.” 

Before the court (I. 626) : “I 
did not tell the Sun man 
that the admiral had said 
‘Damn the Texas/ Prob- 
ably I never mentioned 
‘Damn the Texas/ in any of 
my letters.” 

To Schley (I. 626) : “I told 
Dieuwaide [the Sun's re- 
porter] (I. 595) that I 

could not recollect exactly 
what was said. That you 
[Schley] had said, ‘The 
Texas would have to look 
out for herself.’ ” 


That Interview between the Sun^ s reporter and 
Hodgson was In June, 1899, at which time he said, to 
Dieuwaide, that he “couldn’t recollect exactly what 
was said”; and to Chadwick: “I cannot repeat ver- 
batim.” And yet, more than two years later, and 


3 14 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


three years and more after the battle, he could come 
before the court and repeat ‘Verbatim” (I. 571) the 
language alleged to have been used by Schley, as: 
“Damn the Texas! She must look out for herself,” 
or words to that effect. “He [the Texas'] will take 
care of that,” and he said, “I don’t propose to go in 
any closer and subject myself to torpedo attack.” 
Fair-minded people will be, as they ought to be, 
very doubtful as to placing reliance upon such a 
memory as that. 

Hodgson’s alleged grievance was that the admiral 
did not publish both of those letters of June 1 1 , 1899. 
If Hodgson had intended that, he should have written 
the “categorical denial,” and the explanation of it, in 
the same letter; or have written Schley that both 
letters (or neither) must be published. 

And if the ^^categorical deniaV^ mas not true^ he 
should not have written it. There can be no doubt 
about that, for no man has any right to put his name 
to an untruthful statement. 

Hodgson well said to the court, concerning his ad- 
missions and denials, and of the part he took In this 
whole business (I. 625) : “It was a little hair-split- 

ting that I [he] indulged In at this time”; or, as he 
also luminously said: “Admiral Schley understood 

me as denying the verbal accuracy of a dialogue 
which was a fictitious concoction of the Imagination of 
the editor of the Sun^ ‘or some of his reporters.’ ” 
This “fictitious concoction of the imagination of the 
editor of the Sun or of some of his reporters,” he, then 
to the court affirmed to be “a substantially correct 
statement.” 

The ordinary mind will be puzzled to understand 
how “a fictitious concoction of the editor’s imagina- 
tion” (and for which “concoction” he desired that the 
editor should be shown up “as an unprincipled black- 
guard”) could possibly be “substantially correct.” 
The majority of the court found, as a fact, that: 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 315 


“About the time the Brooklyn began her turn to star- 
board a conversation regarding the proximity of the 
Texas took place between Commodore Schley and 
Lieutenant Hodgson.’’ But the court does not say 
what the alleged conversation was, nor does it state 
that the alleged colloquy occurred. 

If Mr. Hodgson had thought that either Commo- 
dore Schley or Captain Cook did not see the Texas, 
or any other vessel whose proximity seemed to him 
(Hodgson) an element of possible danger, it was 
clearly his duty, as the navigator, to call their atten- 
tion to it. But there his duty ended. Captain Cook 
testified (I. 900) : “After the helm was put hard-a- 

port, he [Hodgson] came across to me, and said, 
‘Captain, do you see the Texas?^ As she was the 
nearest ship at that time, I was looking directly at her. 
Just about then, we were pretty well clear of her — I 
mean opening out her stern. I said, ‘Oh, yes’ and he 
told me that entirely satisfied him, and walked away.” 

Admiral Schley testified (I. 1388) : “During the 

turn Mr. Hodgson very properly made some allu- 
sion to ‘look out,’ perhaps for the Texas; I do not 
recollect what it was; but there was never any col- 
loquy betw^een us. First, He was too good an officer 
to have transgressed one of the plainest duties of an 
officer at that time; second, if he had undertaken it 
I would not have permitted it for a second. As I say, 
that is fiction; there was no colloquy.” 

To have done more than Captain Cook says he did 
would have been an impertinence on the part of Mr. 
Hodgson. He would never have ventured to in- 
struct either the commodore or captain. And if he 
had said to either what the alleged colloquy states, he 
would have got back a reply containing language 
more forcible and unforgettable than the impatient re- 
mark which he asserted that the commodore used in 
reference to the Texas, 

As to the question of whether there was a colloquy 


3i6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


or not, we have only the evidence of Lieutenant Com- 
mander Hodgson that it occurred. There is not a 
word of evidence to corroborate him, and he denied 
twice, — once in his letter to Schley, and again in the 
statement made, over his own signature, before Cap- 
tain Chadwick, — that it occurred. Admiral Schley 
says there never was any colloquy. So, without im- 
peaching the truthfulness of either, the proof that it 
occurred fails. Why should Hodgson — self-contra- 
dicting — be believed rather than Schley? There can 
be no pretense that Admiral Schley had any purpose 
to be unfair to Lieutenant Commander Hodgson. 

The author wishes to say that he believes Lieuten- 
ant Commander Hodgson to be an honorable man, 
but that his mind, from one cause or another, seems 
to have become (as a marine witness once, before a 
court martial, expressed it) ‘‘so obfusticated’’ as to 
that supposititious colloquy that, as is shown, his 
various statements were all contradictory. 

The most appropriate comment upon the whole 

matter is: ^^Parturiunt montes, nascetur redtcidus 

)> 


mus. 


CHAPTER LXXII 


THE COURT OF INQUIRY 

No such court of inquiry as that which passed upon 
this notable controversy was ever before held. As the 
author, in opening his argument before it, said: ‘‘I 

doubt if the naval history of the world presents, or 
ever has presented, a case of the important character 
of that in which we have so long been engaged. I 
doubt if a tribunal more exalted in the character of 
the officers who composed it has ever sat in judgment 
upon a brother officer’s acts. 

“I doubt if any man, with the lifelong character 
and standing and conduct of Admiral Schley, was 
ever before called upon to ask an investigation of his 
conduct as the victorious commander of a fleet. 
There never has been a case, so far as my knowledge 
and search into naval history has shown me, wherein 
the man who, without controversy, was completely 
victorious, and did his whole duty, has felt himself 
compelled to ask an inquiry as to that conduct, before 
his brother officers. I say ‘compelled’; not by the 
Navy Department; not by any charge made by any 
officer against him, — for no officer has had the 
temerity to say, over his own signature, a word 
against the conduct of Admiral Schley in the Battle of 
Santiago ; or in the conduct of the Flying Squadron. 
So, I say that the situation is exceptional, without a 
parallel in all naval history, in all its aspects. 

“There are no accusers here. There is nobody on 
trial. No charges have been preferred. And yet we 
cannot have failed to see, as we have progressed, that 
the case has been conducted as though Commodore 
Schley were on trial. We are compelled to consider 
the case In that aspect — as a trial.” 


3i8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


A large room In one of the buildings at the Navy 
Yard in the City of Washington was fitted for the 
sessions of the court. Ample accommodations for 
several hundred people were provided, and hardly a 
day passed that there were present fewer than three 
hundred well-dressed, Intelligent ladles and gentlemen 
from all parts of the country. Fully fifty, if not more, 
correspondents of the principal newspapers in all 
parts of the land were in attendance, and their re- 
ports were, with a few exceptions, fair and as full as 
could be expected ; and the great dallies printed 
almost verbatim report of the proceedings. 

The military clubs, not only in the United States 
and Canada, but in Europe, were kept fully informed 
of the progress of the inquiry; and the foreign club- 
men (accustomed, as they had been, to see their vic- 
torious commanders rewarded with the highest 
honors) looked on with “sad and wondering eyes” at 
the spectacle of the victor practically on trial for hav- 
ing secured that victory. It was “a spectacle to make 
the gods weep.” 

The acoustics were perfect; every word spoken by 
the Court, witnesses, and counsel could be distinctly 
heard by all, and the order among the spectators 
(which was most courteously maintained by Captain 
Henry W. Carpenter, of the Marine Corps, as ser- 
geant-at-arms, and his subordinates,) secured to 
everyone the greatest comfort attainable on such oc- 
casions. 

The audiences were largely drawn from Washing- 
ton and Baltimore, and almost entirely in sympathy 
with Admiral Schley, who was, from first to last, “the 
observed of all observers.” He, before the morn- 
ing sessions began, at recess, and after the adjourn- 
ments for the day, was compelled to hold a sort of 
levee, with scores of lovely women of all ages from 
“sweet sixteen” to old age, and distinguished men 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 319 


pressing to shake his hand and speak words of sympa- 
thetic kindness and respectful admiration. 

To maintain the solemn decorum of such a court 
was almost an Impossibility. The feeling was too In- 
tense, and applause was frequent, in spite of Dewey’s 
gavel, and warning against it. 

The court, as originally composed, consisted of the 
Admiral of the Navy, as president; and Rear Admi- 
rals Lewis A. Kimberly and Andrew E. K. Benham, 
members. Before it met. Rear Admiral Kimberly 
asked to be excused, on ccount of ill-health, and Rear 
Admiral Henry L. Howison was appointed In his 
place. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 
Captain Samuel C. Lemly, was appointed judge advo- 
cate, with Edwin P. Hanna, Esq., as his assistant. 

When the court met, on September 12, 1901, 
Admiral Schley introduced, as his counsel, Hon. Jere- 
miah M. Wilson, of Washington, D. C. ; Hon. Isador 
Rayner, the Attorney General of the State of Mary- 
land; and Captain James Parker (the author) of 
Perth Amboy, New Jersey. 

Admiral Schley, having objected to Rear Admiral 
Howison as a member, that officer was excused; and 
Rear Admiral Francis M. Ramsay was appointed in 
his stead. Admiral Schley had been serving abroad 
as commander-in-chief of the South Atlantic Squad- 
ron, and neither he nor either of his counsel knew that 
Rear Admiral Benham, as a member of a board, had 
already decided the important question of who was In 
actual command In the Battle of Santiago. If we had 
known that. Admiral Benham would have been ob- 
jected to as a member of the court, and would prob- 
ably have been excused. 

In the opinion of the writer, Benham, knowing that 
he had made up and officially stated his opinion as 
to that question, ought not to have served as a mem- 
ber of that court — without, at least. Informing Schley 
of that fact. 


320 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


There was a semi-tragical interruption of the course 
of proceedings, when, on the sixth day, the senior 
counsel, Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson, suddenly died, at 
his hotel. He was a lawyer of wide renown, and of 
the highest professional and personal character, and 
his death was a great shock and a great loss. In re- 
spect to his memory the court adjourned over the day 
of his funeral, and all attended in a body; the counsel 
being among the pall-bearers. 

For the information of non-professional readers, 
an explanation of the functions and methods of naval 
courts will not be inappropriate. 

A court of inquiry (as its name implies), is a tri- 
bunal of three officers, whose duty it is to examine into 
all the facts and circumstances connected with the 
matters referred to it; to bring out the whole truth 
without regard to the result as to anyone; to express 
its opinions upon the facts, if required by the Precept; 
and to recommend what, if anything, further should 
be done in the premises. 

Elicitation of the truth, and the whole truth, is its 
fundamental duty. 

Its findings are authenticated by the signature of 
the president and the judge advocate, but such signa- 
tures do not show that the president or any particular 
member concurs in such finding. A majority of the 
court determines all preliminary matters, such as 
questions of evidence and proceedings, arising during 
the investigation ; and the findings. 

Any of the members may dissent in writing, but it 
docs not follow that such member concurs merely be- 
cause he does not formally dissent; and no one has 
the right to assume that a finding is unanimous (as 
has been done in this case) merely because there is no 
such dissent. 

It is clearly the duty of the judge advocate to sum- 
mon before the court all who know, and can testify to, 
any of the facts bearing upon the matters to be in- 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 321 


quired into; and he has no right whatever to keep 
back anything pertinent to such inquiry; or fail to 
present any witness having knowledge of those facts. 

The judge advocate early announced (I. 25) : 
‘‘The conduct of Rear Admiral Schley is in question, 
not only at the Battle of Santiago, but in the whole 
Santiago campaign ; but I might as well say here that 
the question of Admiral Sampson’s conduct on those 
occasions is not before the court in any way.” 

A court martial, on the other hand, is a tribunal 
composed of not more than thirteen, or fewer than 
five officers, organized to try an officer or enlisted 
man, upon charges that have been preferred against 
him by proper authority; and to determine his guilt 
or innocence of those charges. All the members of 
the court are sworn to secrecy, and must sign the find- 
ings, whether they concur in them or not; and so it 
may happen that seven members out of the thirteen 
(except in cases involving the punishment of death, in 
which cases three-fourths must concur) may find a 
judgment, and the other six may not concur; but the 
finding will appear to have been unanimous. 

It soon became evident, from the methods of pro- 
ceedure adopted by the judge advocate, that the court, 
so far as he could control, was not to be a court of 
inquiry, but, in fact, a court martial. Instead of sum- 
moning all the witnesses who knew, or were supposed 
to know anything about the matters to be inquired 
into, in order that all the facts might be presented to 
the court, as it was his duty to do, only those witnesses, 
with a few exceptions, were summoned by the judge 
advocate who were known or believed to be unfavor- 
able to Admiral Schley, and who could be relied upon 
to discolor or conceal such facts as might be favorable 
to him. 

Such important and impartial officers and eye-wit- 
nesses as Captain Clark of the Oregon^ his navigator. 


21 


322 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Lieutenant (now Captain) Nicholson, Lieutenants 
Eberle and Ackerman, of that ship; and Lieutenant 
Harlow, of the Vixetij who had taken, from the bridge 
of that vessel, notes of all the incidents of the battle ; 
and all the officers of the Brooklyn, except Captain 
Cook, and Lieutenants Hodgson, her navigator, and 
Lieutenant Doyle, were left to be summoned by 
Admiral Schley. Lieutenant Doyle was subpoenaed 
only because the judge advocate hoped to be able to 
give a sinister appearance to an alteration which 
Doyle had made in the log-book of the Brooklyn, but 
which hope proved vain, for Doyle explained and 
showed it to be entirely innocent and proper. And it 
was not pretended that Admiral Schley had any 
knowledge of or connection with it. 

That log-book had been written by a man named 
Mason, who, having served out his enlistment as an 
apprentice, had gone Into business in Pittsburg. 
Lemly had him brought on from Pittsburg, and had 
carefully examined him with respect to that alteration. 
Mason produced to him a copy of the log as he had at 
first written It ; and made such explanations as showed 
Its exact character, and how the alteration came 
about; and, with full knowledge that the alteration 
was proper, Lemly sent Mason back to Pittsburg, 
with instructions to say nothing to anyone about the 
matter. Mason was, however, loyal to his old com- 
mander, and came over to Schley’s counsel, and told 
them what had occurred. We sent him back to 
Pittsburg, with the statement that he would be called 
If we should need him. We afterwards found It 
proper to summon him. 

This conduct on the part of the judge advocate was 
a plain effort to suppress evidence In the case, and, as 
everybody knows, the ^^supressio verV^ is more cul- 
pable, than the ^^suggestio falsi,^* and both are an 
effort to work a fraud. The former is manly and 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 323 


works in the light, the latter is cowardly and works in 
the dark. 

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson was no doubt 
expected by his testimony to give a sinister character 
to the ‘‘loop” or turn of the Brooklyn; but, if that 
was the hope, he proved a most undesirable witness 
to that end. After his testimony had been given, the 
judge advocate must have understood, better than he 
had ever done before, the disappointment of Balak, 
the son of Zipper, which brought forth his reproach 
to Balaam the son of Beor: “What hast thou done 
unto me? I took thee to curse mine enemies; and, be- 
hold, thou hast blessed them altogether.” 

As to that turn, Hodgson proved to be a first-class 
witness for Schley. 


CHAPTER LXXIII 


WHY DID SCHLEY ASK FOR A COURT OF INQUIRY? 

For more than three years Admiral Schley had been 
subjected to all sorts of malicious misrepresentation 
and Insinuation and had been viciously attacked by 
certain newspapers. But to all this he gave no heed 
until when, about July i, 1901, a highly respectable 
publishing house issued a third volume of a book (the 
first two volumes of which had been published some 
years before) entitled, “The History of the Navy,” 
by Edgar Stanton Maclay.^ 

The statements made in this third volume which 
extended the scope of the history so as to Include the 
war with Spain were of so defamatory a character, 
that the admiral felt impelled to address to the Navy 
Department a letter in which, after characterizing 
the statements of the book as they deserved, he said: 

“I have refrained heretofore from all comments 
upon the innuendoes of enemies muttered or mur- 
mured In secret, and therefore with safety to them- 
selves. I think the time has now come to take such 
action as may bring this entire matter under discussion 
under the clearer and calmer review of my brothers 
in arms; and, to this end, I ask such action at the 
hands of the department as it may deem best to accom- 
plish this purpose.” 

Maclay was an employee of the Government of the 
United States, and In the preface to this third volume 

^ It is proper to state that as soon as the publishers learned of 
the false character of Maclay's book, it was withdrawn from sale 
and suppressed as far as possible; and Maclay was, by order of 
the President of the United States, dismissed from the service of the 
Government, and the use of his third volume in the naval and mili- 
tary academies was prohibited by the Congress of the United 
States. 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 325 


he stated, in effect, that he had submitted the volume 
to several of the higher officers of the navy, and also 
to the Secretary of the Navy, and that what he had 
written met with their approbation. 

It will be observed that Admiral Schley asked that 
the department should ^^take such action as may bring 
this entire ^natter tinder clearer and calmer review 
of [his] brothers in arms!^ 

This certainly, as the admiral Intended and ex- 
pected, involved all who were connected with Schley 
in any way during the time that elapsed between May 
18, when the Flying Squadron, under Schley’s com- 
mand, came under the orders of Admiral Sampson, 
and the end of the Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898. 

The Navy Department, by Its Precept of July 26, 
1901, ordered a court of Inquiry; but instead of di- 
recting an investigation “of the whole matter,” con- 
fined the court to an investigation of the “conduct of 
said Schley during the recent war with Spain, and in 
connection with the events thereof”; and set forth 
ten specifications of matters to be investigated. 

One who reads that Precept cannot fail to see that 
the object which Judge Advocate Lemly, who drew 
it, had in view, was an indictment of Admiral Schley, 
to prove and sustain which every possible effort was 
to be directed. And this purpose was relentlessly 
pursued. 

When Schley, on July 27, wrote to the department, 
suggesting that Paragraph 5 of the Precept be 
modified so as to omit the department’s expression 
of opinion, and thus leave the court free to express 
Its own opinion in that matter, he was Informed that 
the “Precept treats certain matters as established, 
such as the fact that you disobeyed orders.” 

The paragraph which Admiral Schley wished 
omitted was as follows : 

“The circumstances attending and the reasons for 
the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the or- 


326 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


ders of the Department contained In Its dispatch 
dated May 25, 1898; and the propriety of his con- 
duct In the premises.” 

Here was a proposed Inquiry In which the question 
whether there had been a disobedience of orders was 
as much a matter of Inquiry as any other fact alleged 
or not. Whether there had been such disobedience of 
orders was not left to the court to say; It could only 
express opinion whether or not the commodore had 
“willfully disobeyed the orders, or was justified In 
disobeying them.” 

There were other assumptions of fact, just as flag- 
rantly wrong. In a matter of Inquiry. 


CHAPTER LXXIV 


CONCLUSION A CONTRAST 

In the foregoing pages I have endeavored to bear in 
mind the maxim: “Nothing extenuate, nor set 

down ought in malice.” 

I have given authority and document for every 
statement made, except those about what occurred 
in the cabin of the flagship New York, May 26 
(about Schley’s remaining off Cienfuegos), and 
again on July 10, in the interview between Sampson 
and his chief of staff (Chadwick), relative to the 
letter of Sampson about Commodore Schley. Au- 
thority for these, which will be indubitable, can be 
produced if circumstances require. 

The signal book of the flagship New' York (printed 
as an exhibit to the proceedings of the Court of In- 
quiry) shows that the following signals were made 
on the afternoon of July 3 by Commodore Schley to 
Admiral Sampson: 

“2 P. M. — ^We have gained a great victory. De- 
tails will be communicated.” 

To this the only reply was: “Report your casual- 
ties.” 

2.43 p. M. — “This is a great day for our country.” 

To this there was no reply. 

In the great Battle of St. Vincent (between the 
British fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jervis, 
and the Spanish fleet, under Admiral Don Jose de 
Cordova), Nelson, who was only a commodore, vio- 
lated and disregarded the order of battle that had 
been given by the admiral and was being executed 
by him, in plain view of the enemy. 

Nelson’s action resulted in a great success, in which 
he and Collingwood and others of the captains of 
Nelson’s division displayed great ability. 


328 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


Nelson, instead of tacking, wore ship, and thus 
“turned her stern towards the enemy, and increased 
her distance from the enemy by at least her tactical 
diameter,” whatever that was. But once about. Nel- 
son and his supporters attacked the head of the Span- 
ish fleet and destroyed it. Exactly as was done by 
the Brooklyn and Oregon, 

If someone in high station had been criticising 
Nelson’s action on that day, he would no doubt have 
said of the “loop” made by Nelson’s ship: “It 

seriously marred the Captain^ s otherwise excellent 
record; being in fact the one grave mistake made by 
any British ship that day.” 

But grim old Sir John Jervis took a different view, 
and acted differently. 

Mahan (p. 335) says: “He signalled to the 
lent [Collingsworth’s ship] to tack and follow Nel- 
son; and the Victory ^ Jervis’ flagship passed the 
Captain, Nelson’s flagship, and cheered, as did every 
ship in the fleet.” 

Brenton, the naval historian of the combat (Vol. 
I, p. 313) says: 

“When the firing ceased. Nelson went on board 
the flagship Victory , (He carried with him the 
sword of the Spanish rear admiral, which had been 
surrendered to him personally.) “He was received 
on the quarterdeck by the fine old admiral,” (a most 
unusual compliment, because admirals do not come 
out of their cabins to receive subordinates), “who 
took him in his arms, and said he could not suificiently 
thank him; and insisted that Nelson should keep the 
sword of the Spanish rear admiral which he had so 
bravely won.” 

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, our great naval his- 
torian writer and critic, in his “Life of Nelson” (p. 
340) says: “The commander-in-chief had come out 

to greet him upon the quarterdeck of the flagship — a 
compliment naval officers will appreciate — had there 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


329 


embraced him, saying he could not sufficiently thank 
him; and used every kind expression which could 
not fail to make me (he was quoting Nelson) happy.’’ 
Brenton further says: “That evening the captain 

of the Victory j Sir Robert Calder (Admiral Jervis’ 
chief of staff), suggested to the admiral that Nelson 
had rendered himself liable to a court. martial by his 
disobedience of the order of battle that day.” Con- 
cerning this incident Mahan says (p. 341) : 

“In the evening, while talking over the events of 
the day, Calder spoke of Nelson’s wearing out of the 
line as an authorized departure from the mode 
of attack prescribed by the admiral.” 

“ ‘It certainly was so,’ replied Jervis; ‘and if ever 
you commit such a breach of your orders, I will for- 
give you also.’ ” 

It is said that “comparisons are odious”; but con- 
trasts are instructive. 

All generous hearts will regret that the incident of 
Jervis’ treatment of Commodore Nelson was not — 
even in small measure — repeated between Admiral 
Sampson and Commodore Schley when the victorious 
commodore went on board the flagship New York 
after the Battle of Santiago with Cervera. No 
cheers from the New York were granted to him, as 
were given to Nelson and his gallant officers and men 
of the Captain by the Victory and the whole British 
fleet. 

The dramatis personae were all present: An ad- 

miral commanding; a gallant, victorious commodore; 
a Spanish fleet destroyed; a Spanish rear admiral’s 
sword; (even an envious chief of staff). Alas, that 
there should only have been lacking the generous 
spirit that swelled out of the heart of the “fine old 
British admiral” as he embraced and thanked Nelson 
that day, more than a hundred years ago, on the 
quarterdeck of the Victory^ on board of which Nelson 
was to die at Trafalgar some years later! 


330 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


It is a curious fact that Sir Robert Calder, who (as 
above related) undertook to criticise Nelson to Ad- 
miral Jervis, and had meanwhile been promoted to be 
vice admiral, should have been court-martialed, and 
deprived of his command of nineteen sail of the line, 
for a failure to avail himself, on June 22, 1,905, of a 
fine opportunity to destroy the combined French and 
Spanish fleets under Admiral Villeneuve, which Nel- 
son destroyed at Trafalgar four months later. 

If anyone wishes to read a touching story, let him 
read the “Calder incident,” as told by Captain 
Mahan, on pages 704-07 of the “Life of Nelson.” 
In reading the last mentioned book the writer has 
been much impressed by the similarity between Nel- 
son’s experiences, while in pursuit of the French fleet 
before the Battle of the Nile, and Schley’s experiences 
while in pursuit of Cervera’s fleet. Both were greatly 
hampered by lack of information as to the where- 
abouts of the enemy. Nelson sailed eastward to 
Alexandria, as Schley did to the neighborhood of 
Santiago de Cuba. Nelson learned at Alexandria 
that nothing had been seen or was known of the 
French, and Schley was similarly informed by the 
scouts off Santiago, as to Cervera’s fleet. 

Nelson, embarrassed by want of water and other 
supplies, sailed back to Syracuse, and then — after 
procuring them, still without knowledge of the where- 
abouts of the enemy — sailed away again to the east 
in pursuit; and, having found them in Aboukir Bay, 
destroyed them in the Battle of the Nile. 

Schley, troubled on account of his coal supply and 
lack of reliable information as to Cervera, started 
back to the westward; but, as soon as opportunity 
to coal his vessels offered, he availed himself of it, 
and promptly returned to Santiago de Cuba, and 
found Cervera’s fleet there. But before he could lay 
any plan to get at them, he received Sampson’s order 
to sink the collier Stirling in the narrow channel, but 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 331 


before he could do that (if he had wished to do so) 
Admiral Sampson arrived, assumed command, and 
sent Hobson to sink the Merrimac, 

I do not read that Nelson or Schley caused any ship 
to be sunk anywhere to keep the French (or Span- 
iards) in any port. Both were anxious only to get 
their enemy out. When he came out the same result 
followed, to wit, total destruction in both cases. 

It may be said that Schley is not a Nelson. He 
never had the opportunity to be; but the writer may 
be pardoned the opinion that he makes a very close 
second. 

Nelson never won a victory more complete and 
decisive than that won by Schley and his subordinate 
brother officers and men on that 3d day of July, 1898, 
over the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral 
Cervera. Every ship of the enemy and man and 
officer was captured or destroyed; and through it 
crumbled into dust and destruction the power of 
Spain, which, for more than four hundred years, had 
dominated and oppressed so much of this hemisphere. 

The personal attacks upon Commodore Schley be- 
gan by the publication of a letter in Harper^ s Weekly, 
about ten days after the great victory had been won. 
This letter was without signature — anonymous — but 
the Weekly vouched for the high character of the 
writer. (“High character” of a man who sneaks be- 
hind an alias! Ugh!) That writer, like all others 
who have made insinuations against the admiral, has 
remained in the darkness, has never stepped into the 
light, and probably never will. 

The author hereof had been the personal friend 
of Commodore Schley ever since during the Civil 
War, and wrote to him, congratulating him upon the 
part he had been able to play in the great battle, and 
assuring him that he need have no fear that his coun- 
trymen would fail to give him the credit that was his 
just due. 


332 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 


In reply the Commodore wrote the letter which fol- 
lows, and by which this review can, most appro- 
priately, be closed. 


“Flagship Brooklyn, 

“Off Santiago de Cuba, 

“July 20, 1898. 

“Dear Parker: 

“Thank you for your letter. I have felt that the 
marvelous victory of July 3d was the joint product 
of all who were engaged; and I felt no wish to appro- 
priate the congratulations to myself. The Brooklyn's 
luck was to be in that part of the line where the 
assault was first felt; and, afterwards, by her speed 
and direction to continue in the scrap for some three 
hours and a half to the finish. The victory was so 
unique in completeness, and so marvelous in its glory, 
as to be large enough for all who participated. I 
feel no sympathy with the wish expressed to exclude 
anyone; and if I had announced the victory, I should 
carefully have noted all whose prominence of action 
had helped. I think that omission was a mistake 
which has created some thoughtless expressions; and 
I hope no friend of mine will keep this matter alive, 
while the facts, coldly recited, are sufficient. Thank- 
ing you again, my dear friend 

“I am, very sincerely yours, 

“W. S. Schley.” 

The letter shows no erasures or interlineations. 
It evidently was not written and copied, because it 
lacks capitals, and is somewhat tautological, in the 
repetition of the word “victory,” instead of using the 
pronoun. 

The* envelope was marked “Personal,” and the 
letter was not written for publication, but solely for 
my own eye. The sentiments expressed are just what 


SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 333 


flowed spontaneously out of the commodore’s heart, 
through the nib of his pen, on to the white page; 
his words exactly expressed his feelings and convic- 
tions only twenty days after the battle; and that, too, 
after the anonymous and venemous attacks upon him 
had begun. 

From the spirit of that letter Commodore Schley 
has never deviated, and never will deviate, so long 
as he lives to be the frank-hearted and generous 
sailor he has always been. 

James Parker. 

Perth Amboy, New Jersey, 

November i, 1909. 


311 . 77-2 













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